KENNETH JEROME THOMPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1989-11-02
No. 88-2273
THOMPSON and MINER, JJ., concur.
551 So. 2d 1248 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1989) Positive Treatment
Cited by 25 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Kenneth Thompson was arrested after officers found cocaine in his shoes during a pat-down search at a pool hall. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the search of Thompson's shoes exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry frisk because the officer admitted he was not looking for a weapon.


Holding

The court held that the search was unconstitutional. While the officer had reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Thompson based on cocaine found near him, he lacked probable cause to arrest him. More importantly, the search of Thompson's shoes exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry frisk because the officer admitted he was not specifically looking for a weapon but rather for contraband.


Headnotes

[1] A pat-down search is permissible to disclose the presence of a weapon, but may not exceed the frisk of outer clothing unless the pat-down or other circumstances lead the…

[2] An officer may not search the inside of a suspect's shoes for contraband unless the officer reasonably believes the object concealed might be a weapon.

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Key Quotes

“An officer may not continue to search the inside of a suspect's shoes in the hopes of finding contraband unless the officer reasonably believes the object concealed might be a weapon.”

Establishes the legal standard limiting searches beyond outer clothing in Terry frisks

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Facts & Procedural History

Jacksonville deputies conducted a routine premises check of a pool hall on June 24, 1988. Officer Beckman observed three pieces of rock cocaine on the…

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Opinion of the Court
SMITH, Judge.

SMITH, Judge.

Appellant pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine, reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Appellant contends that the cocaine was seized as a result of an illegal pat-down search. We reverse.

Jacksonville deputies conducted a routine premises check of the E & Y Diner, a pool hall, on the evening of June 24, 1988. Officer Beckman testified that many times when the officers enter the pool hall they see people throwing down guns and drugs, but he didn’t see anybody throwing down anything on this evening. The officers asked everybody to step next to the wall so they could look under the pool tables and booths set up in the hall. After appellant stepped away, Officer Beckman noticed three pieces of rock cocaine on the floor within a foot of where appellant was standing. Officer Beckman did not see who dropped the cocaine and had no idea how long the cocaine had been on the floor. There was another subject that was standing to the right of appellant in close proximity to the cocaine. Beckman searched both men. After patting down appellant and finding no weapons, Officer Beckman instructed appellant to remove his shoes where he found two pieces of crack cocaine. At this point, appellant was arrested for possession.

When Beckman was asked why he had appellant remove his shoes, he answered: “Well, it’s a convenient hiding spot that many people have used to hide crack cocaine or marijuana or razor blades1 or possibly even a pocket knife of some sort.” Later Beckman was asked if he was specifically looking for a weapon when he had appellant empty his shoes and he responded: “Not specifically, no.” Beckman also testified that appellant could have refused to empty his shoes and Beckman “probably” would have let appellant go. Beck-man did not testify that he told appellant that appellant could refuse to empty his shoes.

We agree with appellant that to go beyond the temporary stop justified by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the police must have some additional articulable suspicions that the person they have stopped may be armed with a dangerous weapon. If they do, the police may conduct a frisk or pat-down necessary to disclose the presence of a weapon.

However, the search may not exceed the pat-down of the suspect’s outer clothing, unless that pat-down or other circumstances leads the officer to believe that the suspect has a weapon on his person. An officer may not continue to search the inside of a suspect’s shoes in the hopes of finding contraband unless the officer reasonably believes the object concealed might be a weapon. In this case, since as Beck-man candidly admitted he was not looking for a weapon in appellant’s shoes, he exceeded the permissible scope of an investigatory pat-down by asking appellant to remove his shoes, and the subsequent seizure of cocaine was invalid. Jordan v. State, 544 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Walker v. State, 514 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Baldwin v. State, 418 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); and Dunn v. State, 382 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).

Beck-man’s testimony that appellant could “pos sibly” have had a pocket knife in his shoe did not save the search. White v. State, 458 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Although we find that Officer Beck-man had a reasonable founded suspicion and could temporarily detain appellant when he saw rock cocaine in plain view near where appellant was standing, this founded suspicion did not rise to the level of probable cause to arrest appellant for possession so that the subsequent search could be validated as a search incident to lawful arrest. As this court said in Edwards v. State, 532 So. 2d 1311, 1314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), mere proximity to contraband found in a public place and in the vicinity of several other people does not warrant a finding that the person or persons closest to the contraband possessed it.

REVERSED.

THOMPSON and MINER, JJ., concur. . It is commonly known that razor blades are used by cocaine users to "draw a line” for ingestion. Robinson v. State, 547 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).


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Citator

Cited By (14 total)

  • Hines v. State, 737 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
    …search, performed after officer stopped defendant for noncriminal traffic infraction and issued citation, did not give rise to probable cause for officer to reach into defendant’s pocket [*1188] and seize piece of crack cocaine); Thompson v. State, 551 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (officer who pats down defendant’s outer clothing after temporary stop, based on suspicion that he may be armed with dangerous weapon, may not continue to search inside defendant’s shoe in hope of finding contraband unless office…
  • Hatcher v. State, 834 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
    …officer the authority to frisk the occupants of the vehicle, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed with a dangerous weapon. Smith v. State, 735 So. 2d 570, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citing Richardson; Thompson v. State, 551 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)); see also C.Q. “Examples of types of conduct which may constitute articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous include: (1) the suspect’s failure to cooperate, (2) the suspect’s furti…
    1 / 2
  • C.G. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …cted by an officer in a stop and frisk situation may not extend beyond a pat down of a suspect’s outer clothing unless that pat down or other circumstances leads the officer to conclude that the suspect has a weapon on his person. Thompson v. State, 551 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Meeks v. State, 356 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA). In Richardson v. State, 599 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), the first district concluded that in order to conduct a Terry frisk, an officer must have some articulable suspicion to bel…

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