SHEILA J. LARA, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
FORTUNE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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Lara appealed a trial court's award of only $750 in attorney's fees in a dispute with her insurer over PIP benefits, while Fortune cross-appealed seeking to eliminate the fee award entirely. The court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the fee calculation, finding the trial court failed to apply the required Rowe lodestar factors adequately, but affirmed that Lara was entitled to some attorney's fee.
The trial court's fee award of $750 must be reversed and remanded because the court failed to properly apply the Rowe lodestar factors by not setting forth specific findings regarding reasonable hours worked, hourly rate, or the calculation methodology. However, Lara was entitled to recover some attorney's fees, and on remand the calculation should be limited to work performed through July 16, 1986.
[1] A trial court must set forth specific findings and state the grounds upon which an attorney's fee award is based, including the reasonable number of hours and the reasona…
[2] When determining attorney's fees in a contingency fee case, a trial court must apply all factors set forth in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. …
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under Rowe, the trial court must set forth specific findings and state the grounds upon which the fee is based.”
Establishes the standard requiring trial courts to document the basis for attorney's fee awards using the lodestar method
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLara was injured in an automobile accident on January 2, 1986, and was insured by Fortune for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. Fortune faile…
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RYDER, Judge.
Sheila J. Lara objects to a trial court order which granted to her an attorney’s fee of only $750.00 to be paid by appel-lee/cross-appellant Fortune Insurance Company. On cross-appeal Fortune challenges Lara’s right to any fee, and claims entitlement to attorney’s fees from Lara under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1987). We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing as to the point on main appeal but affirm on cross-appeal.
Lara sustained injuries in an automobile accident which occurred on January 2, 1986. On that date, she was insured by Fortune for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, which she requested Fortune pay as lost wages. Fortune did not timely pay these benefits as required by section 627.736(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), and Lara filed a complaint to obtain her benefits.
On July 16,1986, after several months of litigation, Fortune offered to pay the policy limits and an attorney’s fee of $3,500.00 to Lara on the condition that the check be made payable jointly to Lara and her medical providers. Lara refused this offer, and insisted Fortune make the check payable solely to her as lost wages. On December 18, 1988, the trial court allowed Fortune to tender the policy limits into the court registry and ruled that Lara was entitled to an attorney’s fee.
Subsequently, the court ruled Lara’s attorney fee entitlement to be $750.00. In its order, the court set forth the facts and specifically stated it had considered the federal lodestar equation as required by Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985.) However, the court did not set forth how it arrived at the figure of $750.00, did not set forth the reasonable number of hours for which compensation was owed, and did not set forth the reasonable hourly rate at which Lara’s attorney was to be compensated. Under Rowe, the trial court must set forth specific findings and state the grounds upon which the fee is based. Id. at 1151. Therefore, we must reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing after which the trial court should apply all of the Rowe factors to this contingency fee case.
During oral argument before this court, both parties agreed that appellant’s entitlement to attorney’s fees does not extend beyond July 16, 1986. Therefore, upon remand, the trial court should limit its consideration to that time expended by Lara’s attorney until that date.
Appeal reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Cross-appeal affirmed.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
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Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Schick, 553 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…o meet the requirement that the trial court set forth specific findings to support any enhancement factor applied in awarding an attorney’s fees. Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985); Lara v. Fortune Insurance Co., 545 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Atlantis Building B Condominium Association v. Skawski, 544 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). See also Beisswenger v. Omicron Construction and Development Co., 552 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Accordingly, we reverse the final…
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KEY W. Polo Club Developers, Inc. v. Towers Constr. Co. OF Panama City, Inc., 589 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…set forth the reasonable hourly rate at which Towers’ attorney was to be compensated. Under Rowe, the trial court must set forth specific findings and state the grounds upon which the fee awarded is based. Id. at 1151. See Lara v. Fortune Ins. Co., 545 So. 2d 909 (Fla.2d DCA 1989). Accordingly, we reverse the amount awarded and remand for an evidentiary hearing after which the trial court should apply the analysis outlined in Rowe. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.…
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LOW Cost Auto Pawn, Inc. v. Greco, 851 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…ent’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985), in addition to the contract for contingency attorney’s fees. Because the trial court failed to make findings regarding the Rowe factors, reversal is required. See Lara v. Fortune Ins. Co., 545 So. 2d 909, 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Hoover, 833 So. 2d 261, 261-62 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). On remand, the trial court shall also recalculate the amount of costs because the cost award erroneously includes a portion of attorney’s fe…
Authorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)