PATRICIO CERON AND LINDA CERON, APPELLANTS,
v.
PAXTON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
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This case concerns whether a "tow truck" falls under the definition of "automobile" in an insurance policy's exclusionary clause. The appellate court reversed the trial court's summary judgment, finding that a tow truck is likely not an automobile and any ambiguity in the policy should be construed against the insurer.
The court held that a "tow truck" is likely not encompassed by the term "automobile" as used in the exclusionary clause. Furthermore, any ambiguity in the exclusionary provision must be construed against the insurance company.
[1] Exclusionary clauses in an insurance policy are strictly construed against the insurer.
[2] The term "automobile" in an insurance policy may not encompass a commercial vehicle such as a tow truck.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Generally exclusionary clauses in an insurance policy are construed strictly against the issuer of the policy.”
Establishes a fundamental rule of insurance policy interpretation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Cérons sought coverage under a policy issued by Paxton National Insurance Company for damages related to a tow truck. The insurance company denied…
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PER CURIAM.
Generally exclusionary clauses in an insurance policy are construed strictly against the issuer of the policy. National Automobile Insurance Association v. Brumit, 98 So. 2d 830 (Fla.1957); United States Sugar Corporation v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 475 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Tropical Park, Inc. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 357 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation, Ltd. v. Kellin, 391 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); George v. Stone, 260 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). The exclusionary clause involved in the instant case reads as follows:
“This insurance does not apply:
(b) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of (1) any automobile or aircraft owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any Insured, or (2) any other automobile or aircraft operated by any person in the course of his employment by any Insured:
but this exclusion does not apply to the parking of an automobile on premises owned by, rented to or controlled by the named insured or the ways immediately adjoining, if such automobile is not owned by or rented or loaned to any Insured;”
The trial court, in entering a summary judgment for the insurance company, held as a matter of law that a “tow truck” was within the terms of this exclusionary clause. We disagree. It does not appear that the term “automobile” will encompass a commercial vehicle, such as a “tow truck”, and second, if there is any ambiguity in the policy as to the particular exclusionary provision, ambiguity is construed against the company. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. Vordermeier, 415 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Collins v. Royal Globe Insurance Company, 368 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Phelps, 294 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Therefore, the summary judgment under review is hereby reversed and the matter returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Petersen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 615 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…uity in an insurance policy concerning an exclusionary provision, the ambiguity is construed against the issuer of the policy. National Automobile Insurance Association v. Brumit, 98 So. 2d 330 (Fla.1957). Ceron v. Paxton National Insurance Company, 537 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 545 So. 2d 1368 (Fla.1989). Here, an ambiguity arises concerning the term “motor vehicle” as used in the “uninsured motorist” section. It is unclear whether the term was intended to mean a vehicle with four or more whee…
Authorities Cited
- Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n OF Hollywood v. Doppelt Indus. OF Miami, Inc., 357 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Norwood M. Phelps, 294 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Kellin, 391 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Tanner v. Tanner, 391 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Collins v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Vordermeier, 415 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Ernst & Ernst v. Reedus, 260 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Prather v. Republic Airlines, 475 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Junus A. Hall v. State, 475 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)