PAUL GORAL, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Paul Goral appeals his conviction for indirect criminal contempt and 60-day jail sentence. The Florida District Court of Appeal reverses because the trial court failed to follow mandatory procedural due process safeguards under Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 3.840.
The court reversed Goral's conviction and sentence because the trial court violated three mandatory procedural safeguards: (1) failing to issue a proper order to show cause as required by Rule 3.840(a)(1); (2) denying adequate notice and time to prepare a defense by providing only two working days' notice and erroneously denying the continuance motion; and (3) failing to afford Goral an opportunity to be heard prior to sentencing as required by Rule 3.840(a)(7).
[1] Procedural due process requires that an order to show cause be issued by the trial court before conducting a hearing for indirect criminal contempt.
[2] A motion for an order to show cause in an indirect criminal contempt proceeding cannot substitute for the order itself, as the order must be issued by the judge, predicat…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the procedural due process safeguards prescribed by Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.840(a)(l)-(7) were not followed in this case”
States the fundamental reason for reversal—violation of mandatory procedural requirements
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGoral was charged with indirect criminal contempt based on a motion filed by a court-appointed receiver. The trial court conducted a contempt hearing …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Indirect Criminal Contempt cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the defendant Paul Goral from an order adjudging him guilty of indirect criminal contempt and sentencing him to sixty days in the county jail. We reverse the judgment and sentence under review because, simply stated, the procedural due process safeguards prescribed by Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.840(a)(l)-(7) were not followed in this case.
First, no order to show cause, as prescribed by Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.840(a)(1), was ever issued by the trial court below; the court-appointed receiver below filed a motion for such an order, but the trial court never ruled on this motion. Instead, the trial court proceeded to conduct a contempt hearing based on this motion without ever having previously issued an order to show cause. Contrary to the state’s argument, the motion for the order to show cause cannot be treated, in itself, as an order to show cause because (a) the trial judge, and no one else, must issue such order, and (b) the order, unlike the instant motion, must be predicated on sworn proof and must apprise the defendant that he is being charged with indirect criminal contempt. Pugliese v. Pugliese, 347 So. 2d 422, 425-26 (Fla.1977); Paris v. Paris, 427 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Deter v. Deter, 353 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
Second, the defendant received only two actual working days notice of the contempt hearing and was therefore not afforded a reasonable time for preparation of his defense as required by Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.840(a)(1); his motion for continuance was erroneously denied below. The fact that the trial court conducted an additional hearing several days later and received more testimony does not, as urged, cure this due process error. Stramondo v. Dion, 408 So. 2d 858, 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
Finally, the defendant was not afforded an opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of sentence as required by Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.840(a)(7). The fact that the trial court stated it would later entertain a motion to mitigate the sentence does not cure this due process error. Stramondo, 408 So. 2d at 859-60.
The judgment and sentence under review is therefore reversed without prejudice to the institution of proper indirect criminal contempt proceedings upon remand.
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
-
Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…la. 4th DCA 1995). On remand, the trial court must support any decision concerning alimony with the statutorily required factual findings. We also hold that the notice for the hearing on the motion for contempt was insufficient. See Goral v. State, 553 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (two working days’ notice of contempt hearing does not afford the defendant a reasonable time to prepare his defense). Accordingly, we also reverse the contempt order. The husband, however, did not appeal the previously entered or…
-
Woolf v. Woolf, 901 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…Bresch v. Henderson, 761 So. 2d 449, 451 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). This requires that the alleged contemnor be provided with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. Two days notice is insufficient notice of a contempt hearing. Goral v. State, 553 So. 2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); see also J.B. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Children and Family Servs., 768 So. 2d 1060, 1066 (Fla.2000) (noting that two days notice has been held insufficient when far less impor…
-
Russ v. State, 622 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…ble time [be] allowed for preparation of the defense after service of the [*502] order on the defendant.” Here, the contempt hearing was held less than two days after service of the order to show cause. Due process requires more. See Goral v. State, 553 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (holding that notice of only two working days was not a reasonable time for preparation of a defense). Further, Russ’s motion for a continuance on the ground that his attorney could not be there because of the short notice was err…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rocco Pugliese v. Pugliese, 347 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977)
- Deter v. Dinina D. Deter, 353 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Offord v. State, 427 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Stramondo v. Dion, 408 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)