RAMON ARCE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Arce pleaded guilty to cocaine trafficking under an agreement that included a polygraph examination, with the promise of sentence reduction if he passed. After failing the polygraph, he sought to withdraw his plea, claiming he was incapable of passing such tests. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of his withdrawal motion, holding that the plea was voluntary and no abuse of discretion occurred.
The court affirmed the trial court's decision. Withdrawal of a guilty plea is discretionary, not a matter of right, and Arce failed to show abuse of discretion. The trial judge properly weighed conflicting expert testimony regarding Arce's fitness for polygraph examination and reasonably accepted one expert's opinion, and no manifest injustice occurred in requiring Arce to abide by his voluntary agreement.
[1] Withdrawal of a guilty plea is a matter of discretion, not a right, and will not be set aside absent a showing of abuse.
[2] A defendant's claim that he is incapable of passing a polygraph test does not, in itself, render a guilty plea involuntary if the defendant was not incompetent, coerced,…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Withdrawal of a guilty plea is not a matter of right but of discretion and will not be set aside absent a showing of abuse.”
Establishes the legal standard that withdrawal of guilty pleas is discretionary and requires showing of abuse
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArce was arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine. He signed a plea agreement requiring him to plead guilty and submit to a polygraph examinat…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Conflicting Expert Testimony cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Arce was arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine. He entered into plea negotiations with the state and signed an agreement whereby he would plead guilty to trafficking and submit to a polygraph examination. The parties agreed that if the test results confirmed that his responses were truthful, the state would recommend that his sentence upon conviction be substantially reduced. After the test, the polygrapher concluded that Arce had not responded truthfully. Arce then unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his guilty plea, and the trial court sentenced him according to the agreement. He again sought to set aside his plea by claiming that he was the type of individual incapable of passing a polygraph test, and, therefore, his plea was not the voluntary product of an intelligent choice. We affirm the trial court’s decision not to set aside Arce’s guilty plea.
Withdrawal of a guilty plea is not a matter of right but of discretion and will not be set aside absent a showing of abuse. Adler v. State, 382 So. 2d 1298, 1300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). See Meaton v. United States, 328 F. 2d 379 (5th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916, 85 S.Ct. 902, 13 L.Ed.2d 801 (1965). Arce has not alleged that he was incompetent, coerced, ill-advised, or that he suffered from any other infirmity in reaching his agreement with the state. Cf. Yesnes v. State, 440 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (uncontroverted testimony of defendant and his psychologist as to defendant’s narcotics induced incompetency was sufficient to warrant allowing defendant to withdraw his plea). The question in this case was whether the defendant was a fit subject to be appropriately tested by polygraph examination. There was conflicting testimony on this point. One expert said that he was, while the defendant s psychiatrist said that he was not.
The trial judge’s order must be affirmed absent a showing he abused his discretion. Brock v. State, 69 So. 2d 344 (Fla.1954). Given the conflicting expert testimony, it was the trial judge’s responsibility to resolve the disputed factual issue; the record does not reveal abuse of his responsibility to fairly weigh the evidence before him. Fowler v. State, 255 So. 2d 513 (Fla.1971). Therefore, it was within the trial court's discretion to accept either expert’s opinion. See King v. State, 387 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). No manifest injustice occurred in requiring Arce to abide by the agreement he knowingly and voluntarily made. See Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1975).
Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Varallo v. State, 675 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Goins v. State, 672 So. 2d 30, (Fla. 1996); Arce v. State, 543 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).…
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1975)
- Fowler v. State, 255 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1971)
- Yesnes v. State, 440 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Brock v. State, 69 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1954)
- McCORD v. State, 382 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964)
- Aware, Inc. v. Faulk, 380 U.S. 916 (U.S. 1965)
- McGann v. Fed. Prison Indus., 380 U.S. 916 (U.S. 1965)
- King v. State, 387 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)