JOHN P. HYNDS AND KATHERINE HYNDS, APPELLANTS,
v.
DEBORAH D. THOMAS AND MATTHEW THOMAS, APPELLEES
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The appellants were injured in a chain-reaction automobile collision on the Courtney Campbell Causeway and sued the appellees, Deborah and Matthew Thomas. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants based on a finding that the Thomas vehicle did not actually strike the Hynds vehicle. The appellate court reversed, holding that even if the Thomas car did not make direct contact, evidence of Ms. Thomas's traffic citation for an improper lane change constituted prima facie evidence of negligence sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
Summary judgment for the defendant was improper. The defendant's traffic citation for an improper lane change constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence. A defendant seeking summary judgment must show unequivocally that there was no negligence or that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of injury; the defendant made no such conclusive showing.
[1] A summary judgment is improper when the movant fails to unequivocally show there was no negligence or that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the…
[2] Proof of a traffic ordinance violation constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence, but proximate cause and other elements of actionable negligence must be proven inde…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Proof of violation of a traffic ordinance is prima facie evidence only of 'negligence'; proximate cause and other elements of actionable negligence must be proven independently.”
Establishes that a traffic citation provides prima facie evidence of negligence but does not resolve all elements of a negligence claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA chain-reaction automobile collision occurred on the Courtney Campbell Causeway in Tampa. Ms. Thomas attempted an improper lane change while driving …
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DANAHY, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final summary judgment entered in favor of the appellees, the defendants at trial. The summary judgment ended a lawsuit arising from a chain crash of automobiles in which the plaintiffs/appellants’ car was hit from behind by another car on the Courtney Campbell Causeway in Tampa. The trial judge grounded the summary judgment upon a finding that the appellees conclusively proved that their car was not the car which actually hit the appellants’ car. Since the fundamental issue is whether there was any negligence on the part of Deborah Thomas which proximately caused any injury to the appellants, and not whether the Thomas car actually struck the Hynds car, we reverse.
In her deposition Ms. Thomas stated that while driving eastbound on the Causeway she attempted to change lanes, but because of the press of the traffic she could not finish the maneuver and was hit by the car following her. This in turn caused her car to hit the car in front of her which was driven by a woman. As a result of this chain accident, the investigating officer issued her a citation for an improper lane change and she paid the fine. She also stated that she did not remember what plea she had entered at the traffic hearing. Mr. Hynds testified in his deposition that he was hit from behind and was pushed into the car in front of him, but that he was unaware of the gender of the driver either in front of or behind him. This was the proof upon which the trial judge focused when he entered the summary judgment. While it may be that the Thomas car was not the one which actually struck the Hynds car, there is evidence that the Thomas car did strike someone and, furthermore, that in this sequence of collisions, Mr. Hynds was struck from behind and may have received injuries thereby. Because the evidence before the trial court shows that Ms. Thomas was the sole driver in the sequence who was cited for a traffic violation, there is evidence of her negligence. “Proof of violation of a traffic ordinance is prima facie evidence only of ‘negligence’; proximate cause and other elements of actionable negligence must be proven independently.” deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla.1973).
It is axiomatic that “[ujnless a movant can show unequivocally that there was no negligence, or that plaintiff’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury, courts will not be disposed to granting a summary judgment in his favor.” Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So. 2d 29, 31 (Fla.1977).
The movant here made no such conclusive showing. We, therefore, reverse and remand for further proceedings.
HALL and PARKER, JJ., concur.
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LEE v. OLD S. Trucking, Inc., 552 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…h special care. Unless a movant can show unequivocally that there was no negligence, or that plaintiff’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury, courts will not be disposed to granting a summary judgment in his favor. Hynds v. Thomas, 543 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). In this case, summary judgment was granted based on a determination as a matter of law thát Old Southern 1) did not create the hole into which Lee stepped and 2) could not have anticipated that requiring Lee to move would c…
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Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Se. Bank, N.A., 585 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…laygrounds. The evidence suggests that the railroad regularly ignored the city ordinance. Violation of a traffic control ordinance is evidence of negligence. E.g., deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla.1973); Hynds v. Thomas, 543 So. 2d 464 (Fla.2d DCA 1989). See also Brackin v. Boles, 452 So. 2d 540 (Fla.1984). Whether violation of the ordinance is a proximate cause of the injury is a jury issue. Here, the court did not err by determining that the ordinance was relevant and that the j…
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Rupert v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 596 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…vehicle. We disagree. In view of Joyce Rupert’s testimony, State Auto has failed to show unequivocally that the phantom vehicle was not driven negligently or that Joyce’s own negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injuries. Hynds v. Thomas, 543 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Accordingly, we reverse the final summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. PATTERSON and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Wills v. Sears, 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977)
- In re Transition Rule 15, 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973)