CONNER BRYSON, APPELLANT,
v.
M. A. BRIDGES, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Conner Bryson appealed a decree canceling a deed to property in Live Oak, Florida that he had obtained from M. A. Bridges. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the cancellation, finding that Bridges proved fraud in the procurement of the deed through either lack of valid delivery or active and passive deception by Bryson.
The decree canceling the deed was correct. The court found sufficient evidence of fraud either on the theory that there was no valid delivery of the deed as a voluntary surrender by the grantor, or on the theory that Bryson practiced sufficient deception, both active and passive, to entitle Bridges to relief.
“Our reading of the evidence, which has been carefully studied, leads us to the conclusion that the decree was correct, either upon the theory that there was no delivery of the deed in the sense of a voluntary surrender by the grantor, or upon the theory that there was such deception practiced both actively and passively by the would be grantee as to entitle the complainant to relief.”
States the court's holding that the decree canceling the deed was proper under either of two alternative theories of fraud.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceM. A. Bridges filed a bill to cancel a deed to a lot in Bryson's addition to Live Oak that she had conveyed to Conner Bryson. Bridges alleged the deed…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Cancellation Of Deed cases and more on FLexlaw
Cockrell, J.
The appellee as complainant filed her bill to cancel a deed to a certain lot in Bryson’s addition to Live Oak, upon the ground of fraud in the procurement thereof by Conner Bryson. No questions of law are raised but the apellant relies solely and wholly upon the weight of the evidence which he asserts is insufficient to overcome the effects of the sworn answer,, and that therefore the decree of cancellation was error. Our reading of the evidence, which has been carefully studied, leads us to the conclusion that the decree was correct, either upon the theory that there was no delivery of the deed in the sense of a voluntary surrender by the grantor, or upon the theory that there was such deception practiced both actively and passively by the would be grantee as to entitle the complainant to relief. It is not thought necessary to detail the evidence. Mrs. Bridges is fortified and corroborated by other witnesses in every substantial allegation of the bill and her testimony bears the ear marks of truth, while that of the defendant is impeached by his own contradictions and evasions and by the mouths of others. The haste on his part to get the deed and have it recorded, and utter indifference thereafter to remedy a description only too clearly disclosed, as also the promptness with which the complainant sought her legal remedy are noteworthy. We are not dealing with a case of a mere failure to fulfill a promise but a deception as to an existing fact, and the citations for appellant do not apply.
The decree is manifestly correct and will be affirmed.
Shackleford, C. J., and Whitfield, J., concur. Taylor, Hocker and Parkhill, JJ., concur in the opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Icie Lee Nowling McCOY v. Love, 382 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1979)…the deed was void, then no legal title passed to the grantee. If the deed was only voidable in equity, then the equitable defenses of laches and of a bona fide purchaser are available. See Holley v. May, 75 So. 2d 696 (Fla.1954); Bryson v. Bridges, 51 Fla. 395, 41 So. 28 (1906). A bona fide purchaser has the right to rely on the record title of his grant- or, but this protection extends only to those purchasing a legal title. Myers v. Van Buskirk, 96 Fla. 704, 119 So. 123 (1928). The recording of a void…