RAYMOND KIMBROUGH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the stop of the appellant's vehicle was unlawful because it was not based on founded suspicion, and therefore the evidence found during the subsequent search should have been suppressed.
An officer stopped appellant's car, which was legally parked, to identify the occupants and their reason for being there. A computer check revealed an…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from denial of appellant’s motion to suppress the two cocaine rocks found on his person after a stop of his vehicle. Appellant and a companion were sitting in appellant’s automobile on a Sunday morning, legally parked in an alleyway near a motel and several car dealerships. The arresting officer drove his vehicle past appellant’s car then turned around. As appellant started to drive away the officer, who was not investigating any particular criminal activity, stopped appellant’s car to identify the occupants and learn their reasons for being parked there.
A police computer check of appellant’s identity revealed an outstanding arrest warrant in appellant’s name. Appellant was arrested and during the ensuing search of his person the two cocaine rocks were discovered.
We reverse the court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress, as there was no founded suspicion to justify the officer’s stop in the first place. Accordingly, the physical evidence obtained during the subsequent search of appellant would properly be suppressed. State v. Beja, 451 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
DOWNEY, DELL and POLEN, JJ., concur.
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State v. Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2006)…lding that an arrest warrant “does not validate an illegal detention.” Frierson, 851 So. 2d at 300 (quoting Rollins v. State, 578 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)); see also Solino v. State, 763 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Kimbrough v. State, 539 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). The Fourth District stated the conflict issue to be: Where there is no reasonable cause to justify a traffic stop, may an outstanding arrest warrant constitute an intervening circumstance that dissipates the taint of the illega…1 / 2
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Frierson v. State, 851 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…s subject to suppression as the fruit of the poisonous tree, notwithstanding the outstanding warrant We depart from the trial court in one crucial respect. Existing precedent from this court requires suppression of the firearm. Kimbrough v. State, 539 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), involved an officer who stopped a car without founded suspicion. A “police computer check of [the defendant’s] identity revealed an outstanding arrest warrant in [the defendant’s] name.” Id. The defendant was arrested and two [*…
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Rollins v. State, 578 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…activity or cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred. The fact that the officer subsequently discovered an outstanding warrant does not validate an illegal detention. Libby v. State, 561 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Kimbrough v. State, 539 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Since this was allegedly a traffic stop, the determination of whether the officer had cause to stop the vehicle based on a reasonable belief that he had observed a traffic infraction is thus critical. We accordingly vacate appe…
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- State v. Beja, 451 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)