HAL EDWARD COLEMAN, PETITIONER,
v.
HON. OSCAR H. EATON, JR., ETC., RESPONDENT

Fla. 5th DCA | 1989-03-30
No. 89-125
DAUKSCH and DANIEL, JJ., concur.
540 So. 2d 915 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1989) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Petitioner Coleman sought a writ of prohibition challenging the trial court's jurisdiction to prosecute misdemeanor charges after the speedy trial period expired under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. The court granted the petition, holding that the State cannot circumvent the speedy trial rule by refiling charges after a timely discharge motion is filed.


Holding

The court granted the petition for writ of prohibition, holding that the State cannot use the consolidation of felony and misdemeanor charges to avoid the speedy trial rule's mandatory discharge requirement for misdemeanors. Upon timely motion after the speedy trial period expires, a defendant charged with a misdemeanor must be forever discharged from the crime.


Headnotes

[1] A new information filed by the State after a timely motion for discharge has been filed does not moot the motion for discharge if the new information charges the same off…

[2] The State cannot avoid the intent and effect of the speedy trial rule by dropping charges after a timely motion for discharge and then refiling charges arising from the s…

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“the State cannot avoid the intent and effect of the speedy trial rule and engineer its own extension of speedy trial limits by dropping misdemean- or charges after a timely motion for discharge is filed and then later refiling felony and misdemeanor charges arising from the same episode”

Establishes the core holding that the State cannot manipulate the speedy trial rule through strategic refiling of charges

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Coleman was arrested following a motor vehicle accident. An information charging two misdemeanors was filed. More than 90 days after arrest, Coleman f…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
COWART, Judge.

COWART, Judge.

Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition, alleging that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to proceed against him in the prosecution of certain misdemeanor charges because his right to a speedy trial of those charges has been violated under Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We agree and grant the petition for writ of prohibition.

Petitioner was arrested after the motor vehicle he was driving was involved in an accident. An information charging him with two misdemeanors was filed by the State. More than 90 days after his arrest, petitioner filed a motion to discharge that information.

At the hearing on the motion to discharge, the State did not argue that the speedy trial time had not lapsed, but instead advised the court that it had that day filed a new information, charging the petitioner with the same two misdemeanors plus an additional felony arising from the same episode.

The trial court held that the filing of the new information mooted the motion for discharge. When the trial court denied petitioner’s motion to discharge the second information, petitioner filed a petition for writ of prohibition with this court.1

Although it is true that when felony and misdemeanor charges are consolidated for disposition in the circuit court, the misdemeanor is governed by the felony speedy trial time period, such a consolidation cannot be used to avoid the effect of the speedy trial rule. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(h)(2).

As noted in State v. McDonald, 538 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), the State cannot avoid the intent and effect of the speedy trial rule and engineer its own extension of speedy trial limits by dropping misdemean-or charges after a timely motion for discharge is filed and then later refiling felony and misdemeanor charges arising from the same episode, in an attempt to revitalize the misdemeanors. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(i)(2) specifically requires that “In the case of a defendant charged with a misdemeanor, the defen dant. shall, upon motion timely made with the court at the expiration of the prescribed time period, be forever discharged from the crime.” (emphasis added) The fact that the trial of the information was scheduled to take place within 15 days of the filing of the motion for discharge is irrelevant, since the amendment to the rule eliminating the requirement of immediate discharge is not applicable to misdemeanors. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(i)(2).

See also State v. Long, 513 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition is granted and the trial court is directed to discharge the petitioner from further prosecution.

DAUKSCH and DANIEL, JJ., concur. . This court stayed the trial of the misdemeanor charges, pending consideration of the petition for writ of prohibition, but the trial of the felony count proceeded as scheduled and petitioner was acquitted.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Livingston v. State, 564 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
    …counts. Jurisdictional problems arise when speedy trial time runs and it cannot be “revived” merely by the prosecutor’s consolidating it or joining it with a felony count, whether or not the prosecutor did so in good faith. Compare Coleman v. Eaton, 540 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); State v. McDonald, 538 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). In reaching this result, we find the committee note highly persuasive and consistent with the case authority cited herein. Duggar v. State, 446 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw