SHORTER
v.
GARLAND
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The court held that the plaintiff cannot obtain compensatory damages or injunctive/declaratory relief under the Rehabilitation Act because the federal government is immune from damages and the claims are moot.
Plaintiff, a former inmate with gender dysphoria, sued the Attorney General for denial of medically necessary care in violation of the Rehabilitation …
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JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Before the court is the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (ECF No. 95) docketed on March 4, 2022. The magistrate judge recommends that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 82) be granted as to the only remaining defendant, Merrick B. Garland. Plaintiff has filed objections (ECF No. 99) to the report and recommendation. Defendant Garland has not responded to
Plaintiff’s objections. Having reviewed the case in light of Plaintiff’s objections, the undersigned has determined that Part VI (entitled “Remedies”) of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is due to be adopted. Plaintiff,2 a former inmate of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), suffers from gender dysphoria. In her two-count second amended complaint, Plaintiff has sued Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States and Director of the United States Department of Justice, in his official capacity for denial of medically necessary care in violation of Section 794(a) of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) (Count I). The magistrate judge recommends that summary judgment be granted in favor of the Attorney General (1) for failure to state a claim under the RA; and (2) because Plaintiff cannot obtain the relief she seeks in this case.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief against the federal government based on the past actions of officials at the Bureau of Prisons. The magistrate maintains, and the undersigned agrees, that
Plaintiff can obtain no such relief. In Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996), the Supreme Court held that the federal government, as sovereign, cannot be held
Her requests for injunctive and/or declaratory relief fare no better. Unlike claims for monetary relief, which look back at a defendant’s past actions, claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are prospective in nature and are intended to prevent future injuries. Smith v. Allen, 502 F. 3d 1255, 1267 (11th Cir. 2007),
abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011). Because Plaintiff is no longer in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot. See Adler v. Duval Ctny. Sch.
Bd., 112 F. 3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997) (“When the threat of future harm dissipates, the plaintiff's claims for [injunctive and declaratory] relief become moot because the plaintiff no longer needs protection from future injury.”); McKinnon v. Talladega Ctny., Ala., 745 F. 2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984)(“The general rule is that a prisoner's . . . release from a jail moots his individual claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.”).
Plaintiff’s request for a retrospective declaratory judgment—i.e., a declaration that the Bureau of Prisons violated the RA in the past—does not save her RA claims. “In the absence of continuing conduct or an imminent threat of future harm to the parties, declaratory relief is unavailable.” Tiller v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 549 F. App'x 849, 855 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S.1, 18, (1998) (noting that courts “are not in the business of pronouncing that past actions which have no demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong”); Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F. 3d 1342, 1348 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A] declaration that the [challenged] statute as applied in the past to these plaintiffs is unconstitutional would [be] nothing more than a gratuitous comment without any force or effect.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 F. 3d 857, 868 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[a] declaratory judgment merely adjudicating past violations of federal law—as opposed to continuing or future violations of federal law—is not an appropriate exercise of federal jurisdiction”). Because Defendant is immune from claims for compensatory damages under the RA and because her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot, it is ORDERED: 1. Part VI (entitled “Remedies”) of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is ADOPTED and incorporated into this order. Page 5 of 5 2. Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 82) for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the remaining defendant, Merrick B. Garland.
3. The clerk shall enter judgment stating: “All claims are dismissed.”
4. The clerk shall close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED this 11th day of April , 2022.
s/ William Stafford
WILLIAM STAFFORD
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1998)
- Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999)
- Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (U.S. 1996)
- Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir. 1997)
- Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (U.S. 2011)
- Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007)
- McKINNON v. Talladega Cnty., 745 F.2d 1360 (11th Cir. 1984)