ALLAN EUGENE JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1989-01-13
No. 88-119
CAMPBELL, C.J., and DANAHY and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
541 So. 2d 1213 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1989) Negative Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Johnson appealed his guilty plea conviction, arguing he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea based on his misrepresentation of his prior record at sentencing. The court affirmed, holding that because Johnson's plea agreement was specifically for a guidelines sentence (whatever that might be), and he received a sentence within the guidelines range, he was not entitled to withdraw his plea despite the substantial difference between his calculated and actual guidelines sentence.


Holding

Johnson was not entitled to withdraw his plea because the plea agreement was specifically for a guidelines sentence regardless of the amount, and Johnson received a sentence within the terms of his agreement. The fact that his prior record was more extensive than represented does not entitle him to withdrawal when the resulting sentence falls within the bargained-for guidelines range.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant may not withdraw a guilty plea based on a misapprehension of facts when the sentence imposed is consistent with the terms of the plea agreement.

[2] A plea agreement for a "guidelines sentence" obligates the court to impose a sentence within the calculated guidelines range, regardless of the defendant's initial repres…

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Key Quotes

“the only bargain was for a guidelines sentence whatever that would be”

Establishes the critical term of the plea agreement that Johnson bargained for any guidelines sentence, not a specific sentence amount

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Facts & Procedural History

Johnson entered a negotiated guilty plea to various charges with a written plea agreement for a guidelines sentence. Defense counsel calculated the gu…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to various charges. The written plea agreement, signed by appellant as well as his attorney, was for a guidelines sentence. At the plea hearing, defense counsel stated that he calculated the guidelines sentence would be three and one-half to four and one-half years based upon appellant’s representations of his prior record. However, it was made clear that the state was not “buying into” any particular sentence but the only bargain was for a guidelines sentence whatever that would be.

At sentencing, it was shown that appellant had substantially understated his prior record. The actual guidelines scoresheet called for a sentence of twelve to seventeen years. Appellant’s oral request to withdraw his guilty plea was denied and he was sentenced to fifteen years.

On appeal, appellant argues he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea because it was based on his misapprehension of facts, citing Forbert v. State, 437 So. 2d 1079 (Fla.1983). However, For-bert had agreed to an illegal split sentence and the trial judge refused to allow him to withdraw his plea sentencing him to a term of years in excess of the incarceration portion of his plea bargain. In contrast, appellant in this case was sentenced within the terms of his agreement. In Golden v. State, 509 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), also relied on by appellant, there was substantial ambiguity about what sentence appellant bargained for. Not so in this case. That the bargaining here was for a guidelines sentence whatever that might be is clear both in the written plea agreement and in the colloquy at the time of the acceptance of the plea.

Finally, we distinguish this case from Goldberg v. State, 536 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). In both Goldberg and the instant case, the appellants had substantially under-represented their prior records at the time of the plea pursuant to a plea bargain. However, in Goldberg the appellant had bargained for a specific sentence (probation) based on his recitation of no substantial prior record. When the court chose to sentence him to five years because of his substantial prior record, this court held that he should have been given the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Appellant here received the sentence he bargained for. AFFIRMED.

CAMPBELL, C.J., and DANAHY and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Mantle v. State, 592 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
    …understanding or mistake as to the plea bargain, and the state fulfills its obligations to recommend the agreed to sentence. See State v. Adams, 342 So. 2d 818 (Fla.1977); Green v. State, 580 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); [*1193] Johnson v. State, 541 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Stewart v. State, 511 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Little v. State, 492 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Lepper v. State, 451 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). However, if the record reveals a reasonable basis to conclude that a…
  • Babbs v. State, 561 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
    …ered to be inaccurate. As a result, the agreement could not be honored by the state. The result is controlled by the rule in Goldberg v. State, 536 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), and is substantially different from the situation in Johnson v. State, 541 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Here, appellant bargained for a sentence substantially less than the five years and one year which were imposed. It is true that he misled the court, for which he has been punished by contempt, but that does not alter the require…
  • Wingard v. State, 650 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
    …PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Johnson v. State, 541 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). COBB, GOSHORN and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.…

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