PATRICIA ONLEY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, APPELLANTS,
v.
JEROME ONLEY, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1989-03-14
No. 88-2345
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ.
540 So. 2d 880 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1989) Negative Treatment
Cited by 30 cases

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Synopsis

The former wife appealed a contempt order concerning unpaid child support arrearages. The trial court improperly allowed the ex-husband a $2,000 credit for an automobile he gave to their son, reducing the arrearages from approximately $4,000 to $2,000. The appellate court reversed, holding that unilateral payments to or for the child without court authorization cannot discharge or reduce support obligations.


Holding

The court held that support obligations accruing under a court order become vested rights of the payee and vested obligations of the payor not subject to retroactive modification. Unilateral payments to or on behalf of the child, made without court authorization, cannot serve to discharge or reduce support obligations unless they fall within the spirit and intent of the order. The automobile purchase was a gratuity, not an authorized discharge of support duties.


Headnotes

[1] Child support obligations that have accrued under a court order are vested rights and cannot be retroactively modified.

[2] Payments made by a non-custodial parent for a child's benefit, without court authorization, cannot discharge or reduce the support obligations imposed by a court order.

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Key Quotes

“It is well settled that support obligations accruing under a court order in a domestic case become vested rights of the payee and vested obligations of the payor which are not subject to retroactive modification.”

Establishes the fundamental principle that support obligations cannot be retroactively modified

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Facts & Procedural History

Patricia Onley sought to hold her ex-husband Jerome Onley in contempt for failing to pay approximately $4,000 in child support arrearages owed under a…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

The former wife appeals from an order on her motion to hold her ex-husband in contempt for failing to pay arrearages in child support for their two children provided by a final judgment of dissolution. Although by the time of the hearing the unpaid sum amounted to approximately $4,000, the trial judge gave the appellee a “credit” of $2,000 which represented the cost of an automobile he gave to the parties’ teenage son. We reverse this ruling.

It is well settled that support obligations accruing under a court order in a domestic case become vested rights of the payee and vested obligations of the payor which are not subject to retroactive modification. Pottinger v. Pottinger, 133 Fla. 442, 182 So. 762 (1938); Ragan v. Thomas, 515 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Shufflebarger v. Shufflebarger, 460 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Petrucci v. Petrucci, 252 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971).

In the absence of some showing — which was not present here — that a payment to or on behalf of the child served to discharge a duty of support encompassed by the order in question, e.g., Tash v. Oesterle, 380 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), and cases cited, such a payment, if unilaterally made without authority of court, cannot serve to discharge or reduce the requirements imposed upon the non-custodial parent. Ragan v. Thomas, 515 So. 2d at 405; Shufflebarger v. Shufflebarger, 460 So. 2d at 982; see Wooten v. Wooten, 510 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Adams v. Adams, 423 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

In itself, Goldman v. Goldman, 529 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), illustrates both principles. There, the father’s payments for the child’s college room and board were allowed as falling within the “spirit and intent” of the order, while payments for various personal college expenses not covered by the judgment were held to be mere gratuities which could not be set off. This case presents a classic application of the latter situation.

However well-intentioned, Onley had neither authorization nor right to modify by self-help the simple terms of a court order that he periodically pay his ex-wife a designated sum of money for the children’s support.

Hence, the trial judge erroneously provided for a deduction in the amount he unauthorizedly expended for the son’s car. Even as to the $2,000 remaining in arrears under the trial court’s order, it was provided only that the sum be paid down at what seems to have been the unconscionably low rate of $25 per month. While the appellant raises no point on appeal concerning this fact and does not challenge the authority of the court, in ruling on a motion for contempt, to provide for a reasonable repayment schedule in discharge of past due payments, see Ashe v. Ashe, 509 So. 2d 1146, 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), we note that the court must reconsider the entire issue in the light of our instant determination to increase the amount of the recoverable arrearages. When it does so, it should reconsider also the propriety of the terms and conditions of the order requiring payment of the sums due. See generally § 61.17, Fla.Stat. (1987).

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.


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Citator

Cited By (14 total)

  • Hunter v. Hunter, 540 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
    …l reductions in his child-support obligation and to make retroactive the order terminating his obligation to pay the children’s medical expenses. We find no abuse of discretion. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Onley v. Onley, 540 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Finally, appellant claims error in the trial court’s award of medical expenses. He asserts that the court erred in requiring him to pay the medical expenses without crediting him for paid insurance benefits. That assertion lacks…
  • …obligations accruing under a court order in a domestic case become vested rights of the payee and vested obligations of the payor which are not subject to retroactive modifications. Larger v. Diaz, 595 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Onley v. Onley, 540 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). The right to the previously determined child support vests at the time the payments are due: The law is well established that the right of a wife to payment of child support in arrears is vested, and while it is within the disc…
    1 / 2
  • Stebbins v. Stebbins, 754 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
    …wer amount of support according to his own logical method. Although his unilateral decision to modify the agreed amount of payment and to pay less support without court approval clearly was not authorized or excused by the court, see Onley v. Onley, 540 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), the surrounding facts do bear upon the separate question of whether Appellant was deliberately refusing to work in order to avoid his support duty. Moreover, the trial court appeared to base its finding of voluntary unemployment…

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Authorities Cited (11 total)

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