STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
JOHN A. CARTER, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1989-12-07
No. 74336
OVERTON, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur., McDonald, SHAW and GRIMES, JJ., dissent.
553 So. 2d 169 Florida Supreme Court (1989) Positive Treatment
Cited by 18 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to credit for earned gain-time when a new sentence is imposed following revocation of probation, even though the defendant had been released from the original sentence due to accrued gain-time. This decision resolved a certified question of great public importance regarding sentencing credits in probation revocation cases.


Holding

A defendant is entitled to include earned gain-time when computing time served to credit against a sentence imposed after revocation of probation which is part of a probationary split sentence.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant is entitled to credit for earned gain-time when a new sentence is imposed for violation of probation.

[2] Earned gain-time must be included when computing time served to credit against a sentence imposed after revocation of probation that is part of a probationary split sente…

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“is entitled to include earned gain-time when computing time served to credit against the sentence imposed after revocation of probation which is part of a probationary split sentence”

States the holding regarding entitlement to gain-time credit in probation revocation cases

Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

In 1985, Carter was convicted of lewd and lascivious assault and sentenced to five years' incarceration followed by ten years' probation. He was relea…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
EHRLICH, Chief Justice.

EHRLICH, Chief Justice.

We have for review Carter v. State, 552 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (on rehearing), in which the First District Court of Appeal certified the following as a question of great public importance: Id., slip op. at 204. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. [W]hether a defendant is entitled to credit for earned gain-time where a new sentence is imposed for violation of probation.

In 1985, respondent Carter was convicted of lewd and lascivious assault and sentenced to five years’ incarceration followed by ten years’ probation.1 Carter was released in 1987 due to accrued gain-time. Shortly thereafter, Carter was charged with and convicted of battery. His probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to ten years’ incarceration followed by five years’ probation, and was given 923 days’ credit for time served, representing both the actual time spent in prison on the original five-year sentence and time spent in jail following his arrest for battery. Carter requested, but was denied, credit for gain-time earned during his first term of incarceration. The First District Court of Appeal reversed on the authority of Green v. State, 539 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

We recently approved the First District Court’s decision in Green. State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla.1989). In that case, we held that a defendant “is entitled to include earned gain-time when computing time served to credit against the sentence imposed after revocation of probation which is part of a probationary split sentence.”2 Id. at 927. Therefore, we answer the certified question in this case in the affirmative, and approve the decision of the district court below.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur. McDonald, SHAW and GRIMES, JJ., dissent.

. This is a valid probationary split sentence under this Court's decision in Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1988).

. We note that the legislature recently amended sections 944.28 and 948.06, Florida Statutes, to add revocation of probation to the list of circumstances justifying forfeiture of gain-time. Ch. 89-526, §§ 6, 8, Laws of Fla. However, both of these amendments become effective September 1, 1990, id. section 52, and are not applicable to this case.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • L.C. Bradley v. State, 631 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1994)
    …tober 1, 1989. Even this Court made the observation that as of September 1, 1990, the legislature had amended sections 944.28 and 948.06 to add revocation of probation to the list of circumstances suggesting forfeiture of gain time. State v. Carter, 553 So. 2d 169 (Fla.1989). In making this statement, however, we cited chapter 89-526 and made no reference to chapter 89-531. On the other hand, in Tripp v. State, 622 So. 2d 941 (Fla.1993), we noted that chapter 89-531, which became effective October 1, 1989, se…
  • Glass v. State, 574 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1991)
    …to require an initial imposition of the total sentence. Further, in Poore we disapproved the opinion of the district court of appeal which had held that there is no statutory authority for probationary split sentences. Finally, in State v. Carter, 553 So. 2d 169 (Fla.1989), we upheld the validity of a probationary split sentence in the face of the district court of appeal opinion which once again questioned the statutory authority for such a sentence. We acknowledge that Glass makes a legitimate argument f…
  • Glass v. State, 556 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
    …leave us no latitude to vacate the sentence as not being one of the alternatives expressly authorized in section 921.187, Florida Statutes. See Carter v. State, 552 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA) (Judges Barfield and Zehmer, specially concurring), aff'd, 553 So. 2d 169 (Fla.1989). Accordingly, we affirm the split sentence imposed but certify to the supreme court the follow [*467] ing question as one of great public importance: DOES A DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION RESULT PROM THE IMPOSITION OF A PROBATIONARY SPLIT SE…

Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw