THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JORGE LAMAR, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a trial court order granting a defendant's motion in limine to exclude post-arrest statements in which the defendant admitted he would evade conviction for murder. The appellate court reversed, holding that statements from which guilt can be inferred constitute admissible admissions, and remanded with instructions to admit the statements while redacting references to other crimes.
The court held that statements from which a defendant's guilt can be inferred constitute admissible admissions under established law. The trial court erred in excluding the portions of Lamar's statements in which he said 'I'll get away with this one' and 'I'll beat this one,' and these admissions should be admitted with redaction of references to extraneous crimes.
[1] Post-arrest statements made by a defendant, even after requesting an attorney, may constitute admissible admissions if guilt can be inferred therefrom.
[2] Admissions of facts or circumstances from which guilt can be inferred are generally admissible in evidence against the party making them.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“I got away with the murder in Chicago, and I'll get away with this one.”
Lamar's post-arrest statement demonstrating admission of guilt that could be inferred from the statement
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJorge Lamar was arrested for murder and informed of his Miranda rights. He refused to speak and requested an attorney. As the officer was ending the i…
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LEVY, Judge.
Following Jorge Lamar’s arrest for murder, Lamar was taken to the police station and informed of his Miranda rights. He refused to speak and requested an attorney. As the officer was preparing to end the interview, Lamar made the following statement: “I got away with the murder in Chicago, and I’ll get away with this one.” The officer asked Lamar to clarify the statement and Lamar further remarked: “I beat it, and I’ll beat this one.” The trial court denied Lamar’s motion to suppress but granted his motion in limine to exclude the post-arrest statements. The state appeals the order granting Lamar’s motion in limine. We reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to redact the references to extraneous crimes.
Clearly Lamar’s post-arrest statements constituted an admission. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction to entertain the state’s appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(B). See also State v. Brea, 530 So. 2d 924 (Fla.1988) (order suppressing admissions of co-conspirator appealable); State v. Palmore, 495 So. 2d 1170 (Fla.1986) (suppression order barring sworn statement containing admissions appealable); State v. Hale, 505 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (suppression of admissions appealable).
The state, while originally suggesting that the complete statements should be admissible, later agreed that the references to any collateral crimes should be redacted. Thus we do not address the issue of whether that portion of Lamar’s statements evidencing collateral crimes is admissible under the rule established in Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). Rather, the issue before us is the more limited question of whether the motion in limine improperly excluded that portion of Lamar’s declaration in which he stated “I’ll get away with this one” and “I’ll beat this one.”
Lamar’s statements, while not actual “confessions of crime”, do constitute “admissions of crime” in the sense that Lamar’s guilt could be inferred therefrom. It is well established that “admissions of facts or circumstances from which guilt can be inferred ... are in general admissible in evidence against the party making them. . . .” Parrish v. State, 90 Fla. 25, 105 So. 130, 133 (1925). See also Hall v. State, 381 So. 2d 683, 690 (Fla.1978) (statement admissible because “jury could reasonably conclude that this statement was evidence of guilty knowledge of appellant”); Nelson v. State, 372 So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (statements admissible because “they were in the nature of admissions against interest from which it could be inferred that the crime had been committed”), cert. denied, 396 So. 2d 1130 (Fla.1981). Since the trial court incorrectly allowed the motion in limine to exclude these statements which constitute admissions, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Lamar’s motion in limine, and remand with instructions to the trial court to redact that portion of Lamar’s admission which refers to extraneous crimes.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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Citator
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Oral Henry v. State, 651 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…esence in this location and that he would be back again doing the same thing. The fact that the comment implied future criminal activities does not render it inadmissible if it can be interpreted as an admission against interest. See State v. Lamar, 538 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); State v. Patterson, 516 S.W. 2d 571 (Mo.App.1974). We do not address the issues with regard to the sentence because of the necessity to retry this case.1 Reversed and remanded for a new trial. HERSEY and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.…
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Henderson ST. Louis v. State, 584 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…intertwined with the admission and was very prejudicial to the defendant showing only his bad character. Any references to the threats as collateral crimes should have been eliminated, as the state agreed to do in the similar case of State v. Lamar, 538 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). We find no error in the admission of the pretrial and in-court identifications of appellant and no reversible error in the prosecutor’s closing argument comments. Finally, should appellant be convicted upon retrial, we remind th…
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Perera v. State, 873 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…Perera’s statements instead constituted an admission of guilt. See § 90.803(18). An admission of fact or circumstance from which guilt may be inferred is admissible as a general admission against the party who made the statement. See State v. Lamar, 538 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). See also Pieczynski v. State, 516 So. 2d 1048, 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)(holding that the defendant’s statement that he was sorry and could not help himself was admissible as an admission from which guilt could be inferred). S…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)
- Williams v. Florida, 361 U.S. 847 (U.S. 1959)
- White v. Illinois, 361 U.S. 847 (U.S. 1959)
- Parrish v. State, 90 Fla. 25 (Fla. 1925)
- State v. Rickie Lee Palmore, 495 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1986)
- State v. Cesaero Brea, 530 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1988)
- Hall v. State, 381 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1979)
- Nelson v. State, 372 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Nelson v. State, 396 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Hale, 505 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)