ALELI PUIG, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF FERNANDO PUIG, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
SAGA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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In a wrongful death action, the trial court erred by entering a cost judgment against the surviving spouse personally, in addition to against the personal representative of the estate. The court held that Florida's wrongful death statute does not contemplate the surviving spouse as a party to the action, and therefore costs cannot be taxed against her individually.
The portion of the cost judgment taxed against the surviving spouse personally is reversed. Under Florida Statutes § 768.20 and § 768.21, the wrongful death action must be brought by the decedent's personal representative, who recovers for the benefit of survivors and the estate. The surviving spouse should not have been joined as a party to the action, and therefore costs cannot be taxed against her individually.
[1] A wrongful death action must be brought by the decedent's personal representative for the benefit of the decedent's survivors and estate.
[2] A surviving spouse, for whom damages may be recovered in a wrongful death action, should not be joined as a party to the action in their individual capacity.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The action shall be brought by the decedent's personal representative, who shall recover for the benefit of the decedent's survivors and estate all damages, as specified in this act, caused by the injury resulting in death.”
Establishes that only the personal representative is authorized to bring the wrongful death action under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAleli Puig brought a wrongful death action as personal representative of her husband Fernando Puig's estate and also joined the action personally as a…
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PER CURIAM.
In this suit, Aleli Puig, acting as personal representative of the estate of her husband Fernando Puig, brought an action for his wrongful death. She also joined the action personally as a plaintiff.1 Prior to the case being submitted to the jury, Aleli, acting in her individual capacity, withdrew from the suit. Following an adverse verdict and judgment entered in the wrongful death action, the trial court entered a cost judgment against Aleli as personal representative of the estate and also against her personally. This was error.
Section 768.-20, Florida Statutes (1987) specifically provides that “[t]he action shall be brought by the decedent’s personal representative, who shall recover for the benefit of the decedent’s survivors and estate all damages, as specified in this act, caused by the injury resulting in death.” Aleli’s interests were provided for by that section and section 768.21, Florida Statutes (1987) which enumerates the parties, including a surviving spouse for whom the personal representative is entitled to recover damages. Aleli, acting as personal representative, should have identified herself as a surviving spouse claiming damages; however, she should not have joined as a party to the action. Chapter 768 clearly does not contemplate the surviving spouse being joined as a party. If the surviving spouse personally should not properly have been a party in the action, then it would be an anomaly to permit costs of the action to be taxed against her. See Johnson v. Schneegold, 419 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (no statute authorizes the taxing of costs against unsuccessful beneficiaries of the cause of action).
Accordingly, that portion of the cost judgment which was taxed against the surviving spouse personally is reversed.
The appellant’s remaining point was not properly preserved for appellate review.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
. Mrs. Puig did not allege an independent cause of action for emotional distress but rather alleged emotional distress as another element of damage embraced within the wrongful death action. See Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla.1985) (cause of action for damages arising from significant, discernible physical injury caused by psychic trauma resulting from negligent injury to another is direct and distinct claim, rather than derivative claim flowing from injuries to other person).
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Morgan v. Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. OF Fla., 605 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…claim is not any different [*105] from the dismissal of any other claim brought by a party and that unless it constitutes a separate and severable controversy, it will not support a plenary appeal. We agree with the appellees. In Puig v. Saga Corp. 543 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), we held that the surviving spouse of a decedent was not properly a party to a wrongful death action and consequently no costs could be taxed against her personally. We would defeat the legislative purpose in the adoption of secti…
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Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc. v. Johnson, 654 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
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Kadlecik v. Haim, 79 So. 3d 892 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…contrary to current law and improper, because, in essence, it required that the claim against the Estate be paid from funds collected for the benefit of the survivor. See Thompson, 825 So. 2d 941; see also Beseau, 904 So. 2d 641; Puig v. Saga Corp., 543 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Vendola v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 474 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Johnson v. Schneegold, 419 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The appellees attempt to distinguish Thompson and similar holdings by pointing out that Mr. Kadlec…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Walton D. Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985)
- Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co. & C A F Indus., Inc. v. Biddle, 419 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)