STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WAYNE GRIFFITH, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed the trial court's sentencing of Wayne Griffith for two felony counts of driving under the influence, challenging the court's decision to withhold adjudication of guilt and the amount of the fine imposed. The court affirmed the fine amount but reversed the withholding of adjudication, finding it precluded by statute.
The trial court lacked authority to withhold adjudication of guilt for DUI violations, as section 316.656 mandatorily precludes such withholding. However, the fine amount of $250 was properly imposed because section 316.193(2)(b), applicable to fourth and subsequent convictions, specifies only that the offense is a felony of the third degree and makes no reference to mandatory minimum fines.
[1] A trial court is precluded from withholding adjudication of guilt for a violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes, as the sentencing requirements of section 316.656…
[2] Amendments to Florida Statute § 316.193 created an escalating schedule of mandatory fines and maximum jail sentences based on whether a DUI conviction is the first, secon…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“section 316.656, Florida Statutes (1985), precludes the trial court from withholding adjudication of guilt for any violation of section 316.193. The sentencing requirements of this section are mandatory and cannot be circumvented.”
Establishes that the trial court lacked statutory authority to withhold adjudication of guilt in DUI cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWayne Griffith pleaded guilty to two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol. Due to his extensive prior record for the same offense, both ch…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellee Wayne Griffith entered pleas of guilty to two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol. Because of Griffith’s extensive prior record for this same offense, both charges were prosecuted as felonies. § 316.193(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1986 supp.). Griffith was placed on probation for a term of two years, was ordered to pay a fine of $250.00 plus substantial court costs, and suffered permanent revocation of his driving privileges. The disposition was consistent with the sentencing guidelines recommendation of “any non-state prison sanction.” The trial court also withheld adjudication of guilt.
The state argues, and Griffith concedes, that section 316.656, Florida Statutes (1985), precludes the trial court from withholding adjudication of guilt for any violation of section 316.193. The sentencing requirements of this section are mandatory and cannot be circumvented. State v. Muoio, 438 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
The state also contends that the trial court was required to assess a fine of no less than $1,000.00. They rely upon section 316.193(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1985), which established fines of no less than $1,000.00 and no more than $2,500.00 “for a third or subsequent conviction.” However, that statute was amended by Chapter 86-296, sections 1 and 29, Laws of Florida, and the revised statute was in effect at the time of Griffith’s offenses. Whereas prior to the amendment no distinction was drawn for purposes of punishment between a third D.U.I. conviction and a fourth or subsequent conviction, the statute now provides an escalating schedule of mandatory fines and maximum jail sentences depending upon whether the conviction is the offender’s first, second, or third. § 316.193(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987). Fourth and subsequent convictions, however, are dealt with in a separate subsection, 316.-193(2)(b), which specifies only that the offense is a felony of the third degree and makes no reference to fines. In fact, subsection (b) is specifically excluded from the fine schedules in subsection (a).* Accordingly, we find no error with respect to the amount of the fine imposed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CAMPBELL, C.J., and SCHOONOVER and HALL, JJ., concur. *
Because the offense has been reclassified as a felony, the court actually could have imposed a fine not exceeding f5,000. § 775.083(l)(a)(c), Fla.Stat. (1987). However, this section establishes no minimum fines for any offense categories.
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McGHEE v. State, 847 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…the statute must be narrowly construed to provide that a person found guilty of a DUI damaging the property of another is subject to a maximum fine of $1,000.00, but no minimum fine.5 Additional support for our ruling is found in State v. Griffith, 540 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). There, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of DUI. Because of his extensive prior history, the crimes were prosecuted as felonies. The version of section 316.193 in effect when the crimes were committed provided, in pertinent…
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State v. Whitaker, 590 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…ltiple DUI offender who succeeded in avoiding [*1031] formal adjudication, in three previous prosecutions, could not be punished as severely as the drunken driver whose single previous offense resulted in conviction.” Id. See also State v. Griffith, 540 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), holding that the section 316.656(1) adjudication provision is mandatory, and precludes the trial court from withholding adjudication of guilt for any violation of section 316.193. This cause is remanded with directions to pronou…
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State v. Rodrick C. Coatney, 596 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…djudication of guilt or imposition of sentence for any violation of s. 316.193, ... (Emphasis supplied.) The second district held that “the sentencing requirements of this section are mandatory and cannot be circumvented.” [*500] State v. Griffith, 540 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). We agree since appellee in this case pled nolo contendere to a violation of section 316.193(2)(b), the provisions of section 316.656(1) apply. Section 316.-656(1), expressly precludes withholding of adjudication “for any violatio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Muoio, 438 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)