RICHARD HEDRICK, A/K/A RICHARD HENDRICK, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Hedrick appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to correct sentence, arguing he should receive credit for time spent in custody while incompetent to stand trial against his three-year detention requirement as a condition of probation. The court affirmed the denial, holding that Hedrick had waived such credit through his plea agreement.
Hedrick was not entitled to credit for time served while incompetent to stand trial because he had expressly waived such credit as part of his plea agreement. The three-year detention requirement began on February 6, 1987, the date of the plea agreement, and Hedrick was held to the terms of his bargain.
[1] A defendant may waive credit for time served as part of a plea agreement.
[2] A defendant may be held to the terms of a plea agreement, even if those terms involve waiving statutory rights.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The plea agreement was fully explained to appellant in open court and his response indicates he was fully cognizant that he was expressly waiving his right to seek early release from his three years of detention, by appeal or otherwise.”
Establishes that Hedrick knowingly and expressly waived credit for time served as part of his plea agreement
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHedrick was arrested in June 1984 for second-degree murder and battery against law enforcement officers. He was found incompetent to stand trial in Se…
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HERBOTH S. RYDER, Associate Judge.
This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to correct sentence. We affirm.
On June 3, 1984, appellant was arrested and charged with second-degree murder. While in custody, he was further charged with two counts of battery against a law enforcement officer. - On September 26, 1984, appellant was adjudged incompetent to stand trial and was sent to the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee. He remained at Chattahoochee for two years and three months and was then transferred to the Dade County jail. After approximately two months in jail, appellant was deemed competent.
On February 6, 1987, the parties entered into a plea agreement in which they stipulated that appellant was not guilty by reason of insanity on the second-degree murder charge and appellant pleaded nolo con-tendere to the two counts of battery against a law enforcement officer. Appellant agreed to be placed on three years’ probation, with the special condition that he serve three years of detention in a secure mental health facility. If released or transferred from such a facility for any reason prior to the end of the three years, he agreed to serve the balance of the three years in jail. Appellant also agreed not to “seek early termination ... from either the State Hospital or from probation.”
About one year later, appellant filed his motion to correct sentence, maintaining that section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1987), and the supreme court’s recent decision in Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738 (Fla.1987), required that he be given credit for the entire time he spent in custody while incompetent to stand trial, which amounts to two years and five months, against the incarceration that was a special condition of his probation. A hearing was held and the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the three years required as a special condition of probation began on February 6, 1987 and that appellant had waived credit for time served and gain time. This appeal timely ensued.
We have reviewed the record and find that no error was committed. The plea agreement was fully explained to appellant in open court and his response indicates he was fully cognizant that he was expressly waiving his right to seek early release from his three years of detention, by appeal or otherwise. Further, appellant used his nolo plea and his promise to abide by the special conditions of his probation as a lever to extract from the state its agreement to nol-pros the second-degree murder charge. We will hold appellant to his bargain.
Affirmed.
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State v. LaFAVE, 113 So. 3d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…t to which he [or she] is legally entitled under the Constitution, a statute, or a contract.” Garcia, 722 So. 2d at 907; State, Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. E.D.S. Fed. Corp., 631 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Hedrick v. State, 543 So. 2d 873, 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (affirming denial of motion to correct sentence where plea agreement specifically provided that appellant agreed “not to ‘seek early termination ... from either the State Hospital or from probation,’ ” which constituted a wai…
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Morales v. State, 844 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Jones v. State, 635 So. 2d 41, 42-43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Hedrick v. State, 543 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)(“The plea agreement was fully explained to appellant in open court and his response indicates he was fully cognizant that he was expressly waiving his right to seek early release from his three years of detention, by appeal o…
Authorities Cited
- Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1987)