PHYLLIS I. REAVES, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT S. REAVES, JR., APPELLEE
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The appellate court reversed the trial court's order denying a wife's petition for continuation of rehabilitative alimony because a successor judge improperly decided the case on the record without hearing the live testimony presented before the original judge who had recused himself.
A successor judge who does not hear all the evidence may only enter a verdict or judgment upon a retrial or if the parties so stipulate on the basis of the record of the prior proceedings. Because Judge Andrews decided the case on the merits without hearing the live testimony and without a stipulation from the parties, his order must be vacated and the case remanded for a new evidentiary hearing.
[1] A successor judge who did not hear all the evidence presented at an evidentiary hearing may only enter a verdict or judgment upon a retrial or if the parties stipulate to…
[2] A judge's recusal based on a prior representation by their former law firm, even if years prior, is permissible.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A successor judge who does not hear all the evidence may only enter a verdict or judgment upon a retrial or if the parties so stipulate on the basis of the record of the prior proceedings.”
States the controlling legal rule governing successor judges' authority to decide cases based on prior judges' records.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court held an evidentiary hearing on April 14, 1988, regarding the wife's post-judgment petition for continued alimony payments. The origina…
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SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.
On November 6, 1987, this court ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing on the appellant/wife’s post-judgment petition seeking continuation of rehabilitative alimony payments. Reaves v. Reaves, 514 So. 2d 1147 (Fla.2d DCA 1987). On April 14, 1988, Judge Howard P. Rives conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to our mandate. After the hearing was concluded, Judge Rives recused himself since it had come to his attention that several years before his former law firm had represented the wife. On June 13, Judge Rives ordered the clerk of the circuit court to reassign this case to another judge on the regular rotation basis. As a result, the case was assigned to Judge John S. Andrews. On June 16, 1988, Judge Andrews notified the parties in writing as follows:
You are further advised that it is my intention to have the entire proceedings before Judge Rives transcribed and, upon its completion, to consider all mat ters presented to Judge Rives by the parties at the hearing held on April 14, 1988. Based upon the entire record from that hearing, I intend to make my ruling. If either party objects to this procedure, you should file your objection and state your reasons for it no later than July 1, 1988.
In response to the court’s directive, the wife promptly filed a motion requesting the court to set aside Judge Rives’ voluntary recusal, contending that “impartial justice may only come from a judge who has heard all the oral arguments in the public courtroom.” At the husband’s request, Judge Andrews struck the wife’s motion, and proceeded to decide the merits of the cause based on the record, which included the transcript of testimony taken before Judge Rives. On September 20, 1988, Judge Andrews entered an order denying the wife’s petition.
On appeal, the wife complains that it was improper for a successor judge to make an adjudication on the merits of her petition without having heard the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing. We agree. A successor judge who does not hear all the evidence may only enter a verdict or judgment upon a retrial or if the parties so stipulate on the basis of the record of the prior proceedings. Tompkins Land and Housing, Inc. v. White, 431 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla.2d DCA 1983). Accord, Anders v. Anders, 376 So. 2d 439 (Fla.lst DCA 1979). In view of our disposition, we do not reach the wife’s contention that the trial court erred in denying her petition on the merits.
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment denying the wife’s petition. We remand for an evidentiary hearing as previously directed in our opinion of November 6, 1987. On remand, the cause shall be heard de novo by a circuit court judge other than Judge Rives or Judge Andrews.
RYDER and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.
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Alvord v. Christal Alvord, 572 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…cert. denied, 188 So. 2d 821 (Fla.1966). “A successor judge who does not hear all the evidence may only enter a verdict or judgment upon a retrial or if the parties so stipulate on the basis of the record of the prior proceedings.” Reaves v. Reaves, 546 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Tompkins Land, 431 So. 2d at 260. Accord, Bradford, 182 So. 2d at 449. In the instant case, the predecessor judge conducted an evidentiary hearing during which both parties presented testimony and expert witnesses. The succ…
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Smith v. Josie H. Smith, 612 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…since he had observed the witnesses and could evaluate their credibility. A successor judge who did not hear all the evidence may only enter a judgment upon retrial or on the basis of the prior record when the parties so stipulate. Reaves v. Reaves, 546 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 2d DCA1989). We reverse and remand to the trial court for an eviden-tiary hearing in which either side can present additional evidence of the husband’s business income pursuant to the prior mandate of this court. Reversed and remanded. THR…
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Autheria Mitchell v. Metro Dade & Risk Mgmt. for Dade Co., 797 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…(Fla. 1st DCA 1981). See also Frazier v. Bay County, 781 So. 2d 464, 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Hatcher v. St. Joe Paper Co., 608 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Carr v. Byers, 578 So. 2d 347, 347-48 & nn. 1-2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Reaves v. Reaves, 546 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Anders v. Anders, 376 So. 2d 439, 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Particularly since the record contained only a summary of the testimony adduced at the original hearing, we are constrained to reverse. On remand, the judge of compe…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tompkins Land & Hous., Inc. v. Terryceia Vann White, 431 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Anders v. Thaddeus A. Anders, 376 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Reaves v. Reaves, 514 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)