HAROLD CAMPBELL, IRENE CAMPBELL, RICHARD HATHAWAY AND MARYANN HATHAWAY, APPELLANTS,
v.
CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS, APPELLEE
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Appellants challenged a final judgment dismissing their malicious prosecution and civil rights claims against the City of Coral Springs, arguing that the sovereign immunity waiver statute was unconstitutional as applied to malicious prosecution claims. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that Florida's sovereign immunity statute is constitutional and reasonably restricts liability based on the nature of claims.
The statute is constitutional and does not violate equal protection. The statute does not abolish causes of action but reasonably restricts the classes of defendants based on claim nature. Plaintiffs retain the ability to bring malicious prosecution claims against individual officers rather than the city.
[1] A statute waiving sovereign immunity may constitutionally restrict the classes of potential defendants based on the nature of the claims, as part of an overall statutory…
[2] A plaintiff may bring an action for malicious acts against individual officers, even if the city is shielded from liability for malicious prosecution by a sovereign immun…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“section 768.28(9)(a) does not abolish causes of action. Rather, the statute reasonably arranges and restricts the classes of potential defendants based on the nature of the claims as part of an overall statutory scheme.”
The court's central holding that the sovereign immunity statute is constitutional because it restricts defendants, not the cause of action itself.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants were arrested following a disturbance involving police. They were subsequently acquitted of the charges. Appellants then sued the city for …
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STONE, Judge.
The plaintiffs appeal a final judgment in favor of the defendant city in an action for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and violation of civil rights.
Appellant asserts that the waiver of sovereign immunity statute, section 768.-28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), is unconstitutional to the extent that it shields the city from liability for malicious prosecution. The action arose out of a disturbance involving the plaintiffs and the police which resulted in arrests and subsequent acquittals. The trial court dismissed the malicious prosecution claims against the city, which were founded on allegations of malice on the part of the police officers. The jury subsequently found in favor of the city on the false arrest count, and in favor of the officers on the malicious prosecution charge; the court then directed a verdict in favor of the city on the civil rights claims.
The constitutionality of section 768.-28 has previously been upheld in an exhaustive analysis. Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So. 2d 379 (Fla.1981). See also White v. Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, 448 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 2d DCA), dismissed, 443 So. 2d 981 (Fla.1983). Nevertheless, appellants assert, citing City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1965), and Clayton v. City of Cape Canaveral, 354 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), that the application of the restrictions of the statute to malicious prosecution claims against the city deprives them of a common law right without substituting an alternative. See Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1973); City of Coconut Creek v. Fowler, 474 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 486 So. 2d 596 (Fla.1986).
We find no basis in appellants’ argument to deviate from the clear reasoning in Cauley v. City of Jacksonville. Additionally, plaintiffs have failed to show that they would have had a right to bring this action prior to adoption of the declaration of rights in the Florida Constitution. In any event, section 768.28(9)(a) does not abolish causes of action. Rather, the statute reasonably arranges and restricts the classes of potential defendants based on the nature of the claims as part of an overall statutory scheme. See Cauley v. City of Jacksonville; White v. Hillsborough County Hospital Authority; Jetton v. Jacksonville Electric Authority, 399 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 411 So. 2d 383 (Fla.1981). Here, the plaintiffs have a cause of action for malicious acts against the officers rather than the city. We also find no merit in appellants’ claim that the statute is unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. The legislature has the discretion to place limits and conditions upon the scope of the sovereign immunity waiver. See Cauley v. City of Jacksonville; Jaar v. University of Miami, 474 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Jetton v. Jacksonville Electric Authority.
Additionally, we are satisfied from a review of the record that appellants were not precluded, by the court’s order on the malicious prosecution claims, from alleging malicious acts in their action against the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The other issues raised by appellant on the civil rights claims are also without merit. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986); Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Therefore, the final judgment is affirmed.
HERSEY, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur.
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Brown v. City OF Vero Beach & Indian River Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 64 So. 3d 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…sistency by providing instances in which municipalities would not be immune from suit. Id. It is within the legislature’s “discretion to place limits and conditions upon the scope of the sovereign immunity waiver.” Campbell v. City of Coral Springs, 538 So. 2d 1373, 1375 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Such discretion was exercised by the legislature in enacting section 380.276(6). Because the allegations of the amended complaint fall squarely under the statute’s provision for government immunity in the event of injury…
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State v. Koch, 582 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…t a state agency.” The court found the legislature merely substituted the state and its agencies, which previously could not be sued because of sovereign immunity, for the individual who could be sued. Id. See also Campbell v. City of Coral Springs, 538 So. 2d 1373, 1374 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (“section 768.28(9)(a) does not abolish causes of action. Rather, the statute reasonably arranges and restricts the classes of potential defendants based on the nature of the claims as part of an overall statutory scheme”).…
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State v. Kowalski, 617 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…he State Attorney’s Office is immune from suit on matters relating to its decisions as to whether and how to conduct a criminal investigation. Tria-non; see City of Daytona Beach v. Huhn, 468 So. 2d 963 (Fla.1985); Campbell v. City of Coral Springs, 538 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). The cause is remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the defendant in accordance with its motion for summary judgment and motions for directed verdict. REVERSED and REMANDED. HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . See § 27…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978)
- City of ST. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (U.S. 1988)
- Kluger v. Bernadette White & Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973)
- City OF LOS Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (U.S. 1986)
- City OF Miami v. Roce Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965)
- Jaar v. The Univ. OF Miami, 474 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Cauley v. City OF Jacksonville, 403 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1981)
- Jetton v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 399 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- White v. Hillsborough Cnty. Hosp. Auth. & John L. Vanderschilden, M.D., 448 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- City OF Coconut Creek v. Fowler, 474 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)