LYNN LATRENDA JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant Johnson appeals her conviction as an accessory after the fact and a restitution order of $89,731.44. The court affirmed the conviction but vacated the restitution order because it was entered without a hearing, and remanded for a hearing to determine what damages were caused directly or indirectly by defendant's offense.
The conviction for accessory after the fact is affirmed as the evidence was sufficient. The restitution order is vacated and remanded because it was entered without a hearing. On remand, restitution may be ordered for damages caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offense as an accessory after the fact, but not for the initial shooting for which she was acquitted.
[1] A restitution order entered without an opportunity for the defendant to be heard must be vacated and remanded for a hearing.
[2] Restitution may be ordered for damage or loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offense.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Defendant may not be ordered to pay restitution for damages arising out of crimes for which she was acquitted.”
Establishes that restitution cannot be imposed for offenses of acquittal, limiting scope of restitution liability.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant Johnson was convicted as an accessory after the fact. A codefendant shot a victim during an attempted murder and robbery. Defendant drove th…
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PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals her conviction as an accessory after the fact and also appeals a post-conviction order for restitution in the amount of $89,731.44. Assuming arguendo defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was properly preserved for appellate review, we conclude the evidence was sufficient and affirm the conviction. As it is undisputed that the restitution orders were entered without an opportunity for defendant to be heard, the restitution order is vacated and remanded for a hearing pursuant to the provisions of section 775.089, Florida Statutes (1987). See Howren v. State, 510 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
For purposes of the remand we would note that restitution may be ordered “for damage or loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant’s offense.” § 775.089(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987); State v. Williams, 520 So. 2d 276, 277 (Fla.1988). Defendant may not be ordered to pay restitution for damages arising out of crimes for which she was acquitted. Simmons v. State, 484 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); see also Seiler v. State, 534 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Bass v. State, 462 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
Defendant can, of-course, be ordered to make restitution for injury she inflicted directly on the victim during her actions as accessory after the fact. Defendant contends there were no such injuries, but that contention should be presented to the trial court on remand.
Defendant also contends that her acquittal on the charges of attempted murder and robbery precludes assessment of restitution against her for her codefend-ant’s actions in shooting the victim. We agree with respect to the initial injury. However, the defendant drove the code-fendant away from the scene of the shooting, for which she was convicted as accessory after the fact. In so doing, the defendant left the seriously wounded victim to fend for himself. He survived, but with permanent injuries.
The statute does permit the assessment of restitution for damages caused indirectly, as well as directly, by defendant’s offense. . § 775.089(l)(a), Fla.Stat. To the extent that defendant elected to flee, rather than transport the victim to the hospital, there was a delay in the victim’s receiving medical assistance. If there was any demonstrable aggravation of the victim’s injury by reason of the delay, that would be an indirect injury cognizable under the statute.
Conviction and sentence affirmed; order of restitution vacated and remanded for a new hearing.
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Strickland v. State, 596 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…v. State, 580 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) and DeVille v. State, 529 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). We also reverse the restitution orders imposed in this case because the appellant was not afforded an opportunity to be heard. See Johnson v. State, 547 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). In summary, we affirm the revocation of probation and the appellant’s classification as an habitual offender, but we reverse the sentences and orders of restitution and remand for resentencing within the guidelines. Affirmed in…
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Longo v. State, 580 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…encing law. Id. at 987. Lastly, we agree that the lower court erred in ordering restitution to those people named in counts of the information on which appellant was acquitted. Simmons v. State, 484 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Johnson v. State, 547 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Similarly, appellant is not required to pay restitution to the four victims named in the grand theft counts for which venue was lacking. Also, it was improper for the court to order appellant to pay restitution to people not name…
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Barkley v. State, 585 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…ndant’s having committed the offense of which he was convicted. State v. Williams, 520 So. 2d 276 (Fla.1988). Therefore, a defendant may not be ordered to pay restitution for damages arising out of crimes of which he was acquitted. Johnson v. State, 547 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Appellant’s acquittal of both murder and manslaughter, and the resulting implication that he did not cause the victim’s death, thus precludes the assessment of restitution under section 775.089 for funeral and related services as…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Williams, 520 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1988)
- Howren v. State, 510 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Ford v. State, 484 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Bass v. State, 462 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Walton Needham Seiler v. State, 534 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)