GLENDA WORLEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS LEGAL GUARDIAN OF DANA SHEFFIELD AND ANTHONY SHEFFIELD, MINORS, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSEPH SHEFFIELD AND WIFE, MARY SHEFFIELD; BEN HARRIS AND WIFE, MAE HARRIS; AND LANCE GILBERT SHEFFIELD, APPELLEES
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment ruling because the defendants' motion for summary judgment failed to comply with Rule 1.510(c) by not stating with particularity the grounds and substantial matters of law to be argued. The court held that even though the plaintiff was given time to respond, this did not cure the procedural defect of inadequate notice.
The court held that the motion for summary judgment was insufficient because it did not comply with Rule 1.510(c)'s requirement to state with particularity the grounds and substantial matters of law. The procedural defect cannot be cured by allowing the non-moving party to file a response, as this does not provide adequate notice of the issues to be argued.
[1] A motion for summary judgment must state with particularity the grounds upon which it is based and the substantial matters of law to be argued.
[2] A general motion for summary judgment stating only that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rule 1.510(c) states that the motion for summary judgment "shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is based and the substantial matters of law to be argued and shall be served at least twenty days before the time fixed for the hearing."”
Establishes the procedural requirement that the defendants' motion violated.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGlenda Worley filed a three-count complaint individually and as legal guardian of her two minor children against Joseph and Mary Sheffield, Ben and Ma…
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
Appellant filed a three-count complaint individually and as legal guardian of her two children stating actions to quiet title to real property, to cancel a deed to real property, and for violation of a constructive trust. After responding to the complaint, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment which simply stated generally that, “[Tjhere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law.” Appellant filed a motion to strike the motion for summary judgment on the basis that it did not meet the barest requirements of rule 1.510(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court entered an order holding in abeyance the disposition of the motion for summary judgment until appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to it. However, following appellant’s filing of her verified response to said order, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment since the motion did not conform to the rule. We agree and reverse.
Rule 1.510(c) states that the motion for summary judgment “shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is based and the substantial matters of law to be argued and shall be served at least twenty days before the time fixed for the hearing.” In the instant case, the motion filed by appellees did not meet the barest requirements of rule 1.510(c) as it did not state with particularity the grounds upon which it was based. “Such a motion is insufficient to place the non-moving party on notice of the issues of fact or law which will be argued at the hearing.” Locke v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 509 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Finn v. Lee County, 479 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
Although appellees contend that appellant was not prejudiced since she was given fifteen days within which to present a memorandum or affidavit in opposition to the motion and said response was considered by the court before rendering its decision, we suggest that that is not sufficient to cure the defect. If one were to argue that appellant was placed on notice at the time she filed her response to the motion, that response was filed within thirteen days of the entry of the final order of summary judgment and gave her at best only thirteen days’ notice of the substantial matters of law intended to be argued. Under similar circumstances, the court in Finn believed that the granting of the motion was erroneous due to lack of notice.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
WENTWORTH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
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GF Co. v. First Nat'l Bank OF the Fla. Keys, 625 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…PER CURIAM. There being triable issues of material fact, it was error for the trial court to enter a summary judgment. Worley v. Sheffield, 538 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1st DCA1989); Locke v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 509 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA1987); City of Brooksville v. Hernando County, 424 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 5th DCA1982). Therefore, the summary judgment under review is reversed and the matter is…
Authorities Cited
- In re Leola Olive v. State, 509 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Cecil E. Locke and his Wife v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Gaynor v. State, 479 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Finn v. LEE Cnty., 479 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)