MICHELLE E. KRANTZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michelle Krantz pleaded nolo contendere to first-degree arson for setting fire to an unoccupied vehicle in a parking lot. The appellate court reversed, holding that the statute's distinction between first-degree and second-degree arson turns on human occupancy, and an unoccupied vehicle cannot support a first-degree charge.
An unoccupied vehicle does not constitute the type of occupied or likely-to-be-occupied structure required for first-degree arson under Florida law. The crime should have been charged as second-degree arson, and the conviction is reversed.
[1] Setting fire to an unoccupied vehicle in a parking lot constitutes second-degree arson, not first-degree arson, under Florida law.
[2] The definition of "structure" for the purposes of Florida's arson statutes includes vehicles.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the difference between first degree arson and second degree arson concerns primarily human occupancy. If the structure burned is occupied or likely to be occupied then the crime is the greater first degree arson. If not, then the crime is the lesser second degree arson.”
Establishes the controlling legal distinction between the two arson degrees under Florida law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant set fire to an unoccupied automobile parked in a shopping center parking lot at the behest of the car's owner. The vehicle was located appro…
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DAUKSCH, Judge.
Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to the charge of first degree arson. Her motion to dismiss the charge had been denied in face of her challenge to the evidence in support of it. Rule 3.190(c)(4), Fla.R. Crim.P. The facts are not in dispute. Appellant set fire to an unoccupied automobile which was parked in a shopping center parking lot. This was done at the behest of the owner of the car. Arson is proscribed by section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1987).
806.01 Arson.—
(1)Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged:
(a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents;
(b) Any structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present, such as: Jails, prisons, or detention centers; hospitals, nursing homes, or other health care facilities; department stores, office buildings, business establishments, churches, or educational institutions during normal hours of occupancy; or other similar structures; or (c)Any other structure that he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe was occupied by a human being, is guilty of arson in the first degree, which constitutes a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged any structure, whether the property of himself or another, under any circumstances not referred to in subsection (1), is guilty of arson in the second degree, which constitutes a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.-083, or s. 775.084.
(3) As used in this chapter, “structure” means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft.
As can be seen, the difference between first degree arson and second degree arson concerns primarily human occupancy. If the structure burned is occupied or likely to be occupied then the crime is the greater first degree arson. If not, then the crime is the lesser second degree arson. Here the “structure” was a vehicle in a parking lot 200 feet from the nearest building. It was unoccupied and burned on purpose by appellant and the owner for some reason.
Therefore, this is a second degree arson case, should have been charged as such, and it was error for the court to not have reduced the charged crime to second degree arson.
The conviction is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for second degree arson and to resentence.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
SHARP and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
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Stevens v. State, 226 So. 3d 787 (Fla. 2017)…first-and second-degree arson—the primary difference is human occupancy. See § 806.01, Fla. Stat.; Neilson v. State, 713 So. 2d 1110, 1111-12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (noting that occupancy is an essential element of first-degree arson); Krantz v. State, 553 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (“[T]he difference between first degree arson and second degree arson concerns primarily human occupancy.”). Because the offenses appear separate on the face of the statute and—under limited circumstances—second-degree arso…
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Smith v. State, 559 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…count II of the judgment dated September 26, 1988, should be reduced from a third degree felony to a first degree misdemeanor. The state admitted that the evidence failed to show that the victim suffered “serious” bodily injury. Cf. Krantz v. State, 553 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). This will no doubt further affect defendant’s scoresheet and, possibly, [*1284] his sentence.5 Judgment and sentence dated April 12, 1989, VACATED; REMANDED for further proceedings. GOSHORN, J., concurs. HARRIS, J., dissents…
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Stevens v. State, 195 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…e arson was required in this case thus requires understanding the-' relationship between first- and second-degreé arson under section 806.01. The difference between the two offenses primarily relates to the issue of human occupancy. Krantz v. State, 553 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (“As can be seen, the difference between first degree arson and second degree arson concerns primarily human occupancy.”). First-degree arson involves the burning of a building,-and sometimes the contents of a building, that…