RICARDO NUNEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
CAPITAL ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., APPELLEE
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In this declaratory decree action, a Florida appellate court reversed summary judgment finding that an insured had no excess uninsured motorist coverage, holding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the insured knowingly rejected the coverage.
The court held that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the insured knowingly rejected all excess uninsured motorist coverage, and therefore summary judgment was improper. The confusion on the record as to the nature and scope of the rejection—whether it applied to all excess coverage or only the $2,000,000 coverage—precludes summary judgment.
[1] Genuine issues of material fact regarding whether an insured knowingly rejected uninsured motorist coverage preclude summary judgment.
[2] An insured's testimony that they believed a written rejection applied only to a specific amount of coverage, rather than all excess coverage, can create a factual dispute…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This is an appeal by the insured Ricardo Nunez from an adverse final summary judgment in a declaratory decree action wherein it was determined that the insured has no excess uninsured motorist coverage with the insurer Capital Assurance Co. We reverse the summary judgment under review upon a holding that genuine issues of material fact exist on this record as to whether the insured knowingly rejected the subject uninsured motorist coverage.”
Establishes the central issue and the court's holding that material fact questions preclude summary judgment.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRicardo Nunez purchased an insurance policy with an underlying and excess uninsured motorist component. He testified that he originally purchased $1,0…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the insured Ricardo Nunez from an adverse final summary judgment in a declaratory decree action wherein it was determined that the insured has no excess uninsured motorist coverage with the insurer Capital Assurance Co. We reverse the summary judgment under review upon a holding that genuine issues of material fact exist on this record as to whether the insured knowingly rejected the subject uninsured motorist coverage.
Although the insured signed a written rejection of all excess uninsured motorist coverage some weeks after the underlying and excess policy was sold to him, there is considerable confusion on this record as to whether this was a knowing rejection. The insured testified by deposition that he originally purchased $1,000,000 in excess uninsured motorist coverage and that he rejected $2,000,000 of such coverage when offered by the insurer’s agent. The insured’s original insurance application arguably corroborates this testimony in that it tends to indicate (although does not compel a finding) that the insured wanted some type of excess uninsured motorist coverage. The insured further testified by deposition that he thought his subsequent written rejection related solely to the $2,000,000 uninsured motorist coverage which he says he did not want. This being so, we think that the confusion shown on this record as to whether this was a knowing rejection of all excess uninsured motorist coverage precludes a summary judgment in this case. See Lumbermen’s Mut Casualty Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Wilson v. National Indem. Co., 302 So. 2d 141, 141-42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); cf. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Darden, 338 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. dismissed, 353 So. 2d 680 (Fla.1977). But cf. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 406 So. 2d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), rev. denied, 413 So. 2d 877 (Fla.1982).
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Russell v. State, 355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Jerrold B. Wilson v. Nat'l Indem. Co., 302 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Darden, 338 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 406 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)