CITY OF MIAMI AND HERNANDO A. CARRILLO, PETITIONERS,
v.
TIGER BAY CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, APOGEE II CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, APOGEE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, TOWNSCAPE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, AND CENTERVIEW TOWNHOUSE ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENTS
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The court reversed a permanent injunction requiring homeowners to remove a skateboard ramp, finding it complied with specific planning criteria for play structures and that the homeowners association's general architectural review requirements were not applicable.
The court held that the skateboard ramp did not violate the restrictive covenants because it complied with the specific Planning Criteria for play structures, and the general architectural review requirements did not apply to such structures.
Homeowners constructed a skateboard ramp in their backyard. They believed it complied with the subdivision's Planning Criteria regarding play structur…
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ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
PER CURIAM.
Denied.
NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ., concur.
COPE, Judge
(concurring).
In my view Section 6(f) of the City Charter does not preclude enactment of an ordinance having retroactive application. The apparent purpose of Section 6(f) is to assure that, except for emergencies, the citizenry has 30 days’ notice before new enactments go into effect and become part of the City’s body of law. Section 6(f) therefore rendered Ordinance No. 10313 ineffective for any purpose until 30 days after its passage. After the 30-day waiting period expired, the ordinance became operative and, in accordance with its own terms, was retroactive.
I concur in the denial of certiorari, however, because the application at issue here was not a “complete application” as that term is defined in Section 3602, Miami Zoning Ordinance.