ROBERT BERNARD FRANKLIN, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1989-06-15
No. 72488
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
545 So. 2d 851 Florida Supreme Court (1989) Negative Treatment
Cited by 202 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court answered a certified question of great public importance regarding the sentencing authority of trial courts when a defendant violates probation or community control following a split sentence. The Court held that upon violation of a probationary split sentence, a judge may resentence the defendant to any term within the original guidelines range, including a one-cell upward increase, but no further departure is permitted.


Holding

Upon a violation of probation during a probationary split sentence, a trial court may resentence the defendant to any term falling within the original guidelines range, including the one-cell upward increase permitted by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)14. However, no further increase or departure is permitted for any reason.


Headnotes

[1] Florida law recognizes two forms of "split sentences": a "true split sentence" where incarceration is suspended, and a "probationary split sentence" where incarceration i…

[2] Upon violation of probation after a true split sentence, a judge may resentence a defendant to any time not exceeding the withheld portion of the original sentence, with…

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Key Quotes

“Upon a violation of probation during a probationary split sentence, a trial court may resentence the defendant to any term falling within the original guidelines range, including the one-cell upward increase. However, no further increase or departure is permitted for any reason.”

This establishes the holding regarding the scope of sentencing authority upon probation violation.

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Facts & Procedural History

Robert Bernard Franklin was sentenced to a term of incarceration followed by community control. After serving 3 years and 43 days of incarceration, he…

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Opinion of the Court
BARKETT, Justice.

BARKETT, Justice.

We have for review Franklin v. State, 526 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (en banc), which certified the following question of great public importance:

Having sentenced a defendant to a term of incarceration followed by probation or community control, may the court after a violation of the probation or community control, impose any sentence which could have been originally imposed with credit for time served and must such sentence be within the guideline range unless valid reasons for departure are given[?]

Id. at 164. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. In the recent opinion of Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1988), we cited with approval the opinion of the Fifth District below, id. at 164, and held that Florida law recognizes two forms of “split sentences.” The first, a “true split sentence,” occurs when the judge sentences the defendant to incarceration but suspends a portion of the term. The second, a “probationary split sentence,” occurs when the judge sentences a defendant to a period of incarceration followed by a period of probation or any form of community control. The sentence in this instance is of the second type.

Under Poore, a judge is entitled to impose a true split sentence for any length of time provided by law so long as the incarcerative portion falls within the guidelines recommendation, assuming no valid reason for departure exists for the initial sentence. Upon the violation of probation after incarceration, the judge then may re-sentence the defendant to any period of time not exceeding the remaining balance of the withheld or suspended portion of the original sentence, provided that the total period of incarceration, including time already served, may not exceed the one-cell upward increase permitted by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)14. Any further departure for violation of probation is not allowed. Lambert v. State, 545 So. 2d 838, 841-842 (Fla.1989).

In cases involving a probationary split sentence, the judge also may impose sentence for any length of time provided by law so long as the incarcerative portion does not exceed the guidelines, unless a valid reason for departure exists. Upon the violation of probation, however, the judge then may sentence the defendant to any period of incarceration permitted by the guidelines up to the maximum provided by the one-cell upward increase, with credit for time served. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)14.

In the present case, petitioner had served 3 years and 43 days of incarceration and then violated the terms of his subsequent community control. Upon resentencing, the guidelines range without the one-cell upward increase was 12 to 17 years, whereas it would have been between 17 and 22 years with the upward increase. Effectively, the recommended sentencing range in this instance was between 12 and 22 years. This meant the judge could have imposed additional incarceration of between 8 years, 322 days and 18 years, 322 days, since petitioner already had served 3 years, 43 days.

The judge in this case resentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of 15 years, with credit for time served, for a total additional incarceration of 11 years, 322 days. This sentence met the requirements of Florida law. Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)14, the judge may, but is not required to, increase upward by one cell. In this instance, the judge validly exercised his discretion not to increase, but chose to impose a sentence in the lower end of the permissible range.

We give a qualified affirmative answer to the certified question. Upon a violation of probation during a probationary split sentence, a trial court may resentence the defendant to any term falling within the original guidelines range, including the one-cell upward increase. However, no further increase or departure is permitted for any reason. Lambert. We approve the result reached below.

It is so ordered.

EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (98 total)

  • REE v. State, 565 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1990)
    …that any departure sentence for probation violation is impermissible if it exceeds the one-cell increase permitted by the sentencing guidelines. Lambert, 545 So. 2d at 842. Accord State v. Tuthill, 545 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla.1989); Franklin v. State, 545 So. 2d 851, 852-53 (Fla.1989). The rationale for our holding in Lambert is, first, that the guidelines do not permit departure based on an “offense” of which the defendant may eventually be acquitted. Lambert, 545 So. 2d at 841 (citing Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(…
  • Duncan v. Moore, 754 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2000)
    …t is the releasee’s intervening misconduct which triggers the new sentence. See Lawson v. State, 751 So. 2d 623, 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(discussing community control revocation); Franklin v. State, 526 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)(same), approved, 545 So. 2d 851 (Fla.1989), disapproved in part on other grounds, State v. Watts, 558 So. 2d 994 (Fla.1990). Therefore, we find that requiring that a Conditional Release eligible inmate finish his or her sentence by satisfactorily completing a period of post-priso…
  • Louie Anthony Sellers v. State, 578 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
    …ase authorized by rule 3.701(d)(14) for violating community control or probation is based on the permitted range shown on the original guidelines scoresheet used at the first sentencing. Peters v. State, 531 So. 2d 121 (Fla.1988); Franklin v. State, 545 So. 2d 851 (Fla.1989); True v. State, 564 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Washington v. State, 564 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Denegal v. State, 562 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Hosmer v. State, 523 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Lockett v. State, 516…

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