PHILLIP MORGAN WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the imposition of court costs was improper without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard.
Appellant was sentenced for drug possession offenses and the trial court orally announced the imposition of court costs. The sentence was otherwise wi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SHIVERS, Judge.
The appellant in this case pled nolo contendere to two counts of possession of crack cocaine and one count of possession of cocaine paraphernalia. On December 3, 1987 he was sentenced to thirty months incarceration followed by thirty months probation on each of the possession of cocaine charges, and to 364 days incarceration on the possession of paraphernalia charge, all to run concurrently. In addition, the trial court made an oral announcement at the sentencing hearing of the imposition of $1,775 in unspecified court costs.
We agree with the conclusion reached in defense counsel’s Anders1 brief that the court imposed a legal guideline sentence, since the incarcerative portion of the split sentence falls within the 12-30 month guideline range, and the total of the incar-cerative and probationary periods does not exceed the term provided in section 775.-082(3)(d), Florida Statutes for third-degree felonies. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(12), Committee Note. Upon review of appellant’s and appellee’s supplemental briefs,2 however, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of costs, finding that appellant was not given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard as required by Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). We therefore affirm in part, reverse, and remand for the trial court to either strike the imposition of costs or to provide appellant with notice and an opportunity to object.
WENTWORTH and MINER, JJ., concur. . Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).
. This court requested supplemental briefs on the issue of costs, pursuant to State v. Causey, 503 So. 2d 321 (Fla.1987), after an examination of the record revealed an apparently meritorious issue not raised in the Anders brief.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Munday v. State, 547 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…BARFIELD, Judge. The convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED. However, the imposition of costs is REVERSED because appellant was not given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984); Williams v. State, 538 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Reese v. State, 521 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The case is REMANDED to the trial court with directions to either strike the imposi [*337] tion of costs or to rehear this issue in accordance with Jenkins. BOOTH and WIGGIN…
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Walker v. State, 555 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…cedes that this was error, and we agree. Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984) requires that the trial court give notice of its intent to assess costs and then make a finding that the defendant has the ability to pay. Accord Williams v. State, 538 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). However, the decision in Jenkins was without prejudice to the state to tax the costs after complying with the required procedures. Thus, we remand to give the trial court the opportunity to comply with Jenkins. In sum, we affir…
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Reid v. State, 565 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…ceration is computed in determining whether the sentence exceeds the guidelines. See Morris v. State, 532 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(11, 12). See also Tyner v. State, 545 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Williams v. State, 538 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Neither Poore nor Franklin support a conclusion that the length of the term of incarceration and of probation should be treated differently in a “true” split sentence than in a “probationary” split sentence. To hold otherwise…
Authorities Cited
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967)
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- State v. Causey, 503 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1987)