CHARLES C. CHIDIAC, APPELLANT,
v.
CADILLAC GAGE COMPANY, TEXTRON, INC., AND MAHMOUD MOHAMMED FUSTOK, APPELLEES
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Chidiac appeals a summary judgment dismissing his claim for sales commissions on military vehicle contracts, arguing the statute of limitations should not begin until he discovered that commissions were actually paid. The court affirms, holding that the limitations period began when Chidiac learned of the underlying sales in 1974, regardless of his ignorance about whether commissions were paid.
The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has actual notice of the facts forming the basis of his claim, regardless of his ignorance about whether commissions were paid. Chidiac's claim was barred because he had actual notice of the sales in 1974, making a claim filed in 1982 untimely.
[1] A cause of action for breach of contract arises at the time of the breach, not when damages resulting from the breach are discovered.
[2] The statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the alleged breach of contract, even if the parties continue to have a contractual relationship.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“mere ignorance of the existence of the cause of action without more will not postpone the operation of the statute of limitations”
Establishes the fundamental rule that ignorance alone does not toll the statute of limitations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1972, Chidiac and Fustok each entered into written agency agreements with Cadillac Gage Company (CGC) for sales of military equipment to the Saudi …
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PER CURIAM.
Charles C. Chidiac appeals a final summary judgment in favor of Mahmoud Mohammed Fustok and Cadillac Gage Company [CGC] on Chidiac’s cause of action for commissions arising from sales of military vehicles to the Saudi Arabian National Guard [SANG].
In 1972, Chidiac and Fustok each entered into a written agency agreement with CGC in connection with the sale of military equipment to SANG. The agreement, providing for the division of commissions, was limited to a 6 month period beginning in September 1972 and terminating in the spring of 1973. Automatic extensions to five years were to occur only in the event of an actual sale during the six month period. No sales were made during the six month period, and while Fustok’s agency agreement was subsequently renewed in writing, Chidiac’s agency agreement was neither renewed nor extended.
Eventually, in 1974, CGC consummated several contracts with SANG for the sales of vehicles. Chidiac does not dispute that he learned of the sales in October of 1974. However, Chidiac argues that the reason he did not file his cause of action for commissions until March of 1982 was because Fustok and CGC concealed the fact that commissions had actually been paid.
It is fundamental that “mere ignorance of the existence of the cause of action without more will not postpone the operation of the statute of limitations.” Dovenmufhle, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Cory., 478 So. 2d 423, 424-25 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). See also Hawkins v. Washington Shores Sav. Bank, 509 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (statute of limitations runs at time action should have been discovered through exercise of reasonable care); Houston v. Florida-Georgia Television Co., Inc., 192 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) (statute of limitations in invasion of privacy action runs from time invasion was committed, not time when plaintiff first learned of invasion; mere ignorance of facts does not postpone operation of statute).
Here, Chidiac had actual notice in 1974 of the facts which formed the basis of his claim against CGC and Fustok. Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run as of that time, and clearly bars Chidiac’s cause of action brought seven years later. Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of Fustok and CGC was properly entered.
Affirmed.
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Sami Behar v. Sunbank/Miami, N.A., 591 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…at, we conclude that the plaintiff's conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent bailment, constructive fraud and conspiracy claims were time barred, in any event, by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. Chidiac v. Cadillac Gage Co., 541 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 551 So. 2d 460 (Fla.1989); § 95.11(3), Fla.Stat. (1989). The plaintiff contends that Perdo-mo’s testimony of how the checks arrived at, and were disposed of by, Flagship should not have been accepted as true by the trial…
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Authorities Cited
- harla Mae Houston v. Florida-Georgia Television Co., Inc., 192 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)
- Dovenmuehle, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 478 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Kaydette Hawkins v. Wash. Shores Sav. Bank, 509 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)