CROWN PONTIAC, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
RANDY R. BELL, AND MARIA C. BELL, APPELLEES
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Crown Pontiac appealed a trial court order granting its own motion for a new trial after a jury verdict favored the Bells on fraud claims. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, holding that a party cannot appeal an order granting a new trial when seeking to challenge prior adverse rulings rather than claiming error in granting the new trial itself.
A losing party may not appeal an order granting a new trial unless claiming error in granting the new trial itself. Crown cannot use the new trial order as a vehicle to challenge prior adverse rulings. Any challenge to the denial of the directed verdict must await a final judgment after the new trial.
[1] A party may not appeal an order granting its own motion for a new trial.
[2] An order granting a new trial cannot serve as a vehicle to appeal prior rulings adverse to the party that moved for the new trial, absent an assertion that the new trial…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the losing party may not appeal an order granting a new trial unless that party claims that it was error to grant a new trial on any issue. Where, as in the case before us, such error is not asserted, the order granting a new trial may not serve as the vehicle for review by this court of prior rulings by the trial judge adverse to that party.”
States the controlling legal principle that parties cannot use new trial orders to appeal prior adverse intermediate rulings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Bells purchased a used 1984 Trans Am from Crown, represented as a dealer's demonstration model. The Bells alleged the car had actually been stolen…
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ALTENBERND, Judge.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Crown Pontiac, Inc., appeals the trial court’s order which granted Crown’s own motion for a new trial. Because Crown requested this order and is not aggrieved by the order, we dismiss this appeal.
Randy and Maria Bell filed suit against Crown seeking rescission of a used car sales contract, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. They based their requests for relief upon breach of implied warranty and fraud. The Bells purchased from Crown a used 1984 Trans Am. Crown represented the car to the Bells as a “dealer’s demonstration” model which had been driven only by Crown’s employees. The Bells alleged, however, that the car actually had been stolen from Crown, driven several thousand miles, recovered by the Pinellas County Sheriff's Department, and refurbished by Crown. The Bells experienced several problems with the car, which Crown was unable to correct. The Bells further alleged that they would not have purchased the car had they been informed about the car’s history.
During trial, Crown moved for a directed verdict arguing that the Bells had failed to prove any damages. The trial court took this motion under consideration and eventually denied it. The jury rejected the Bells’ breach of warranty claim, but found in their favor on the fraud claim. The verdict awarded the Bells $7,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. After the verdict, Crown moved for a new trial on all issues of fraud and renewed its motion for directed verdict. The trial court granted the new trial and denied the renewed motion for directed verdict. Thus, no final judgment has been entered by the trial court.
Initially we denied the Bells’ motion to dismiss without prejudice to their raising this jurisdictional argument in their brief. Now that the case is fully briefed and the record is before us, it is clear that Crown is merely attempting to use this appeal as a vehicle to challenge the trial court’s decision denying Crown’s motion for directed verdict.
This case is controlled by our reasoning in Hill v. American Medical Affiliates, Inc., 387 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), review denied, 397 So. 2d 778 (Fla.1981). In Hill, we held that:
[T]he losing party may not appeal an order granting a new trial unless that party claims that it was error to grant a new trial on any issue. Where, as in the case before us, such error is not asserted, the order granting a new trial may not serve as the vehicle for review by this court of prior rulings by the trial judge adverse to that party.
We are not asked in this case simply to reverse a new trial order and to reinstate part or all of the jury’s verdict. Instead, Crown asks that we reverse the denial of a directed verdict. Crown is appealing an order which it does not want us to reverse.
The issue which Crown wishes to appeal must await a final judgment. Such a final judgment cannot be entered until the conclusion of the new trial. Crown may be correct in arguing that judicial efficiency would be accomplished if it could appeal this issue before the second trial. On the other hand, the resolution of the second trial may moot this issue and render any appeal unnecessary. Since our jurisdiction is established by the Florida Constitution and the rules of the Supreme Court of Florida, such policy arguments can only be addressed in other forums.
Dismissed.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Polk Cnty. v. Sofka, 702 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 1997)…l has the effect of completely revitalizing the case for further proceedings, the party requesting, and receiving, a new trial may not seek immediate review of an earlier order denying its motion for a directed verdict); Crown Pontiac, Inc. v. Bell, 547 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (a party requesting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial may not seek review of the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict following the granting of its alternative motio…
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The Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Davy, 753 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…ure, provides that an order granting a new trial may be [*585] appealed as a final order, we had doubt as to our jurisdiction because Franklin Life appeared to be appealing an order as to which it was the prevailing party. See Crown Pontiac v. Bell, 547 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), cited with approval in Polk County v. Sofka, 702 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.1997). Accordingly, sua sponte we issued a notice to show cause raising the appealability of this order. See Mapolee v. Wilson, 122 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1…
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Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles/Division of Risk Mgmt. v. Maricela Romano, 948 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…R CURIAM. Upon consideration of the employer/carrier’s (E/C) response to this court’s order to show cause dated December 4, 2006, the court has determined that the order on appeal is not a reviewable adverse order. See Crown Pontiac, Inc. v. Bell, 547 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). If, in the future, claimant files another petition for benefits seeking benefits from the E/C, the E/C may assert their affirmative defense of misrepresentation at that time. DISMISSED. WOLF, LEWIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Rowland Hill v. Am. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 387 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)