JAMES C. BURNS, JR., AND GERDA BURNS, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL OF LARGO, AN AFFILIATE OF HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA, GEORGE SPOTO, JR., M.D., AND DIAGNOSTIC CLINIC, INC., APPELLEES
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PER CURIAM.
The appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Burns, the plaintiffs in the trial court, challenge the directed verdict entered in favor. of the defendants/appellees in this medical malpractice suit. The trial court granted the appellees’ motions for the directed verdict at the close of the appellants’ case-in-chief. We have carefully reviewed the entire record in this case, particularly the testimony of the appellants’ expert witness, Dr. Bussey. After careful consideration of the record, the briefs, and oral argument, we find that the trial court did not err in so directing the verdict. The appellants failed to present a prima facie case of negligence under any theory, including res ipsa loquitur. See Marrero v. Goldsmith, 486 So. 2d 530 (Fla.1986); Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla.1984).
Accordingly, we affirm.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and HALL and PARKER, JJ., concur.
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Millard v. Brannan, 553 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…the question to the supreme court, has held that a party [*1252] seeking attorney’s fees under the medical malpractice statute was not precluded from recovering statutory attorney’s fees by failing to request them in the pleading. Heath v. PiRoman, 544 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). But cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 346 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (disallowance of statutory dissolution of marriage attorney’s fees for failure to plead). The third district court has held that a party seeking attorney’s fees unde…
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Authorities Cited
- Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984)
- Marrero v. Malcolm G. Goldsmith, M.D., 486 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1986)