BERNICE CAMILLO AND CALVIN CAMILLO, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF FLORIDA, MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA AND CITY OF KEY WEST, APPELLEES
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Bicyclist Bernice Camillo was injured when she swerved to avoid a collision and caught her foot on eyebolts extending from a seawall onto a DOT-maintained sidewalk in Key West, Florida. The court reversed summary judgment against the Department of Transportation, finding a jury question exists as to DOT's liability for maintaining streets free from known obstructions, but affirmed dismissal of Monroe County and the City of Key West based on lack of responsibility and sovereign immunity for legislative functions.
The DOT is potentially liable as a landowner responsible for maintaining its streets and sidewalks free from obstructions it knew or should have known about, even when created by third parties, and this liability is not barred by sovereign immunity. Monroe County is not liable because it had no responsibility for the area or defect. The City of Key West is not liable because any claim based on its approval of the mooring practice is foreclosed by sovereign immunity for legislative or enforcement functions.
[1] A governmental agency responsible for street and sidewalk maintenance may be liable for injuries caused by an obstruction, even if created by a third party, if the agency…
[2] A governmental entity's responsibility for maintaining streets and sidewalks free from obstructions is not subject to the defense of sovereign immunity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the responsibility of any governmental agency, as a landowner responsible for the area in question, to maintain its streets and sidewalks free from an obstruction of which it knew or should have known, even though that obstruction may have been initially created by some third person”
Establishes the core principle that DOT has a duty to maintain sidewalks free of obstructions regardless of who created them
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMs. Camillo was riding her bicycle on a sidewalk adjacent to U.S. 1 in Key West when she swerved to avoid an impending collision with a child and his …
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
As Ms. Camillo was riding her bicycle on the sidewalk adjacent to U.S. 1 in Key West, she was forced to swerve to avoid an impending collision with a child and his dog. As she did so, she caught her foot between three “eyebolts” which extended approximately two inches into the path through the seawall which was alongside the walkway. On the other side of the wall, the bolts provided a mooring for a houseboat allegedly owned by Mel Fisher. As a result of the accident, Ms. Camillo was thrown over the seawall and suffered serious injuries. She sued the Department of Transportation, which was responsible for the maintenance of the street and sidewalk, Monroe County, the City of Key West, and Fisher. Apparently on grounds of sovereign immunity, the trial judge entered summary judgment for the three governmental defendants, from which the plaintiffs, Ms. Camillo and her husband, have taken this appeal.1 We reverse as to the DOT and affirm as to the county and city.
In our judgment, a jury question is clearly presented as to the liability of the DOT. The basis of this holding is simply the responsibility of any governmental agency, as a landowner responsible for the area in question, to maintain its streets and sidewalks free from an obstruction of which it knew or should have known, even though that obstruction may have been initially created by some third person, here, presumably the defendant Fisher. Armas v. Metropolitan Dade County, 429 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); State Department of Transportation v. Kennedy, 429 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); see also Silver Palm Properties, Inc. v. Sullivan, 541 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (rehearing en banc granted November 9, 1988).
See generally Department of Transportation v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla.1982); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.1979).
It is clear also that this aspect of potential governmental liability is not, contrary to the DOT’s contention, subject to the defense of governmental immunity. Neilson, 419 So. 2d at 1071; Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1010; Foley v. State Department of Transportation, 422 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Haspil v. State Department of Transportation, 374 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); see also Trianon Park Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla.1985).
Nor is there any merit to the DOT-proposed distinction between a defect which is created in the course of time, as in most of the cited cases,2 and a so-called “permanent installation” such as this one. Both create obstructions in the entity’s street or sidewalk which, a jury could find, it negligently failed to remove or protect a pedestrian against.
Finally, the foreseeability of the accident is likewise clearly a factual question unresolveable by summary judgment. Crislip v. Holland, 401 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), pet. for review denied, 411 So. 2d 380 (Fla.1981). See generally Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
We reach a different conclusion as to the other two appellees. Insofar as the county is concerned, we are unable to detect any basis for its responsibility for the area or defect. Accordingly, it is simply not liable for the accident as a matter of law without reference to its status as a governmental subdivision.
The plaintiffs’ only assertion as to the City of Key West is the contention that it approved and condoned the practice of mooring boats with the use of the offending eyebolts. Such a claim is clearly foreclosed by those aspects of the law of sovereign immunity which preclude liability for the discharge of legislative or enforcement functions. Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 919-920.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
. Fisher remains a party below.
. For example, Kennedy involved a parking bumper which eroded leaving exposed reinforcing rods extending over the DOT’s sidewalk; Armas concerned a tree branch which extended over the city’s property from an adjacent privately owned area, resulting in the obstruction of a stop sign.
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S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Fla. Dep't OF Transp., 668 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…ng the order issued in DOT’s favor. Had the order before us been appealed by Lavaniegos, it would have most assuredly been reversible, as there were patently material questions of fact remaining to be resolved. See Camillo v. Department of Transp., 546 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), review denied, 547 So. 2d 1209 (Fla.1989). However, while Lavaniegos chose not to seek review of the determination, eodefendant Southern Bell chose to appeal the order. Pensacola Interstate Fair, Inc. v. Popovich, 389 So. 2d 117…
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Jauma v. The City OF Hialeah, 758 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…. [*698] Nevertheless, the City had a non-delegable duty to maintain its roads, sidewalks, and rights-of-way in a reasonably safe condition. See Grier v. Metro. Dade County, 660 So. 2d 273, 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), Canillo v. Dept. of Transportation, 546 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). The residents complained to the City about the flooding and City employees observed the flooding on more than one occasion. The City took no steps to correct the flooding or to ensure that the contractor did so. Thus, there wa…
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Warren v. State, 559 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…the mere fact that they were there to be seen does not render her own conduct in approaching them the sole legal cause of the accident. Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So. 2d 14, 22-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); see Camillo v. Department of Transp., 546 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), review denied, 547 So. 2d 1209 (Fla.1989). Compare Pope v. Cruise Boat Co., 380 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (pedestrian). Compare also Gloris v. Williams Paving Co., 556 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (pedestrian). The record t…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cnty., 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979)
- Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. City OF Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985)
- Dep't OF Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982)
- Stahl v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 438 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Jackson v. State, 401 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Armas v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 429 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Foley v. State, 422 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- State of Fla. Dep't OF Transp. v. Kennedy, 429 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Silver Palm Props., Inc. v. Sullivan, 541 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Haspil v. State of Fla. Dep't OF Transp., 374 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)