RAYMOND M. PERRAS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, holding that a negotiated plea was voluntary even though a probationary period was added to the incarceration term. The court distinguished this case from a prior ruling where a plea was deemed involuntary due to lack of notice about additional probation.
No, the negotiated plea was voluntary. Unlike in a prior case, the trial court did not make representations about the sentence, and the appellant acknowledged understanding the potential penalties and that the sentence was up to the court.
[1] A negotiated plea agreement is not rendered involuntary solely because the trial court imposes a probationary period, even if not explicitly detailed in the agreement, wh…
[2] A trial court's imposition of a probationary period beyond the explicit terms of a negotiated plea agreement is erroneous when the defendant was not informed of the possi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Regarding appellant’s argument under Point III that his negotiated plea was involuntary inasmuch as he was never informed that an additional probationary period could and would be added to his negotiated term of incarceration, we distinguish the holding in Jefferson v. State, 515 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), from the circumstances of the instant case.”
Introduces the main legal issue and the court's intention to distinguish from precedent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant pleaded guilty as part of a negotiated plea agreement. He later sought post-conviction relief, arguing his plea was involuntary because he w…
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
We affirm the trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief. Regarding appellant’s argument under Point III that his negotiated plea was involuntary inasmuch as he was never informed that an additional probationary period could and would be added to his negotiated term of incarceration, we distinguish the holding in Jefferson v. State, 515 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), from the circumstances of the instant case. Significantly, in Jefferson, the trial court explicitly stated that it would sentence the defendant within a certain range of incarceration, after which the defendant signed a written plea agreement stating that he would be sentenced within that particular range.
Thus, this Court found that the trial court’s imposition of an additional eight years probation was erroneous, as the defendant had never been informed that an additional probationary period could be added to his negotiated term of incarceration or given an opportunity to withdraw his plea once it became apparent that the court intended to impose a greater term of supervision.
In contrast, the instant negotiated plea stated only that the state would not seek a sentence outside of the guidelines range; the court did not make any similar representation as in Jefferson. Further, appellant’s petition to enter the plea reflected that he understood the mandatory minimum penalty for the charge as well as the maximum possible sentence therefor, that the sentence was up to the court only, and that the agreement was entered into freely and voluntarily. At sentencing, the state stood by its agreement and did not seek a sentence outside of the recommended guidelines range.
Moreover, appellant did receive a guideline sentence as the 15-year probationary period did not account for a portion of his sentence. Cigelski v. State, 453 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), pet. for rev. den., 459 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.1984).
AFFIRMED,
SHIVERS, C.J., and WENTWORTH, J., concur.
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Spacco v. State, 739 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…ion relief); see also Allen v. State, 710 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Bouie v. State, 360 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA); Green v. Dugger, 575 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Jefferson v. State, 515 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Cf. Perras v. State, 550 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), rev. denied, 562 So. 2d 346 (Fla.1990) (where court did not agree to specific sentence and state abided by its agreement and did not request probation, split sentence imposed by court did not render defendant’s plea involuntary)…
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Jennings v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)…on v. State, 515 So. 2d 407, 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (holding that the court violated the plea agreement because it did not inform the ---PAGE 3--- 3 defendant that an additional probationary period would be imposed). However, in Perras v. State, 550 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), this court distinguished Jefferson, holding that there is a key difference between the court stating that it will sentence a defendant within a certain range under an agreement and the State agreeing to seek a sentence within a…
Authorities Cited
- Jefferson v. State, 515 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Cigelski v. State, 453 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)