DAVID S. PROSSER, ISAIAS RAMOSE AND ELOUISA RAMOSE, PETITIONERS,
v.
POLK COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Polk County sought to condemn land located in Hillsborough County for a road extension project. The Florida appellate court held that counties have statutory authority to condemn property outside their territorial limits for non-recreational purposes, and that the statutory prohibition on extraterritorial condemnation applies only to recreational uses.
Polk County may condemn property located outside its territorial limits for non-recreational county purposes. The statutory prohibition on extraterritorial condemnation in section 127.01(2), Florida Statutes, applies only when the condemned property is intended for parks, playgrounds, recreational centers, or other recreational purposes.
[1] A petition for writ of prohibition is properly treated as a petition for writ of certiorari when it does not allege a total absence of subject matter jurisdiction.
[2] The authority of a county government to exercise the power of eminent domain is derived solely from statute.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the authority of a county government to exercise the power of eminent domain derives solely from statute”
Establishes that county condemnation power is entirely statutory, requiring interpretation of relevant statutes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolk County initiated eminent domain proceedings to condemn property owned by David Prosser and Isaias and Elouisa Ramose located in Hillsborough Coun…
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PER CURIAM.
David Prosser and Isaias and Elouisa Ramose seek a writ of prohibition to bar the circuit court from proceeding with an eminent domain action brought by Polk County. Because the petition does not allege a total absence of subject matter jurisdiction; see English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla.1977); we treat the pleading as a petition for writ of certiorari. Art. Y, § 2(a), Fla. Const.; Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(c).
Polk County seeks to condemn petitioners’ land to facilitate an extension of County Line Road from New Tampa Highway southward to State Road 60. The new road and its right-of-way, if constructed, would roughly parallel the boundary between Polk and Hillsborough Counties. Petitioners’ property lies within Hillsborough County, and so the condemnation proceedings were commenced in that circuit. Because this project has been undertaken solely by Polk County, Hillsborough County has taken no part in and voiced no objection to the proceedings.
The sole question presented by this petition is whether Polk County may condemn and take property located outside its territorial limits. Petitioners argue that it cannot do so without express legislative authority, and that no such authority has been granted. While we do not dispute that the authority of a county government to exercise the power of eminent domain derives solely from statute; Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311, 31 So. 2d 483 (1947); and while the applicable statute is silent as to where such property may lie, we cannot find that the present action is therefore precluded.
Section 127.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), delegates to each county of the state “the right to appropriate property, except state or federal, for any county purpose.” No limitation is placed upon the location of such property. However, subsection (2) of the statute, which was added in 1945 by Chapter 22802, Laws of Florida, does state that “no county has the right to condemn any lands outside its own county boundaries for parks, playgrounds, recreational centers, or other recreational purposes ” (emphasis supplied). Polk County argues, and we agree, that these provisions should be construed in pari materia and that they admit to only one reasonable interpretation: a legislative intent to circumscribe the geographical extent of otherwise valid county condemnation proceedings only when recreational use of the subject property is contemplated.
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.
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Pinellas Cnty. v. Baldwin, 80 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…rred entirely outside the County’s limits in another county. Thus there may be a question about the County’s authority to exercise the power of eminent domain in another jurisdiction in the manner alleged in the complaint. Cf. Prosser v. Polk Cnty., 545 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (holding that Polk County had the authority to condemn and take property outside its territorial limits for a road project that roughly paralleled the boundary between Polk and Hillsborough Counties). On appeal, the County argues…
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Kirkland v. City OF Lakeland, 3 So. 3d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…a road. This court has previously upheld the exercise of eminent domain powers delegated to Polk County to permit that county to take land inside Hillsborough County, at least when Hillsborough County voiced no objection. See Prosser v. Polk County, 545 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Likewise, in this case, Polk County does not object to the taking. It is noteworthy that the City’s decision to take this land was based in large part upon an interlocal agreement between the City and Polk County. Under that agr…
Authorities Cited
- Carey English v. McCRARY, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977)
- Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co., Inc. v. Cnty. OF Brevard, 159 Fla. 311 (Fla. 1947)