CHRISTAN STARKES

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

Christan Starkes appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for certification of taxable costs pursuant to section 939.06, Florida Statutes (2014).

We agree that the trial court erred in finding the case had not been “discharged” within the meaning of the statute. For the reasons discussed below, we treat Mr. Starkes appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus and grant the relief requested. Facts The case began when a three-count information was filed against Mr. Starkes. During the pendency of that matter, Mr. Starkes was arrested and charged with one-count of felony Driving While License Suspended or Revoked (DWLSR) in a separate case. He eventually entered plea agreements in both cases and received concurrent ten-year sentences to be served in the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC).

Mr. Starkes later filed motions to withdraw the plea agreements. His motion was successful as to his plea to felony DWLSR; however, the trial court denied his motion as to the other case, and that ten-year sentence was left undisturbed. The revived case transitioned back into a pretrial status. This unique procedural posture resulted in Mr. Starkes remaining in county jail as opposed to DOC transfer. Upon being informed of Mr. Starkes’ continued residence in the county jail and of the State’s intention to prosecute the pending case, the trial court, sua sponte, dismissed the case to return him to the custody of the DOC. Despite objecting to the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal, the State declined to appeal.

Thus, the propriety of the trial court’s action in dismissing the case is not before us. Mr. Starkes then filed the motion at issue here, arguing that he had incurred certain costs while detained and that, because the case was discharged by the trial court, he was entitled to a certification of payment of taxable costs pursuant to section 939.06.1 The trial court denied the motion, finding its dismissal of the case did not constitute a “discharge” as contemplated by section 939.06. Specifically, the court concluded, “the dismissal was not the result of the State being lax in its prosecution or lacking sufficient evidence of guilt.” On appeal, Mr. Starkes argues that he is entitled to a certification of taxable costs because the plain language of section 939.06 fails to discriminate with respect to any given reason for a “discharge.” We agree.

Legal Analysis We review the trial court’s interpretation of section 939.06 de novo. See Payton v. State, 239 So. 3d 129, 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (noting that a lower court’s interpretation of statute and applicable case law is reviewed de novo).

Section 939.06 provides: A defendant in a criminal prosecution who is acquitted or discharged is not liable for any costs or fees of the court or any ministerial office, or for any charge of subsistence while detained in custody. If the defendant has paid any taxable costs, or fees required under s. 27.52(1)(b), in the case, the clerk or judge shall give him or her a certificate of the payment of such costs, with the items thereof, which, when audited and approved according to law, shall be refunded to the defendant. § 939.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added).

The plain language of the statute requires a criminal defendant be free from cost liability when his case terminates by “acquittal or discharge.” Although the term “discharged” appears to have a fluid meaning in Florida statutes and may have been interpreted to include defendants who have been acquitted as well as those who have had charges dropped or served their sentence, the language of section 939.06 itself shows that the Florida legislature discerns a distinction between defendants who are discharged and those who are acquitted. Volusia Cty., Fla. v. Carrin, 666 So. 2d 603, 604-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

When a defendant is acquitted of a crime, the charges are never actually “un-charged.” Instead, an acquittal operates as a verdict representing that the charges were litigated at a trial and affirmatively rejected by the fact-finder. A discharge, on the other hand, plainly refers to circumstances where a defendant was charged in a criminal case and later “un-charged” without a final verdict being reached—in other words, where the charges were later either withdrawn by the State via nolle prosequi or dismissed by a court, regardless of the underlying reasons. See Haines v. State, 80 So. 3d 1144, 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“A nolle prosequi by the state amounts to a ‘discharge’ entitling a defendant to a refund of costs under [section 939.06].”).

Dismissal of a criminal case does not necessarily indicate that a defendant is innocent or that the prosecution was not diligently pursued. Practical considerations often dictate a nolle prosequi by the State without reference to the merits of a charge. Mr. Starkes’ motion for certification of taxable costs was the proper first step for a defendant seeking relief under the statute. See Haines, 80 So. 3d at 1146. Once such a motion is filed, section 939.06 requires the trial court to determine whether the defendant has incurred any of the costs, fees, or charges covered by the statute before the acquittal or discharge of the case. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, Pinellas Cty. v. Sawyer, 620 So. 2d 757, 758 (Fla. 1993).

