B. B. DANIELS, ESTELLE BURNSED AND MICHAEL CARTER, A MARRIED WOMAN, WHO SUES BY HER HUSBAND, JOE CARTER, APPELLANTS,
v.
CLARA MERCER, SAMUEL M. MERCER, J. LUDY MERCER, CORA KNOWLES AND SOLON STARLING, A MINOR, APPELLEES
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld the validity of a deed conveying homestead real estate from Adam M. Mercer and his wife to three of their children in 1917, rejecting the claim that the conveyance was an illegal attempt to devise property contrary to the Florida Constitution.
The deed was a valid conveyance because it was duly executed by both the homestead owner and his wife, stated valuable consideration, the complainants failed to prove that no consideration was paid, and the reservation of user rights did not prevent passage of title when the deed was delivered.
“An alienation of the homestead may be to some of the children of the homestead owner if it is duly made in good faith for an appropriate consideration and for no illegal purpose.”
Establishes the legal standard for valid homestead conveyances to children
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1917, Adam M. Mercer, owner of homestead real estate, and his wife executed a deed conveying the homestead to three of their children for stated co…
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It appears that Adam M. Mercer, the owner of homestead real estate, in 1917 joined by his wife, “for and in consideration of the sum of one dollar and other valuable considerations to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged,” executed a deed of conveyance of the homestead lands to *363three of their children, the owner of the homestead having other living adnlt children or their descendants. The deed of conveyance was delivered to one of the grantees who kept it in his possession and had it recorded in 1921. The wife who joined in executing the conveyance of the homestead died and the husband thereafter married twice, the last wife surviving the husband who died while still living on the homestead, the conveyance containing the following provision:
“It is understood by and between the parties hereto that the parties of the first part shall use and enjoy the said property during their life or lives, and at the death of both of the parties of the first part then the parties of the second part shall have the right to the immediate possession of the said property, and each and every part thereof and not before.”
In a bill of complaint brought in 1927 by children of a daughter of the homestead owner who was not among the grantees of the homestead, against the widow, the grantees in the deed and a minor grandchild of the homesteader, praying for a cancellation of the deed conveying the homestead and for partition thereof, it is alleged that when the deed was executed the homestead owner
“made and executed a will disposing of all his property with the exception of the land so' deeded * * by which the said Adam M. Mercer disinherited your orators, who are his grandchildren, and made no provision for them; ’ ’
that
“the grantees in said deed did not pay any consideration therefor; that said deed was in truth and fact only an attempt on the part of Adam M. Mercer to devise and dispose o'f his homestead contrary to the Constitution and Laws of the State of Florida.”
The defendants by answer,
“ deny that the said deed was an attempt on the part of Adam M. Mercer to dispose of his homestead so as to *364defeat the interest of any of the parties named in this bill of complaint; and they deny that the grantees in said deed did not pay any consideration, therefor; and they deny that said deed was an attempt of Adam M. Mercer to devise and dispose of his homestead contrary to the Constitution and laws of the State of Florida; but they state the fact to be that said conveyance was a bona fide conveyance of said property for good and valuable consideration to said grantees, and that while the said Adam M. Mercer, under the terms of said deed together with his wife, did enjoy the use of said property during their said lives, that since the date of the said deed the fee simple title of said land has vested exclusively in Samuel M. Mercer, J. Luby Mercer, and Cora Knowles, defendants, herein.”
On final hearing the bill of complaint was dismissed and the complainants appealed.
Under the constitution the owner of a homestead may alienate the homestead real estate by deed “duly exe-' cuted by himself or herself, and by husband and wife, if such relation exists.” Section 4, Article X. An alienation of the homestead may be to some of the children of the homestead owner if it is duly made in good faith for an appropriate consideration and for no illegal purpose.
In this case the deed alienating the homestead was duly executed by the homestead owner and his wife. It states a valuable consideration for its execution and the complainants did not sustain their allegation that “the grantees in said deed did not pay any consideration therefor.” The grantors were dead. There is substantial evidence that a valuable consideration was paid. The reservation in the deed as to user did not stop the passage of title to the grantees when the deed was delivered and the deed is not shown by “its terms or otherwise” to be in effect a will.
On the whole record the complainants failed to duly *365prove the facts essential to the relief prayed and the bill of complaint was properly dismissed.
Affirmed.
Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur.
Buford, 0. J., and Ellis and Brown, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Neva S. Norman v. Cora Tanner Kannon, 133 Fla. 710 (Fla. 1938)…mestead exemption for the protection of the family. Hart v. Gulf Fertilizer Co., 91 Fla. 991, 108 So. 886; Byrd v. Byrd, 73 Fla. 322, 74 So. 313; Wright v. Wright, 75 Fla. 7, 77 So. 616; Shad v. Smith, 74 Fla. 324, 76 So. 897. In Daniels v. Mercer, 105 Fla. 362, 141 So. 189, a consideration was paid for the conveyance to some of the children under circumstances that did not violate the Constitution or the applicable statute. In Rawlins v. The Dade Lumber Company, 80 Fla. 398, 86 So. 334, there were no chi…
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Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schreiber, 479 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1985)…y, joined by the spouse if married, could convey the property, even if there were children to whom it would descend upon the death of the owner, but only for a valuable consideration. Regero v. Daugherty, 69 So. 2d 178 (Fla.1953); Daniels v. Mercer, 105 Fla. 362, 141 So. 189 (1932). This holding was in keeping with the constitutional policy of preserving the family homestead as a means of providing continued shelter to the family. Without valuable consideration, a conveyance of the homestead was void. See,…
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Fla. Nat. Bank Tr. Co. v. Brown, 47 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1949)…principal thing, and the mortgage an accessory, and that the transfer of the debt ipso facto carries with it the security." "The holder of the note may discard the mortgage entirely, and sue and recover on the note." The case of Daniels v. Mercer, 105 Fla. 362, 141 So. 189, involved a deed or conveyance by the owner of a homestead to three of his children and excluded other adult children and their descendants. The wife of the owner joining in the conveyance died and the husband married twice thereafter.…
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