GROVER B. REED
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a death row inmate's postconviction motion. The inmate sought relief based on new U.S. Supreme Court rulings regarding jury findings for death penalty eligibility, but the court found these rulings did not apply retroactively to his case, which became final before the relevant decisions.
No, the court held that the Hurst decisions do not apply retroactively to defendants like Reed whose death sentences were final before Ring v. Arizona. The court found that Reed's jury had unanimously found at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, satisfying the requirements of the applicable precedent.
[1] The retroactive application of Hurst v. …
[2] A jury must unanimously find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt for a death sentence to be valid.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Accordingly, we ordered Reed to show cause as to why we should not affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to our decision in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 217 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017), which precludes the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State to defendants (like Reed) whose sentences of death were final when Ring was decided.”
Explains the initial basis for affirming the lower court's denial, based on precedent regarding non-retroactivity.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGrover B. Reed, sentenced to death in 1990, filed a successive postconviction motion seeking relief based on subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions i…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM. We have for review Grover B. Reed’s appeal of the trial court’s order denying Reed’s successive postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. In his motion, Reed sought relief from his sentence of death, raising claims predicated on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and this Court’s decision on remand in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from by State v. Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S41 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020). Reed’s sentence of death became final in 1990, before the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). See Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d
- 2 - 203 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882 (1990). Accordingly, we ordered Reed to show cause as to why we should not affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to our decision in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 217 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017), which precludes the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State to defendants (like Reed) whose sentences of death were final when Ring was decided. Since then, however, we decided Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S41, which is dispositive here. Pursuant to Poole, there is no Hurst v. Florida or Hurst v. State error in Reed’s case because a unanimous jury finding establishes the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. See Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly at S48 (“reced[ing] from Hurst v. State except to the extent it requires a jury unanimously to find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt” as required by Hurst v. Florida); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707 (2020) (holding that, under Hurst v. Florida, “a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible,” but that a jury “is not constitutionally required to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or to make the ultimate sentencing decision within the relevant sentencing range”). In Reed’s case, two of the four statutory aggravating circumstances found by the trial court—the capital felony was committed during the commission of a sexual battery and for pecuniary
- 3 - gain—are established because Reed’s jury found him guilty of the contemporaneous crimes of sexual battery and robbery. See Reed, 560 So. 2d at 204, 205 n.1. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying relief. It is so ordered. CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., concurs in result only with an opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (U.S. 2002)
- Hurst v. Florida., 136 S. Ct. 616 (U.S. 2016)
- Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017)
- Grover Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1990)
- McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702 (U.S. 2020)