FRANCES C. BASHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
MILTON BASHAM, JR., APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1989-03-14
Nos. 88-1061, 88-1368
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL and COPE, JJ.
541 So. 2d 118 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1989) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

In a divorce case, the wife appealed the trial court's division of marital property and denial of alimony. The appellate court affirmed, holding that special equity in assets is only warranted when separate, nonmarital funds are traceable to specific assets, not when commingled funds have been used for marital expenses.


Holding

The court held that special equity is properly awarded only when a spouse's separate, nonmarital funds are traceable to a specific asset. When funds are commingled in joint accounts and used for marital living expenses, no special equity attaches. The trial court properly considered the pension as part of the marital assets in fashioning an equitable distribution scheme.


Headnotes

[1] A spouse may be awarded special equity in an asset to the extent that the spouse's separate, nonmarital funds are traceable to that specific asset.

[2] No special equity attaches to funds brought to a marriage when those funds are deposited into joint accounts and used for marital expenses.

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Key Quotes

“Special equity was properly awarded to appellant to the extent her separate, nonmarital funds were traceable to a specific asset.”

Establishes the traceability requirement for claiming special equity in marital property division.

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Facts & Procedural History

The parties entered into a stipulation agreeing to restore themselves to their pre-marital conditions by returning what each brought to the marriage a…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant wife seeks reversal of certain aspects of the trial court’s decree effecting a division of property, and declining to award alimony, in the dissolution of the parties’ marriage. We affirm.

The parties entered into a stipulation providing that “[b]oth parties agree to be restored to their respective pre-marital conditions in so far as giving back to each other what each brought to the marriage (if special equity) and any remainder by way of increased value will be equally divided. This includes the marital home, stocks and coin collection.” The trial court awarded special equity in the parties’ real estate and in certain stocks, and divided the remainder of the marital property between the parties. Appellant contends, among other things, that the trial court erred by failing to award sufficient credit for funds brought by her to the marriage and deposited in the parties’ joint bank accounts, and erred by failing to divide appellee’s pension payments between the parties.

We conclude no error has been shown. Special equity was properly awarded to appellant to the extent her separate, nonmarital funds were traceable to a specific asset.1 See Roberts v. Roberts, 520 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (special equity awarded where down payment on marital home provided from wife’s separate, nonmarital funds); Gregg v. Gregg, 474 So. 2d 262, 264-65 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (spouse’s nonmarital funds supplied part of consideration for purchase of farm proper ty). Aside from the foregoing, the parties’ funds, including the funds brought to the marriage by appellant, were for years held in various joint accounts, the funds being utilized by the parties for living and other expenses in the course of the marriage.2 No special equity attaches in such circumstances. See Terreros v. Terreros, 531 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

As to the pension, a portion of which was attributable to the period of the marriage, the trial court properly considered it in the context of the other marital assets in fashioning a scheme of equitable distribution. See Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1986). We have examined the other contentions of appellant and conclude that no reversible error has been shown.

AFFIRMED.

. Credit was awarded to the extent the appellant’s separate funds were the source of the down payment for the parties' marital home, in which appellant was awarded special equity.

. During the course of the dissolution, the parties by agreement divided their remaining cash balances equally. The parties’ other marital property was allocated by court order.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Adkins v. Adkins, 650 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    …in part, of marital funds, to wit: the husband’s earnings from his law practice, as well as certain other nonmarital funds. We conclude that by commingling these marital and nonmarital funds, this account became a marital account. Basham v. Basham, 541 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Terreros v. Terreros, 531 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Accordingly, (1) the $58,000 increase in equity in the home due to the mortgage payments made by the husband from this account, and (2) the enhanced value to the home of t…
  • Heinrich v. Heinrich, 609 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
    …some nonmarital assets into the John Heinrich Trust accomplished such a commingling that all of the assets must be deemed marital without the possibility of the husband showing a special equity in any of those assets. She relies on Basham v. Basham, 541 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) and Walser v. Walser, 473 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); see also Terreros v. Terreros, 531 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). To begin with, the rule of decision in the present case is supplied by the equitable distribution statute…

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