TIMOTHY MICHAEL WOOD, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that failure to comply with procedural due process requirements when assessing court costs against criminal defendants constitutes fundamental error that does not require a contemporaneous objection to preserve for appeal. The court reversed the Second District Court of Appeal's holding that Wood waived his challenge to an improper cost assessment by failing to object at sentencing.
A contemporaneous objection is not necessary to preserve a challenge to the improper assessment of court costs. The failure to comply with Jenkins procedural due process requirements constitutes fundamental error that can be raised on appeal without a prior objection at sentencing.
[1] The failure to provide adequate notice and a meaningful hearing before imposing costs on a criminal defendant constitutes fundamental error.
[2] A contemporaneous objection is not necessary to preserve for appellate review the issue of improper cost imposition on an indigent defendant without prior notice.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“court costs could not be assessed against a defendant without adequate notice and a judicial determination that the defendant has the ability to pay”
Establishes the core holding of Jenkins regarding due process requirements for cost assessment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTimothy Wood pled guilty to grand theft and uttering worthless checks. At sentencing, the trial court assessed court costs against Wood pursuant to Fl…
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PER CURIAM.
We have for review the opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal in Wood v. State, 519 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The court in that case certified to this Court the same question it had certified in Barker v. State, 518 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). We also review this issue in Henriquez v. State, 545 So. 2d 1340 (Fla.1989). The certified question before us asks:
WHETHER A CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW THE PROPRIETY OF IMPOSING COSTS ON AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT AT A SENTENCING HEARING WITHOUT THE PRIOR NOTICE REQUIRED BY JENKINS V. STATE, 444 SO.2D 947 (FLA.1984).
Barker, 518 So. 2d at 452. See also Wood, 519 So. 2d at 731. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Wood pled guilty to several counts of grand theft and uttering worthless checks and was convicted on those counts. At sentencing the trial court informed Wood that court costs would be assessed against him pursuant to section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1985).
On appeal to the second district, the court held that because Wood did not contemporaneously object to the assessment he had waived his claim that he did not receive adequate notice of the assessment of costs as required by Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). The court then noted that it was certifying the same question it had certified to us in Barker, though it declined to actually recite the question in the opinion.
Thus we are confronted with the question of whether the failure to comply with procedural due process requirements for assessing costs against criminal defendants, as enunciated in Jenkins, constitutes fundamental error. In Outar v. State, 508 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), the fifth district, and in Bellinger v. State, 514 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the first district, held that this failure does constitute fundamental error, therefore obviating the requirement of a contemporaneous objection.
We begin our analysis by noting that in Jenkins we impliedly held that such due process violations are fundamental error. That case, like this one, involved a defendant who had costs and statutory liens imposed upon him without prior notice or hearing. Just as in this case, Jenkins failed to object to the assessment of costs. Jenkins v. State, 422 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), approved in part, disapproved in part, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). Although our majority opinion in that case .does not directly address the contemporaneous objection requirement, we did note our disagreement with the district court’s holding that an affirmative objection was necessary for appellate review in that situation. Id. at 949.
Here though, we are directly confronted with the question of fundamental error in failure to comply with Jenkins. Our opinion in Jenkins is founded upon constitutional rights of due process and the most basic requirements of adequate notice and meaningful hearing prior to the termination of substantive rights or some other state-enforced penalty. In Jenkins we held that court costs could not be assessed against a defendant without adequate notice and a judicial determination that the defendant has the ability to pay. Id. at 950.
This holding goes to the very heart of the requirements of the due process clauses of our state and federal constitutions. The denial of these basic constitutional rights constitutes fundamental error. In Barker, the second district reasoned that the same costs would mechanically be reimposed following notice and hearing as required by Jenkins. Were this true in every case, there would be no need for notice and hearings. Unfortunately, costs are sometimes incorrectly assessed against defendants. It is the rights of these persons whom the due process clause seeks to protect, and it is fundamental error for a court to fail to protect those rights. Without adequate notice and a meaningful hearing, a court has no way of knowing who should pay costs and who should not. Without adequate notice and a meaningful hearing, the requirements of due process have not been met.
Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative, quash the decision of the second district in Wood, and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, shaw, barkett, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
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Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2000)…ions of fundamental error describe trial error, this Court has at times referred to unpre-served errors in the sentencing context as “fundamental”. and corrected them on direct appeal. See State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993); Wood v. State, 544 So. 2d 1004 (Fla.1989). In Johnson, for instance, we found that the defendant’s claim that the habitual offender statute violated the single subject requirement constituted fundamental error. 616 So. 2d at 3—4. In reaching this conclusion, we noted that to be f…1 / 2
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State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1991)…cision with the requirements of Jenkins, i.e., that a defendant must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to assessment of costs and, before repayment is enforced, a court must determine the defendant’s ability to pay. Wood v. State, 544 So. 2d 1004 (Fla.1989), held that the failure to comply with the procedural due process requirements for assessing costs against an indigent defendant, as enunciated in Jenkins, constituted fundamental error.3 See also Shipley v. State, 528 So. 2d 902 (Fla.1988…1 / 2
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del Valle v. State, 80 So. 3d 999 (Fla. 2011)…Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993) (“[F]or an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process.”); Wood v. State, 544 So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Fla.1989) (“[S]uch due process violations are fundamental error.”). [*1005] The State’s mootness argument must also fail. Although we recognize that Del Valle’s probation has already been terminated by the trial court, “[i]t is well settled t…
Previewing 3 of 90 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Henriquez v. State, 545 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1989)
- Jenkins v. State, 422 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Outar v. State, 508 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Darrin Bellinger v. State, 514 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Barker v. State, 518 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Wood v. State, 519 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)