CHARLES THOMAS REZNER, APPELLANT,
v.
KAREN CARMEN REZNER, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1989-12-06
No. 88-2156
ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
553 So. 2d 334 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1989) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the husband challenges the trial court's award of permanent alimony to the wife and the division of marital property. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding permanent alimony to a self-supporting wife and by distributing 80% of marital assets to the wife ostensibly as lump sum alimony to cover her attorney's fees.


Holding

The court reversed both the permanent alimony award and the disproportionate asset distribution. The wife's self-supporting status and substantial earning capacity as a teacher and former real estate salesperson precluded an award of permanent alimony. Additionally, attorney's fees cannot justify a disparate division of marital assets, and lump sum alimony is not a vehicle to assure payment of attorney's fees.


Headnotes

[1] An award of permanent periodic alimony is an abuse of discretion when the recipient spouse has the ability to become self-supporting and the award results in a greater di…

[2] Marital assets should be divided equally unless there is a showing of disparity in contribution or other justification for disparate treatment.

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Key Quotes

“with the husband supporting two of the children without any support flowing from the wife the result is to make their positions substantially unequal”

Establishes why the alimony award was improper given the husband's burden of supporting two children without reciprocal support from the wife

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Facts & Procedural History

The parties have three children; the wife has primary custody of one child and receives child support, while the husband has primary custody of the ot…

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Opinion of the Court
WARNER, Judge.

WARNER, Judge.

The husband appeals a final judgment of dissolution claiming that the award of permanent alimony to the wife and the division of the marital property amounted to an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. We agree and reverse.

The wife has primary physical custody of one minor child and receives child support for this child. The husband has primary physical custody of the parties’ other two children. Despite the fact that the income of both parties was insufficient to meet their respective expenses, the wife received an award of permanent periodic alimony which resulted in her having a greater disposable income than the husband.1 The wife contends that the trial court was attempting to equalize their respective positions. However, with the husband supporting two of the children without any support flowing from the wife the result is to make their positions substantially unequal.

Furthermore, the wife has the ability to become and is in fact self supporting. She is a teacher who has advanced rapidly since re-entering this profession. Her income is more than two-thirds of her husband’s current income. The wife has also been a very successful real estate salesperson in the past, at one time selling $500,000 of real property in one month. With this kind of support ability on behalf of the wife the award of permanent alimony to the wife was an abuse of discretion. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). See also Contogeorgos v. Contogeorgos, 482 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), and Wismar v. Wismar, 522 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).

We also reverse the award to the wife of the husband’s interest in the marital home as lump sum alimony. That distribution to the wife resulted in the wife receiving 80% of the marital assets.2 We have held in Longo v. Longo, 533 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), that marital assets should be divided equally unless there is some showing of disparity in contribution or other justification to warrant the disparate treatment. The trial court expressed no justification except that it was awarded as “lump sum alimony and in full payment of Respondent’s obligation towards Petitioner’s attorney fees and costs.” Compensation for attorney’s fees is not a justification for disparate division of marital assets under Canakaris, Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), aff'd 466 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1985), or any other decided authority. Lump sum alimony is a method with which to satisfy support obligations, special claims, or equitable disposition of interests in jointly held properties. Tronconi, 466 So. 2d at 205. It is not a vehicle to assure payment of attorneys fees. In addition, the amount of attorney’s fees claimed here was only about one-fourth of the value of the husband’s one-half interest in the home. Therefore, even under the trial court’s rationale, the wife would be substantially overcompensated for her attorney’s fees.

There are in this case other factors in the record which may justify a disparate division of marital assets or the award of lump sum alimony to the wife. Whether and to what extent these factors are sufficient to justify the division made by the trial court absent the justification of attorneys fees is properly left to the trial court’s resolution, and we remand for the trial court to rede termine the equitable distribution of marital assets and lump sum alimony. Furthermore, the trial court will have to evaluate the request for attorneys fees on behalf of the wife after it distributes the marital assets.

Finally, on remand the trial court should provide for payment of the parties’ credit card debts which was not addressed in the final judgment. See Italiane v. Italiane, 342 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur. . Our result therefore takes into account the amended final judgment which changed the primary physical residence of one of the children. While by order it appeared that this court had denied a motion to supplement the record with this order, that was in fact an error. . The husband has also claimed that the wife received the balance of their money market account which was not considered by the trial court. Including those monies, the wife received more than 80 percent.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Mayers v. Mayers, 575 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
    …inuing responsibility, if any, on the part of the husband, in the form of alimony and to make an award of attorney’s fees, in light of the equitable distribution of the marital assets in accordance with the following authority. See Renzer v. Renzer, 553 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Zachary v. Zachary, 551 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Clemson v. Clemson, 546 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Harris v. Harris, 498 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Hiler v. Hiler, 442 So. 2d 373 (Fla.2d DCA 1983); Section 61.075,…
  • Ennis v. Ennis, 613 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
    …re the trial court does not support an award of permanent periodic alimony. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 303 So. 2d 629 (Fla.1974); Siegel v. Siegel, 564 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Fulks v. Fulks, 558 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Rezner v. Rezner, 553 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Griffith v. Griffith, 528 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Evans v. Evans, 443 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Snider v. Snider, 371 So. 2d 1056 (Fla.3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1202 (Fla.1980); Peck v. Peck, 291 So.…

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