GEORGE W. JOHNSON AND IRENE M. JOHNSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
THOMAS BEDNAR, APPELLEE
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Sellers of a business violated a covenant not to compete, were enjoined, and then violated the injunction. The trial court held them in contempt and imposed a $25,000 fine. The sellers appealed, challenging the evidentiary standard, the fine amount, and the lack of a purging provision, but the appellate court affirmed the contempt order.
The contempt order was properly entered because the trial court found the violations were done knowingly and in willful disregard of the final judgment, which is tantamount to a clear and convincing evidence standard. Coercive fines in contempt proceedings need not bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages. A purging provision is not required when only a fine is imposed rather than incarceration.
[1] A contempt order may be affirmed when the trial court finds violations were committed knowingly and in willful disregard of a final judgment, which language is tantamount…
[2] Coercive fines may be imposed in contempt proceedings to compel compliance with a judgment without resorting to imprisonment.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the violations were done "knowingly and in willful disregard of the Final Judgment." Such language is tantamount to a finding that the evidence was clear and convincing.”
Establishes that the trial court's finding satisfied the clear and convincing evidence standard required for contempt, avoiding a debate over the evidentiary burden.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGeorge and Irene Johnson sold a business to Thomas Bednar subject to a covenant not to compete. The Johnsons violated the covenant, and a final judgme…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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LETTS, Judge.
This case involves the sale of a business followed by violations of a covenant not to compete, resulting in an injunction against the sellers. The violations continued and a contempt order, the subject of this appeal, ensued. We affirm.
The sellers first argue that the contempt order must be reversed because it is based on a preponderance of the evidence standard, whereas the requirement for a contempt order is clear and convincing evidence. We avoid any debate over this complex question by simply relying on the order here appealed, wherein the trial court found that the violations were done “knowingly and in willful disregard of the Final Judgment.” Such language is tantamount to a finding that the evidence was clear and convincing.
The sellers next argue that the trial court erred in assessing a $25,000 fine to be paid to the buyers. As the sellers see it, the fine must bear a reasonable relationship to the actual damages suffered by the aggrieved party. They cite Balzam v. Cohen, 427 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Apart from the fact that the record does not demonstrate that the fine did not bear such a reasonable relationship, we, in the fourth district, have disavowed Balzam and have held that coercive fines can be imposed in contempt proceedings:
A coercive fine may be appropriate in order to force the contemnor to comply with the judgment without resorting to the more drastic step of jailing the offending [party].
Florida Coast Bank of Pompano Beach v. Mayes, 433 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), petition for rev. dismissed, 453 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1984).
The only other argument which we address is the sellers’ contention that the trial court erred in not providing a purging provision. Such a contention would be sustainable if incarceration had been ordered, but a purge provision is not required if the contemnor does not need a key to his prison cell. In the case at bar, the trial court did not impose imprisonment. See Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274 (Fla.1985). A purging provision, therefore, was unnecessary.
We find no merit in the other points on appeal.
AFFIRMED.
ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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Johnson v. Bednar, 573 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1991)…KOGAN, Justice. We have for review Johnson v. Bednar, 552 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), based on conflict with Balzam v. Cohen, 427 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. In 1983 petitioners sold to respondent the capital stock of a water-conditioning business. Their ag…
Authorities Cited
- Eugenia Bowen & the Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1985)
- Fla. Coast Bank OF Pompano Beach v. Mayes, 433 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Brickell Shores Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. 1440 Corp., 427 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Balzam v. Cohen, 427 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)