TODD IUEN, APPELLANT,
v.
LIVE WIRE ELECTRIC COMPANY AND U.S. FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, APPELLEES
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Todd Iuen appealed a workers' compensation claim denial based on the statute of limitations for medical benefits. The court reversed, holding that the employer's payment for medical examination and x-rays in August 1986 constituted authorized remedial attention that revived the two-year limitations period, making his January 1987 claim for surgery timely.
The court held that the August 1986 examination and x-rays constituted authorized remedial attention because the claimant informed his supervisor before the visit and the employer paid the resulting bill. This voluntary provision of remedial attention revived the two-year limitations period, making the January 1987 claim timely filed.
[1] A claim for remedial attention in workers' compensation is barred unless filed within two years after the time of injury, unless remedial attention has been furnished by…
[2] Voluntary payment for remedial attention by an employer revives the two-year limitation period for filing a workers' compensation claim, even if a two-year period without…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Voluntary payment for remedial attention revives the two year limitation period, even if a two year period without compensation payments or remedial attention has already passed.”
Establishes the legal principle that the statute of limitations can be revived by voluntary provision of medical treatment
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn May 1984, Iuen injured his knee at work and was authorized to see an orthopedist who advised it would heal naturally. Iuen continued working and di…
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JOANOS, Judge.
Claimant Todd Iuen has appealed from a determination by the deputy commissioner that his claim for medical benefits was barred by the statute of limitations, Section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In May 1984, Iuen injured his knee in the course of his employment with Live Wire Electric Company (employer) and was authorized to consult an orthopedist, Dr. Ma-honey. Dr. Mahoney did not treat the knee, telling Iuen that it would heal with time. Iuen continued thereafter to work for employer. He did not consult Dr. Ma-honey again until August 1986, after informing his supervisor that he was going to do so. No objection was made, and the record reflects that employer’s insurance carrier paid the resulting bill for examination and x-rays. It was not until Iuen sought authorization for knee surgery that the employer and carrier (E/C) alleged that the statute of limitations had run on the May 1984 injury. The deputy commissioner agreed, and dismissed Iuen’s claim on that ground.
Section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1985) provides that all rights for remedial attention shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed with the division within two years after the time of injury, except that, if remedial attention has been furnished by the employer without an award on account of.such injury, a claim may be filed within two years after the date of the last remedial attention furnished by the employer. Voluntary payment for remedial attention revives the two year limitation period, even if a two year period without compensation payments or remedial attention has already passed. Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co., 490 So. 2d 1252 (Fla.1986); Proctor v. Swing Set Day Care Center, 498 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
The deputy herein found that Iuen’s August 1986 visit to Dr. Mahoney was not authorized and therefore that the E/C did not furnish remedial attention so as to revive the two year limitations period. However, in Ken hones Landscaping, Inc. v. Tucker, 382 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), this court held that a claimant’s testimony of the E/C’s awareness of the need for treatment and its payment of the resulting bill demonstrates that the treatment was authorized. In this case, it was unrefuted that Iuen consulted his employer prior to seeing Dr. Mahoney in August 1986, and that the resulting bill was paid by the E/C in September 1986. The deputy’s finding that Iuen was not authorized to consult Mahoney is therefore not supported by the record, and we reverse on this issue.
The deputy made no determination on the issue of whether “remedial attention” was furnished at the August 1986 visit. It is undisputed that Dr. Mahoney performed an examination and x-rays of the knee. The record is clear that the purpose of these actions was to determine a course of treatment which Mahoney was prepared to pursue but for the E/C’s refusal to authorize it. See Barnett v. EMR Telemetry, 396 So. 2d 791, 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Tower Chemical Co. v. Hubbard, 527 So. 2d 886, 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). We therefore find that remedial attention was furnished during the August 1986 authorized consultation, and this issue need not be revisited on remand.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the E/C voluntarily provided remedial attention in August 1986. The two year limitations period was thereby revived, Daniel, supra, and the January 1987 claim for medical benefits was timely filed. The order appealed is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BOOTH and MINER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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ABC Liquors, Inc. v. Creed, 573 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…of Whiteman appears to me to dictate a holding that the claim was barred by the limitation prescribed by 440.-19. The holdings in Proctor v. Swing Set Day Care Center and Seibels, 498 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) and Iuen v. Livewire Elect. Co., 538 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), do not conflict with the holding in Whiteman. Those cases, like the earlier holdings in Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co., 490 So. 2d 1252 (Fla.1986); Bowman v. Food Fair Stores, 400 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), review denied, 412…1 / 2
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Commercial Roof Decks & Crims, Inc. v. Flippo, 616 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…Flippo countered that Whiteman had been superseded by later cases holding that remedial attention was “furnished” when it was paid for, citing Proctor v. Swing Set Day Care Center, 498 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), Iuen v. Live Wire Electric Co., 538 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), and ABC Liquors, Inc. v. Creed, 573 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Flippo argued that the E/C’s payment of almost $9000 in medical bills within two years of the August 13, 1991 claim rendered it timely. The JCC agreed, and order…
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Estes v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist. (Fla. 1st DCA 2026)…ns period, leaving the original two-year period completely in its wake. This court also treated the prior language as either an extension of the limitations period or, similarly, a revival of the limitations period. See Iuen v. Live Wire Elec. Co., 538 So. 2d 1312, 1313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (“Voluntary payment for remedial attention revives the two year limitation period, even if a two year period without compensation payments or remedial attention has already passed."); Roe v. City Inv./Gen. Dev. Corp., 587 S…
Authorities Cited
- Higdon v. State, 490 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 1986)
- ARD v. State, 498 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Barnett v. EMR Telemetry & Travelers Ins. Co., 396 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Tower Chem. Co. & Fla. Farm Bureau v. Hubbard, 527 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- KEN Lones Landscaping, Inc. v. Tucker, 382 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)