J. FRANK ARNOLD, III, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Frank Arnold pleaded nolo contendere to cocaine possession while reserving the right to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress. The court reversed, holding that the traffic stop was a pretextual violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because the officer used a minor traffic infraction as a cover to search for drugs based on the appellant's reputation.
The court held that the motion to suppress should have been granted because the officer used a minor traffic violation as a pretext to stop the vehicle. The state failed to show that a reasonable officer would have made the stop absent an additional invalid purpose.
[1] A traffic stop is invalid if the arresting officer uses a minor traffic violation as a pretext to stop a vehicle, absent evidence that a reasonable officer would have mad…
[2] An officer's suspicion of intoxication, based on a vehicle weaving over a dividing line without endangering other vehicles, may not be sufficient to justify a stop if the…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the state must show under the particular circumstances that a reasonable officer would have made the stop "absent an additional invalid purpose."”
Establishes the legal standard from Kehoe v. State that the state must prove the stop would have been made regardless of the officer's intent to search for drugs.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn December 1987, Deputy Kenney knew the appellant was involved in drug trafficking and had been monitoring his vehicle at a restaurant. When Arnold l…
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[*295] THREADGILL, Judge.
The appellant, Frank Arnold, pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine, specifically reserving his right to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress. We agree that the motion should have been granted and therefore reverse the conviction and sentence.
In December, 1987, Deputy John Kenney of the Manatee County Sheriffs Office was on routine patrol and noticed a car which he knew belonged to the appellant at a restaurant. Kenney had heard that the appellant was involved in the drug trade • and had previously conducted an investigation, albeit unsuccessful, of the appellant. He apprised another officer of the location of the car and asked to be notified if the car left the restaurant.
The appellant left the restaurant at around 2:30 in the morning, and Kenney and the other officer followed in separate vehicles. Officer Kenney testified that he observed the appellant’s car weave over the dividing line several times, and that although it did not endanger any other vehicles, he suspected intoxication and decided to stop the ear. As the car pulled over, Kenney observed the appellant make a stuffing motion under the seat. As soon as the appellant vacated the vehicle, Ken-ney searched under the seat, despite the appellant’s inquiry concerning the need for a search warrant. Underneath the seat Kenney found cocaine in a “cocaine sifter.”
We find that the motion to suppress should have been granted because the arresting officer used a minor traffic violation as a pretext to stop the appellant’s vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court in Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.1988), declined to adopt a “could arrest” approach and held that the state must show under the particular circumstances that a reasonable officer would have made the stop “absent an additional invalid purpose.” 521 So. 2d at 1097.
The transcript clearly indicates that Ken-ney was on the lookout for the appellant, and was watching for any minor traffic violation so that he could stop and search the vehicle. The officer testified that he stopped the car on suspicion of D.U.I., but he requested no field sobriety tests nor did he issue a ticket for the alleged weaving. As noted in Kehoe, it is difficult to drive without occasional minor violations. Id. See also Brown v. State, 62 So. 2d 348 (Fla.1952). It is apparent that the officer used the crossing of the center line to justify the stop so he could search the car for drugs.
While a search of an automobile is permissible where the officer has a reasonable belief that a suspect is dangerous and may be armed based on specific, articulable facts, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201, 1220 (1983); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), we do not find that the search here was based on such facts. The transcripts clearly reflect that the state used the appellant’s reputation to justify the search of his vehicle, despite knowledge that information concerning, his alleged drug activities had previously proved unreliable. The officers thus had no legally objective belief that the appellant was an armed narcotics smuggler sufficient to justify a weapons search immediately upon stopping the vehicle.
Absent the reputation, the only possible justification for the search would be the stuffing motion the appellant made pri-or to the stop. This court held in G.J.P. v. State, 469 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), that quick movements alone are not enough to sustain a temporary detention for further investigation. See also Currens v. State, 363 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
We, therefore, reverse and remand with instructions that the appellant be discharged.
Reversed and remanded.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur.
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Alton Brown v. State, 577 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…e at 1097. Here, several factors indicate a pretext, including the fact that Brown was not cited for a traffic violation. See Smith v. State, 564 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Whitfield v. State, 559 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Arnold v. State, 544 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Further, at the hearing, Officer Cuicci was unable to cite the ordinance and the state did not present evidence of such an ordinance. Moreover, the officer admitted that police cars were parked on the same side of the street as B…
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White v. State, 619 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…State v. Lagree, 595 [*431] So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). And Lock-ard never pursued the purported basis for the stop by issuing a citation or a warning for the loud music. See Brown v. State, 577 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1991); Arnold v. State, 544 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Because there is no record support for the judge’s finding that the stop was not pre-textual, we conclude that the judge reversibly erred in making this finding and in basing his judgment upon the fruits of the unlawful stop. Tu…
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Charlton v. State, 550 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…the fruits of a pretextual stop. We disagree. Investigatory stops for noncriminal traffic infractions may raise the possibility that the stop was but a pretext for a search leading to an arrest on more serious charges. See, e.g., Arnold, v. State, 544 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (unlawful pretext stop for crossing center line); Monroe v. State, 543 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (unlawful pretext stop for bald tire); Porcher v. State, 538 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (unlawful pretext stop for followin…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (U.S. 1983)
- Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1988)
- G.J.P. v. State, 469 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Brown v. State, 62 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1952)
- Currens v. State, 363 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)