VANCE H. FLOWERS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a juvenile defendant's adult sentence because the trial court failed to timely consider all six statutory criteria mandated by Florida Statute section 39.111(7)(c) before imposing adult sanctions. The case establishes that procedural compliance with statutory sentencing requirements is mandatory and cannot be cured by a subsequently entered written order.
The trial court's failure to timely consider the six criteria at the sentencing hearing before determining disposition constitutes reversible error that cannot be cured by a subsequent written order. Additionally, the trial court's factual findings regarding criterion 4 (sophistication and maturity) were inadequate because they referred only to past criminal behavior without addressing the juvenile's home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living.
[1] A trial court must consider all six statutory criteria mandated for determining the suitability of adult sanctions before any other dispositional determination.
[2] A written order imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile must conform to the six statutory criteria.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The statute not only requires the trial court to consider all six criteria in determining the suitability or nonsuitability for adult sanctions before any other determination of disposition, but also requires that the decision to impose adult sanctions be in writing and in conformance with the six criteria.”
Establishes the dual requirement: timely consideration of criteria at sentencing and written conformance to those criteria.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVance H. Flowers, a juvenile defendant, received adult sanctions at sentencing. The trial court failed to consider the six criteria required by sectio…
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GUNTHER, Judge.
We reverse the appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing pursuant to section 39.111(7), Florida Statutes (1987).
We reverse the sentence imposing adult sanctions on the juvenile defendant because the trial court erred in failing to timely consider all six criteria mandated by section 39.111(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1987). The statute not only requires the trial court to consider all six criteria in determining the suitability or nonsuitability for adult sanctions before any other determination of disposition, but also requires that the decision to impose adult sanctions be in writing and in conformance with the six criteria. §§ 39.111(7)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1987).
In the instant case, the trial court failed to consider the six criteria at the sentencing hearing before determination of disposition as required by section 39.111(7)(c). Although the trial court subsequently entered a written order with specific factual findings, such an order did not cure the trial court’s error in failing to timely consider the statutory criteria. See State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984), and Hammonds v. State, 543 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Accordingly, we reverse the sentence and remand to the trial court to resentence the defendant.
Since the trial court, upon remand, will be considering the suitability or non-suitability of adult sanctions before imposing sentence, we note that the trial court’s order provided adequate specification of the facts as to five of the six criteria enumerated in section 39.111(7)(c). However, with respect to criterion 4, which addresses the juvenile’s sophistication and maturity, the trial court only referred to the defendant’s past criminal behavior without commenting on the juvenile’s home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living as required by section 39.111(7)(c)4. According to Posey v. State, 501 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), simply referring to past criminal behavior is not a sufficient factual finding to support criterion 4. Thus, upon remand, the trial court should carefully reconsider criterion 4 and provide adequate specification of the facts justifying the imposition of adult sanctions.
In conclusion, we reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing pursuant to section 39.111(7), Florida Statutes (1987), because the trial court did not timely consider the six criteria of section 39.111(7)(c) before imposing adult sanctions. Furthermore, we alert the trial court to the inadequacy of the specific factual findings as to criterion 4.
Sentence reversed and cause remanded for resentencing.
WALDEN and WARNER, JJ., concur.
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Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)…. 2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), based on express and direct conflict with State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984), Bell v. State, 598 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), Meyers v. State, 593 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), and [*530] Flowers v. State, 546 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).1 The issues are whether a trial court must consider each of the statutory criteria required under sections 39.059(7)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1991),2 at the time of sentencing a juvenile as an adult, and, if so, whether the…
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Surrency v. State, 585 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…ctions. He complains that the trial court erred in failing to comply with the technical requirements of section 39.111, subsections (7)(c)4, (7)(c)6, and (7)(d), Florida Statutes. We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. Flowers v. State, 546 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Posey v. State, 501 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). The pertinent statutes provide: 39.111 Community control or commitment of children prosecuted as adults.— ** (7) When a child has been transferred for criminal prosecution…
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Fletcher Berry v. State, 636 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Moreover, none of the other decisions cited as the basis for conflict involved a waiver issue. See Bell v. State, 598 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Meyers v. State, 593 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Flowers v. State, 546 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). . The First District declined to follow Preston v. State, 411 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1280 (Fla.1982), the case upon which conflict jurisdiction was based. Preston held that the defendant implicitly…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Learnhart Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984)
- Posey v. State, 501 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Hammonds v. State, 543 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)