PAULETTE MCNAIR BEACHUM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Paulette McNair Beachum was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer after the trial court denied her motion for continuance based on the absence of a key witness. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the continuance without conducting an inquiry into the circumstances of the witness's absence, despite having previously determined the witness was necessary to the defense.
The trial court committed a palpable abuse of discretion by denying the continuance without conducting an inquiry into the circumstances of the witness's absence and allowing appellant to demonstrate the subject matter of the witness's expected testimony. The case is reversed and remanded for new trial.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a motion for continuance when a witness, previously found necessary for the defense, is not served with a subpoena and the…
[2] A trial court should conduct an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding a necessary witness's absence and provide the defense an opportunity to demonstrate the subject…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the granting or denial of a motion for continuance is within the trial court's discretion, and that the court's ruling will not be disturbed "unless a palpable abuse of discretion is demonstrated."”
Establishes the standard of review for continuance motions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFour days before trial, defense counsel moved for a witness subpoena for Pamela Williams, asserting Williams had information relevant and necessary to…
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SHIVERS, Chief Judge.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for continuance. We reverse and remand for new trial.
Four days prior to the scheduled trial date, defense counsel moved for issuance of a witness subpoena for one Pamela Williams, alleging that Williams was known to have information which might be relevant and necessary to the defense. The trial court granted the motion that day, directing the clerk of the court to issue a trial subpoena, and specifically finding Williams to be “necessary for the proper defense of the defendant.” The witness was never served with the subpoena and, on the morning trial was to begin, appellant moved for a continuance, arguing that the case could not be properly presented without the witness’s presence. The motion was denied, and appellant was tried and found guilty of battery on a law enforcement officer. It is well settled that the granting or denial of a motion for continuance is within the trial court’s discretion, and that the court’s ruling will not be disturbed “unless a palpable abuse of discretion is demonstrated.” Smith v. State, 525 So. 2d 477, 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). As this court stated in Smith, “[t]he common thread running through those eases in which a palpable abuse of discretion has been found, is that defense counsel must be afforded an adequate opportunity to investigate and prepare any applicable defense.” Id. We are mindful of the point raised in appellee’s brief that appellant had three months prior to trial to locate this witness, yet waited until four days before trial to move for issuance of a subpoena. Since the trial court -specifically found that Williams was necessary to appellant’s defense, however, we find that its failure to grant a continuance on the basis of Williams’s absence constituted a palpable abuse of discretion. At the very least, the court should have conducted an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the witness’s absence, and given appellant the opportunity to demonstrate the subject matter of the witness’s expected testimony. Absent such an inquiry, appellee’s argument that Williams’s testimony was merely cumulative is without merit.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for new trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ERVIN and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
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Robinson v. State, 561 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…State, 525 So. 2d 477, 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The facts of this case clearly show that appellant has met that heavy burden. Indeed, the appellant presents a more compelling case than that which was involved in the recent case of Beachum v. State, 547 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), wherein this court found an ábuse of discretion in the denial of Beac-hum’s motion for continuance. This case is a far cry from the typical eleventh-hour motions for continuance [*421] which are dumped on the trial courts with…
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Griffin v. State, 598 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), this court stated that “[a] denial of a motion for continuance will be reversed when the record demonstrates ... that adequate preparation of a defense was placed at risk by virtue of the denial.” See also Beachum v. State, 547 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (trial court’s failure to grant continuance due to witness’ absence constituted palpable abuse of discretion in that court found witness to be necessary for proper defense, despite fact that appellant had three months prior to tr…
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D.B. v. Dept. OF Children AND Families, 742 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…l rights. Ordinarily, it is strictly within the discretion of the trial judge whether or not a continuance is granted, and the trial court’s discretion will not be interfered with on appeal where justice is not denied. See, e.g., Beachum v. State, 547 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Where the specific testimony a witness was to offer was not, and could not have been, offered by any other witness, and where that testimony is central to the issue at bar, it constitutes an abuse of discretion to deny a continu…
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- Smith v. State, 525 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)