IAN HUGHES, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a discovery violation and granting a continuance, thereby waiving the speedy trial period.
Appellant was charged with speeding and DUI and demanded discovery. The defense disclosed three new witnesses one week before trial, which the county …
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from the circuit court’s denial of a petition for writ of prohibition, following the county court’s denial of appellant’s motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds. We affirm.
Appellant was charged with the misdemeanor offenses of speeding and driving under the influence in violation of sections 316.187 and 316.1934, Florida Statutes (1987). Appellant pled not guilty and demanded reciprocal discovery from the State.
One week prior to trial (and 15 days prior to expiration of the speedy trial period), the defense disclosed three new witnesses to the State. The county court found that the late disclosure constituted a discovery violation by the defense and continued the trial. Upon expiration of the initial speedy trial period the defense moved for discharge, which was denied. The defense then filed a petition for writ of prohibition in the circuit court, which was denied after hearing.
The defense concedes it had known the identity of the three witnesses at the time reciprocal discovery initially occurred the previous month. On this record there was no abuse of discretion by the court below in concluding, after adequate inquiry into the circumstances, that a discovery violation had occurred. Upon that determination the court below had broad discretion to fashion a remedy, including a continuance. Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.220(j). As the continuance was attributable to the defense, the time limits of the speedy trial rule were waived. J.B. v. Korda, 436 So. 2d 1109, 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); see Garbett v. State, 484 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1332, 1335 (Fla.1986); Burns v. State, 433 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
Affirmed.
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Malmsberry v. State, 819 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…n witnesses to the State so close to both the trial and the expiration of the speedy trial period. Upon that determination, the trial court had broad discretion to fashion a remedy, including a continuance. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.220(h); Hughes v. State, 542 So. 2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the continuance was attributable to the defense, resulting in a waiver of the time limits of the speedy trial rule. Id. (citing J.B. v. Korda, 436 So. 2d 1109, 1110 (Fla. 4th…
Authorities Cited
- In the Interest of J.B. v. Honorable Lawrence L. Korda, 436 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Garbett v. State, 484 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Burns v. State, 433 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)