KIM O'LEESKY, FORMERLY KNOWN AS KIM LIGGETT, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES L. LIGGETT, APPELLEE
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Kim O'Leesky appealed a dissolution of marriage judgment, contending the trial court failed to make an equitable distribution of marital property, specifically a $140,000 pension plan contribution made during the two-year marriage. The court reversed in part and remanded, holding that pension plans are marital assets subject to equitable distribution if marital efforts or earnings contributed to their acquisition or enhancement.
A spouse's pension or retirement benefits must be considered a marital asset for purposes of equitable distribution if marital efforts or earnings were used to acquire or enhance the plan. The trial court must make specific findings of fact disclosing the basis for equitable distribution of assets accumulated during the marriage, or enter findings justifying the lack of any equitable distribution. Equitable distribution does not require equal distribution but must consider factors including standard of living, duration of marriage, and each party's contribution to the marriage.
[1] A spouse's entitlement to pension or retirement benefits acquired during a marriage is considered a marital asset subject to equitable distribution.
[2] If no marital efforts or earnings were used to acquire a pension plan or enhance its value, it is not a marital asset subject to equitable distribution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[A] spouse's entitlement to pension or retirement benefits must be considered a marital asset for purposes of equitably distributing marital property.”
Establishes that pension plans are subject to equitable distribution in dissolution proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for two years. During the marriage, $140,000 was contributed to the appellee's pension plan. The parties disputed what contri…
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HALL, Judge.
The appellant, Kim O’Leesky, appeals the final judgment in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. She contends that the trial court erred when it failed to make an equitable distribution of the marital property as requested by her in her petition for dissolution. We find merit in the appellant’s argument and reverse the judgment of dissolution in part.
The parties disagree as to what contribution, if any, the appellant made to the acquisition of marital assets during the parties’ two-year marriage. The asset in question is the appellee’s pension plan, to which $140,000 was contributed during the marriage. “[A] spouse’s entitlement to pension or retirement benefits must be considered a marital asset for purposes of equitably distributing marital property.” Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265, 270 (Fla.1986). “The instant decision represents no revolutionary departure from Florida law.” 491 So. 2d at 269. However, if no marital efforts or earnings were used to acquire the pension plan or to enhance its value, the plan and any appreciation to it is not a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. Wright v. Wright, 505 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
The trial judge did not make any finding as to the disposition of the pension plan nor did he justify his failure to make some equitable distribution of the marital property. See Miceli v. Miceli, 533 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Danoff v. Da- noff, 501 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Van Boven v. Van Boven, 453 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Without these findings, we cannot assess the propriety of the final judgment.
We approve the final judgment except as to the provision for lump sum alimony and the division of marital property and remand this cause with directions that the trial court make specific findings, which we believe essential in matters of this kind, disclosing the basis for equitable distribution of the assets accumulated during the marriage, or enter findings of fact to justify the lack of any equitable distribution.
If the trial court should make an equitable distribution of the marital assets it should consider the following guidelines. An equitable distribution does not require an equal distribution. Equitable distribution encompasses not only assets acquired during the marriage, but also premarital assets contributed to or enhanced during the coverture.1 Nevertheless, a trial court may consider the standard of living established during the marriage, the duration of the marriage, the contribution of each party to the marriage, and any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties. Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), approved, 466 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1985).
The trial court, in its discretion, may direct the receipt of further evidence or arguments by the parties or may resolve the matter on the existing record.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
FRANK, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur. . "Once that fact is properly decided, then, as a matter of law, marital assets must be considered for equitable distribution purposes. It then becomes a matter of sound judicial discretion based upon equitable principles as to the amount each party is to receive as equitable distribution.” Macaluso v. Macaluso, 523 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
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Clemson v. Cathleen Carol Clemson, 546 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…distribution. While we have not previously nor do we now impose a requirement that the trial judge make specific findings of fact in respect to every equitable distribution, in certain situations, such findings are needed. See, O’Leesky v. Liggett, 544 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Miceli v. Miceli, 533 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).2 We affirm the trial court’s award of permanent alimony and its retention of jurisdiction to consider an award of costs and attorney’s fees to the wife. We also affirm the po…
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Demont v. Demont, 67 So. 3d 1096 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…r jointly 'by them.” § 61.075(6)(a)1.a., Fla. Stat. (2009); Heinrich v. Heinrich, 609 So. 2d 94, 95-96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). The initial determination as to whether an asset is marital or non-marital is a fact-finding process. See O’Leesky v. Liggett, 544 So. 2d 268, 269 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Macaluso v. Macaluso, 523 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The ultimate conclusion that an asset is marital and therefore subject to equitable distribution is a question of law, subject to de novo review. See Farrior…
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O'Dell v. O'Dell, 583 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…la. 1st DCA 1988); Crapps v. Crapps, 501 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 511 So. 2d 297 (Fla.1987). . See Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1985). . See Clemson v. Clemson, 546 So. 2d 75, 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); O’Leesky v. Liggett, 544 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). See also Carroll v. Carroll, 528 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 538 So. 2d 1255 (Fla.1988); Barrs v. Barrs, 505 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Danoff v. Danoff, 501 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Although not presently…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1986)
- Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1985)
- Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Miceli v. Miceli, 533 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Danoff v. Burton H. Danoff, 501 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Wright v. Wright, 505 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Fica v. State, 523 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- MacAluso v. MacAluso, 523 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- van Boven v. Dr. John van Boven, III, M.D., 453 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)