CHRISTINA A. VANNUCCI, APPELLANT,
v.
RANDY VANNUCCI, APPELLEE
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Christina Vannucci appealed a trial court order conditioning but allowing her ex-husband Randy's one-month visitation with their three-year-old daughter despite allegations of sexual abuse. The appellate court quashed the order and remanded, holding that the trial judge must make a clear factual finding on whether abuse occurred by a preponderance of the evidence and enter an appropriate visitation order based on that finding.
The trial court must make an explicit factual finding by a preponderance of the evidence regarding whether the child was sexually abused. If abuse is found, visitation must be restricted in a manner that realistically protects the child and gives the court enforceable control over conditions. If abuse is not established by a preponderance of the evidence, the motion to limit visitation should be denied. The trial court cannot reach a middle ground by imposing conditions while allowing visitation to proceed without a clear factual determination.
[1] A trial court must either grant or deny a petition to modify visitation rights based on a finding supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
[2] When a trial court fails to make a clear finding of fact regarding allegations of child abuse, its order regarding visitation must be quashed and remanded.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If the trial judge believed Randy's side of the case, he should have denied the appellant's petition to modify visitation. If he found by a preponderance of the evidence that the child was sexually abused by Randy, then he should have granted appellant's petition, and restricted appellee's visitation rights in a manner designed to realistically protect the child, until the judge is convinced the child is no longer in danger.”
Establishes the two alternative paths the trial judge must follow based on factual findings, rejecting the middle ground of imposing conditions without clear findings
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChristina sought to limit or terminate Randy's visitation rights after alleging he sexually abused their three-year-old daughter during a summer visit…
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SHARP, Judge.
Christina A. Vannucci appeals from the trial court’s ruling (after a full hearing) on her motion to limit or terminate Randy Vannucci’s visitation rights with the parties’ three-year old daughter. The trial court imposed various conditions on Randy’s visitation rights (constant supervision by Randy’s parents, and Randy’s commencing therapy to obtain counselling and a psychological profile for the court), but it ordered that Randy’s one-month visitation in Pennsylvania with the child commence on July 24, 1989. We received Christina’s Emergency Motion for Stay/Restraining Order on July 22, 1989 and due to the nature of the case, we expedited the non-final appeal.1
The transcript of the hearing contains sufficient evidence to support a finding by the trial judge that Randy sexually abused the child when she was visiting him in Pennsylvania last summer. It also contains a vigorous denial by Randy that he abused the child, supported by testimony from his relatives that in the prior two summer visitations, Randy was never alone with the child. If the trial judge believed Randy’s side of the case, he should have denied the appellant’s petition to modify visitation. If he found by a preponderance of the evidence2 that the child was sexually abused by Randy, then he should have granted appellant’s petition, and restricted appellee’s visitation rights in a manner designed to realistically protect the child, until the judge is convinced the child is no longer in danger. Unfortunately, the trial judge did neither in this case. Therefore we quash the order appealed and remand to the trial judge for entry of a proper order. If the trial judge determines that the evidence established by a preponderance thereof that Randy abused the child, the court shall make such a finding, and shall limit Randy’s visitation rights in such a manner that the court will have control, jurisdiction and authority over the supervising party, and any conditions or requirements regarding visitation can be enforced by him. If the trial judge finds that appellant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that appel-lee abused the child, then appellant’s motion to limit visitation should be denied.
QUASH order; REMAND.
No motion for rehearing will be entertained.
DANIEL, C.J., and COBB, J., concur. . Fla.R.App.P. 9.130.
. In re Bryan, 531 So. 2d 1062, 1063-1064 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Solomon v. McLucas, 382 So. 2d 339, 346 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 389 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.1980).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Saenz v. Saenz, 602 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…d in a continuing and not unexpected conflict with his ex-wife. Neither can justify the severe restriction on the contact between daughter and parent which is embodied in the requirement of supervised visitation. Compare, e.g., Vannucci v. Vannucci, 546 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Adams v. Adams, 376 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1109 (Fla.1980); Hechler v. Hechler, 351 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). . It may be added that our analysis of the inadequacy of the record to suppor…
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Davis v. Leonard and Ardella Dixon, 604 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…pare Walborsky v. Walborsky, 258 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) (restriction of visitation justified by “extremely aggravating and distressing” conduct of non-custodial father), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 831 (Fla.1972); cf. also Vannucci v. Vannucci, 546 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (sexual abuse of child sufficient reason to restrict visitation). For these reasons, the order under review is reversed. See Sharp v. Hixon, 293 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Reversed and remanded. . Our conclusion makes it un…
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Hays v. Hays, 599 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…nt right to visit her child. The court can also fashion many limitations and restrictions on visitation rather than to deny it entirely, for example, the court can permit visitation only in a secure, supervised environment. See Vannucci v. Vannucci, 546 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). The order barring all contact, in any manner or form, and barring visitation should be reversed and the case remanded with directions that some provision for contact and visitation be permitted with only limitations and restri…
Authorities Cited
- Solomon v. Donald L. McLUCAS et ux., 382 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- In re Bryan, 531 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)