THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
NORMAN EADY, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed a suppression order and the court reversed, holding that a traffic stop for speeding was justified by reasonable suspicion despite the officer's lack of certainty about exceeding the speed limit. The court reinstated evidence of a concealed firearm discovered during the stop.
The court held that the traffic stop was justified. Only a simple founded or reasonable suspicion of a violation based on the officer's visual or aural perception is necessary to support a police stop, not probable cause or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The officer's observations of high speed, tire screeching, and passing gear kicking in fully and objectively supported reasonable suspicion of a speeding violation.
[1] A police officer's observation of a vehicle proceeding at a high rate of speed, accompanied by the sound of screeching tires and a passing gear, establishes a reasonable…
[2] A traffic stop is justified by a founded or reasonable suspicion of a violation, not requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt or probable cause.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is no question that neither proof beyond a reasonable doubt so as to justify a conviction nor even probable cause to believe that a traffic offense has been committed is required to support a police stop on that basis. Instead, only a simple "founded" or "reasonable" suspicion of a violation based on the officer's visual or aural perception is necessary.”
Establishes the legal standard for traffic stops—reasonable suspicion is sufficient, not probable cause or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Gatterello observed a vehicle proceeding at a high rate of speed, hearing tire screeching and a passing gear kicking in. After the car passed …
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The state appeals from and we reverse an order suppressing the weapon involved in a prosecution for carrying a concealed firearm on the ground that the traffic stop for speeding which led to its discovery was unjustified.
Officer Gatterello of the Miami Police Department was on routine patrol in his cruiser in the mixed commercial-residential northwest section of the city when he saw a vehicle proceeding at what he described as “a high rate of speed” and “heard a tire screeching and like a passing gear kicking in.” After the car passed him and continued to speed up, Gatterello pulled it over. A computer check revealed that the operator, the appellee Eady, was driving with a suspended license and had an open bench warrant. After the officer arrested Eady on these grounds, a concededly valid search of the car1 revealed a pistol concealed under the front seat. The trial judge granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the gun on the ground, as reflected by Gatterello’s candid statements at the suppression hearing, that the officer could not be “sure” the defendant was exceeding the speed limit and that he wished to stop him only for a warning that this might be the case. These facts do not support the order under review.
There is no question that neither proof beyond a reasonable doubt so as to justify a conviction nor even probable cause to believe that a traffic offense has been committed is required to support a police stop on that basis. Instead, only a simple “founded” or “reasonable” suspicion of a violation based on the officer’s visual or aural perception is necessary. See Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1975); State v. Cobbs, 411 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). In our judgment, this rule is clearly satisfied by the undisputed facts of this case. What Gatterello both saw and heard fully and objectively supported his suspicion that Eady was going too fast under the circumstances and was thus guilty of a violation of the law. See § 316.183(1), Fla.Stat. (1987) (“No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions, and having regard to the actual and potential hazards, then existing.”); State v. Fernandez, 526 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), cause dismissed, 531 So. 2d 1352 (Fla.1988); Gustafson v. State, 243 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), modified, 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1972).
REVERSED.
. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); State v. Maya, 529 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); State v. Fernandez, 526 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), cause dismissed, 531 So. 2d 1352 (Fla.1988); State v. James, 526 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
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Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Roberts, 938 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…lower court, Petitioner relies upon two precedents as authority for its contention that the lower court departed from clearly established legal principles. We agree with the lower court that these precedents can be distinguished. In State v. Eady, 538 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), the officer testified that he saw a vehicle proceeding at “a high rate of speed” and “heard a tire screeching and like a passing gear kicking in.” After the vehicle passed the officer, it continued to speed up before the officer…1 / 2
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State v. JOY, 637 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…pursuit of a suspected speeder. The fact that the patrol car’s speedome [*948] ter was not calibrated is of no moment because an officer may stop a vehicle suspected of speeding based on the officer’s visual and aural perceptions. See State v. Eady, 538 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (officer’s testimony that he saw a vehicle proceeding at “a high rate of speed,” and “heard a tire screeching and like a passing gear kicking in” constituted a reasonable suspicion of a speeding violation so as to justify stop of…
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State v. Allen, 978 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…ble cause to stop the vehicle. Police may stop a vehicle if the officer has a well-founded, articulable suspicion that the occupant has committed a traffic offense. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Eady, 538 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). The Third District has held that police may stop a vehicle for a speeding violation based on the officer’s visual or aural perceptions and that verification of actual speed by the use of radar equipment or clocking is not necessa…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (U.S. 1981)
- Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975)
- State v. Gustafson, 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972)
- State v. Fernandez, 526 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Gustafson v. State, 243 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- State v. Maya, 529 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- State v. Earnest James, 526 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- State v. Cobbs, 411 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)