FIRE DEFENSE CENTERS AND DENNIS LARUSSO, JOE FLANIGAN, ED FLETCHER, CECIL RUTAN, AND WILLIE F. VINE, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1989-09-08
No. 88-2924
ERVIN, WENTWORTH and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
548 So. 2d 1166 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1989) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Fire Defense Centers and its principals appealed the insurance commissioner's order revoking or suspending their licenses. The appellate court found certain evidentiary errors but deemed them harmless, affirmed the penalties with modifications, and deleted a sentence exceeding the commissioner's statutory authority.


Holding

The commissioner erred in rejecting the hearing officer's findings in paragraphs 25 and 31 without proper procedure, but these errors were harmless. The commissioner properly excluded the improperly authenticated evidence but should have remanded that charge for further hearing. The commissioner did not abuse discretion in increasing penalties based on other properly granted exceptions. The commissioner lacked statutory authority to prohibit employment in the fire protection business and that provision was deleted.


Headnotes

[1] A hearing officer's finding of fact supported by competent substantial evidence in the record cannot be rejected by a reviewing tribunal.

[2] An exhibit is improperly admitted into evidence if it is not shown to be related to the specific subject matter of the charge.

Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“It was error for the commissioner to reject the hearing officer's finding of fact in paragraph 25, as it was supported by competent substantial evidence in the record.”

Establishes that the commissioner cannot reject findings supported by competent substantial evidence.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The appellants held licenses in the fire protection equipment business. A hearing officer made findings of fact regarding charges against the appellan…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We review a final order of the insurance commissioner revoking or suspending certain licenses held by the appellants. It was error for the commissioner to reject the hearing officer’s finding of fact in paragraph 25, as it was supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Although we do not find error in the commissioner’s ruling that Respondent’s exhibit 3 was improperly admitted in evidence because not shown to be related to the specific fire extinguisher involved in that charge, we disapprove the commissioner’s overruling of the hearing officer’s finding of fact in paragraph 31 based on the exclusion of this evidence. Under the circumstances of this case, the correct remedy was to remand the specific charge that the evidence was submitted to prove or disprove to the hearing officer for further hearing to afford the party relying on the admission of such evidence an opportunity to meet the objection sustained by the reviewing tribunal, or to offer additional evidence to prove the fact in question.

We hold these errors harmless in this instance, and find no abuse of discretion in the commissioner’s increasing the penalty imposed based on the other numerous exceptions to the hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law that were properly granted by the commissioner. We treat the sentence on page 12 of the final order reading, “During this period, Mr. LARUS-SO shall not be employed in, or in any other way associated with, the business of fire protection equipment,” as surplusage not within the authority of the statute, and direct its deletion from the final order. The appealed order and the penalties imposed, as modified herein, are AFFIRMED,

ERVIN, WENTWORTH and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • …ecame apparent to HRS that estoppel was a relevant issue in reaching its decision, was for HRS to refer the matter back to the hearing officer for further evidence and findings of fact on that issue. See Fire Defense Centers v. State, Dept. of Ins., 548 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), rev. denied, 560 So. 2d 233 (Fla.1990); Inverness Convalescent Center v. Department of Health and Rehab. Servs., 512 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Friends of Children v. Department of Health and Rehab. Servs., 504 So. 2d 1345…

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw