CARY MICHAEL LAMBRIX, APPELLANT,
v.
RICHARD L. DUGGER, ET AL., APPELLEES
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A prisoner sued prison officials for violating due process in a disciplinary hearing and claimed cruel and unusual punishment. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal as to the prison director (based on lack of direct liability) but reversed dismissals as to other defendants who either filed motions without proper grounds or did not respond to the complaint.
The court affirmed dismissal as to Dugger because civil rights liability cannot be based on respondeat superior theory alone. The court reversed and remanded as to McQueen because dismissal with prejudice was improper when amendment could cure the defect. The court reversed and remanded as to Keyes, Saunders, and Davis because the trial court improperly granted a motion to dismiss on behalf of parties who had not moved for dismissal.
[1] Civil rights liability cannot be predicated upon a respondeat superior theory.
[2] Leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given when justice so requires, allowing a plaintiff at least one opportunity to state a cause of action unless it is clear no s…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Liability for civil rights violations cannot be predicated upon a respondeat superior theory.”
Establishes the legal basis for affirming dismissal as to Dugger, the prison director
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Lambrix, a prisoner at Florida State Prison, filed a pro se civil complaint on February 1, 1988, alleging that prison officials failed to co…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, a prisoner at Florida State Prison, filed a pro se “Complaint of Civil Damage” claiming that appellees had not complied with the proper procedures for a disciplinary hearing conducted on February 1, 1988, and thus, had violated appellant’s due process rights. He further claimed that disciplinary confinement subsequent to this hearing constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The complaint named five defendants: (1) Richard Dugger; (2) C.D. McQueen, Corrections Officer; (3) Ted Keyes, Classification Officer; (4) C.K. Davis, Corrections Officer; and (5) Counselor Saunders.
On August 1, 1988, two of the appellees, Dugger and McQueen, filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. The other three appellees did not file a response but, on October 25, 1988, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss submitted by appellees Dugger and McQueen, and entered an order of dismissal with prejudice as to all five appellees on the grounds that appellant “failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” However, no motion for dismissal was pending on behalf of appel-lees Keyes, Saunders and Davis. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The appellees’ motion to dismiss was properly granted as to appellee Dug-ger. Liability for civil rights violations cannot be predicated upon a respondeat superior theory. Rankin v. Colman, 476 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
The complaint against appellee McQueen should not have been dismissed with prejudice. Rule 1.190, Fla.R.Civ.P., provides that leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given when justice so requires. This is generally interpreted to allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint at least one time in an attempt to state a cause of action unless it is clear that a plaintiff cannot in good faith allege a set of circumstances sufficient to state a cause of action. Town of Micanopy v. Connell, 304 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Thus it was error to dismiss this complaint with prejudice. Sidener v. Jones, 455 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Accordingly that portion of the order appealed from as to defendant McQueen is reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions that appellant be given leave to amend his complaint pursuant to Rule 1.190, Fla.R.Civ.P. Also, it was error for the trial court to grant a motion to dismiss as to parties who did not so move or in any other way respond to the complaint. Thus, we reverse the dismissal with prejudice as to appellees Keyes, Saunders and Davis and remand to the trial court with instructions that the appellees be given 20 days within which to file responses to appellant’s complaint.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions.
SMITH, THOMPSON and MINER, JJ., concur.
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Grove Isle Ass'n, Inc. v. Grove Isle Assocs., LLLP, 137 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…to allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint at least one time in an attempt to state a cause of action unless it is clear that a plaintiff cannot in good faith allege a set of circumstances sufficient to state a cause of action.” Lambrix v. Dugger, 547 So. 2d 1265, 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In light of this well-established law, the trial court’s dismissal of the Condominium Association’s first Complaint with prejudice was an abuse of discretion. See Lambrix, 547 So. 2d at 1265; see also W. Kendall Holdings,…
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Ranell Tillery, Jr. v. Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just., 104 So. 3d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…to do so under Florida Administrative Code Rule 60Y-5.001(7). By analogy, if this were a civil action before a circuit court, it would be appropriate to dismiss Tillery’s complaint, but leave to amend likely would be required. See Lambrix v. Dugger, 547 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In the future, we trust that the Commission will follow its rules and afford complainants a reasonable opportunity to amend deficient complaints, particularly considering the remedial purposes of the Act. The Legislature’s inte…
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Runner O. Santana v. Henry, 12 So. 3d 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…plaintiff was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard); Mumma v. Mumma, 734 So. 2d 571, 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (trial court did not have inherent power to dismiss causes as not being prosecuted with reasonable diligence); Lambrix v. Dugger, 547 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (trial court erred in dismissing prisoner’s complaint against prison officials who did not move to dismiss). The general rule that pleadings ought not be dismissed on grounds no party urges has special force when the plead…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rankin v. Colman, 476 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Parker v. State, 304 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Town OF Micanopy v. Connell, 304 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Sidener v. Jones, 455 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)