THE STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
JAMES JOINES, RESPONDENT
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Florida sought review of a county court's discharge of a defendant based on alleged deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. The state successfully challenged the discharge, arguing that the delays were attributable to the defendant and that defense counsel had acquiesced to postponement, making the speedy trial claim without merit.
The court held that the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated because the pretrial delays were chargeable to the defendant, defense counsel acquiesced to further postponement when the case was first reached for trial, and there was no evidence of prejudice to the defendant.
[1] A defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial is determined by a four-prong test considering the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's respons…
[2] A defendant's acquiescence to a continuance, even when the case is not reached for trial on the scheduled date, can weigh against a claim of speedy trial violation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court must consider: a) the length of the delay, b) the reason for the delay, c) the defendant's responsibility to assert the right, and d) the prejudice to the defendant.”
Articulation of the four-factor Barker v. Wingo test for speedy trial claims
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJoines was charged on October 13, 1987 with traffic and DUI offenses. A continuance was granted on December 17, 1987 due to improper public defender a…
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NESBITT, Judge.
By common law certiorari, the state seeks review of a decision of the appellate division of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit affirming defendant’s discharge from prosecution in the county court where he had been discharged on the basis that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been denied. We grant certiorari for the following reasons.
On October 13, 1987, the defendant was charged with various offenses including the failure to drive in a single lane; driving under the influence of alcohol; and driving with no valid driver license.
On December 5, 1987, defense counsel filed an appearance and a demand for discovery.
On December 17, 1987, it was determined that the public defender had been improperly appointed. A continuance was entered and charged to the defendant.
On January 20, 1988, defendant moved for a continuance because a police officer had failed to appear for deposition. This second continuance was also granted but was not charged to the state because nonappearance of a police officer for deposition is ordinarily not chargeable to the state. Granade v. Ader, 530 So. 2d 1050 (Pla. 3d DCA), review denied, 541 So. 2d 1172 (Fla.1988); State ex rel. Betancourt v. Klein, 354 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). The trial was thereafter scheduled for May 11, 1988.
However, the court that day was carrying the case load of another county judge and did not reach the case for trial.
Consequently, it was carried over. At that time, defense counsel stated on the record: “I have no problem with that. There is no speedy issue.” When the case was again scheduled for trial on June 9, 1988, the defense counsel ore tenus moved for discharge claiming an abridgment of defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial; the motion was granted.
The supreme court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) articulated a four-prong test for determining whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial. In such cases, the court must consider: a) the length of the delay, b) the reason for the delay, c) the defendant’s responsibility to assert the right, and d) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117. In this case, the pretrial delays were chargeable to the defendant.
Furthermore, when the ease was first reached for trial, his trial counsel clearly acquiesced to further postponement.
Consequently, there was no evidence whatsoever, either on or off the record of any prejudice to the defendant for failure to try him on the original trial date of June 9, 1988. Once again, as Judge Schwartz observed in State v. Brown, 527 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 534 So. 2d 398 (Fla.1988), the defense has seized “upon an immaterial, utterly non-prejudicial glitch in the prosecution in order to secure, not the speedy trial which [s]he obviously did not want, but a speedy dismissal which the circuit court erroneously granted.”
When the appellate division of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit sits in review of the County Judges’ Court, it does so as a court of error. In this case, the appellate division departed from the essential requirements of the law in affirming the order discharging the defendant below. We are authorized to correct this error by way of common law certiorari. Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla.1983).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is granted and the decision of the appellate division, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, is quashed with directions to remand the cause for trial.
It is so ordered.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Guzman, 697 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…importantly, he failed entirely to show, as is required to justify dismissal, that the discovery violation resulted in cognizable prejudice to his case which was uncorrectable within the speedy trial time. Guzman, 667 So. 2d at 989; State v. Joines, 549 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Brown, 527 So. 2d at 209, and cases cited. To the contrary, not only, as in Broum, would “[a]ny state discovery violation ... only have assisted ... [the defendant] in [perhaps] preventing” the use of relevant testimony against h…
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Salzero v. State, 697 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…ana, Inc., 368 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The purpose of the speedy trial rule is to assure a speedy trial, not a speedy discharge. State v. Thomas, 659 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (concurring opinion); see also State v. Joines, 549 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); State v. Brown, 527 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Had defendant stated his objection, the trial would have been set for an earlier date, and the defendant would have received the speedy trial he says he desired. There…
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Pruitt v. State, 682 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…2d 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Appellate courts must remain detached, neutral and unemotional in such matters. The bottom line is, appellate courts should not fiddle with completely legal sentences. I would deny certiorari review. See State v. Joines, 549 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Leon County v. Mitchell, 611 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).…
Authorities Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972)
- Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1983)
- State v. Brown, 527 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Granade v. Honorable Marshall H. Ader, 530 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Hillier v. Purdy, 354 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)