Where the defendant has paid any such “taxable costs or fees,” certification of the costs becomes a ministerial duty of the court in which it possesses no discretion. Haines, 80 So. 3d at 1146; Clark v. State, 570 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

The defendant must then obtain from the trial court an order directing that the defendant is entitled to a refund in the amount due. Haines, 80 So. 3d at 1146. Here, the trial court denied Mr. Starkes’ motion for costs finding that no “discharge” occurred within the meaning of section 939.06.

The trial court relied on State v. Crawford, 378 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Crawford had been criminally charged in county court with cruelty to animals, and he pleaded not guilty. Id. at 822. Before trial, the county court judge determined at an evidentiary hearing that Crawford’s health precluded him from physically tolerating the proceedings and dismissed the case. Id. After dismissal, Crawford moved for an order of discharge and taxation of costs pursuant to section 939.06.2 Id. The motion for costs was denied. Id.

On appeal to the circuit court, the denial was reversed. Id. at 822-23.

However, the Second District ultimately reversed the circuit court, reasoning: The only two situations in which a defendant is not liable for costs are when he is acquitted or when he is discharged. Here, Mr. Crawford was neither acquitted, nor was he discharged. While the county court did say that for all practical purposes Crawford was discharged by the dismissal, it is our opinion that the court did not mean that there had been a true discharge such as to bring sections 939.06 and 939.07 into operation. Rather, the court was simply stating the obvious. The dismissal occasioned by the defendant’s health had the practical effect of precluding further prosecution. Id. at 823.

In support of reversal in Crawford, the Second District’s opinion reasoned that “common sense and justice” leads to the conclusion that the “obvious purpose of sections 939.06 and 939.07 is to protect a defendant from costs when he is innocent or when the state fails to pursue a vigorous prosecution.”³ Four years after Crawford, the Second District issued a seemingly contrary opinion regarding application of section 939.06 in State ex rel. Cavanaugh v. Coe, 439 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).

In Coe, the Second District reversed a trial court’s denial of costs finding that a trial judge’s exercise of discretion in applying the statute was improper. Id. at 313.

The court stated as follows: The trial judge refused to issue the certificate on the theory that there was discretion to deny such costs when office, or for any charge of subsistence while detained in custody.” § 939.06, Fla. Stat. (1977) (emphasis added).³ Section 939.07, Florida Statutes, was repealed effective July¹, 2004.

“ . . . a person who factually is guilty . . . ” is found not guilty by the jury.

We find no such exception express or implied in the statute.

Therefore, we grant the petition and direct the trial judge to give petitioner a certificate of taxable costs which he may submit to the county for reimbursement. Id. Crawford limits entitlement to taxable costs under section 939.06 to only those defendants who are acquitted by a jury or where the State is lax in prosecution. 378 So. 2d at 823.

However, Coe condemns the use of discretion as no exceptions, express or implied, are contained within the statute. 439 So. 2d at 313. We decline to adopt the holding of Crawford.

We agree with the reasoning of Coe that section 939.06 does not empower the trial court with discretion regarding application. The plain and unambiguous language of the statute provides that defendants who are acquitted or discharged are not liable for certain enumerated costs. If such costs have been paid in these qualifying cases, the court “shall” provide a certification of payment in order that the defendant may seek reimbursement. If the Legislature intended to shield from cost liability only a defendant who was acquitted by a jury or whose case was discharged because the state was lax in its prosecution, it would have so stated.⁴ Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005).

Because the pending case against Mr. Starkes was discharged, under the plain language of section 939.06 the case qualifies for certification of taxable costs. Because the certification of any covered costs is a ministerial duty of the trial court, Mr. Starkes’ claims to relief are properly raised as a petition for writ of mandamus. See Haines, 80 So. 3d at 1146; F.

R. App. P. 9.040(c).

Accordingly, we certify conflict with Crawford, treat this appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus, grant the petition, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. B.L. THOMAS and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.⁴ The Florida Supreme Court has previously declared the language of section 939.06 to be “unequivocal.” Sawyer, 620 So. 2d at 758.